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Abstract 
 
Despite most educated people now accepting Darwinian explanations for human 
physical evolution, many of these same people remain reluctant to accept similar 
accounts of human behavioural or cognitive evolution. Leftists in particular often 
assume that our evolutionary history now has little bearing on modern human social 
behaviour, and that cultural processes have taken over from the biological imperatives 
at work elsewhere in nature. 
The leftist view of human nature still largely reflects that of Karl Marx, who 
believed that our nature is moulded solely by prevailing social and cultural conditions, 
and that, moreover, our nature can be completely changed by totally changing society. 
Ethical philosopher Peter Singer challenges this leftist view, arguing that the 
left must replace its non-Darwinian view of an infinitely malleable human nature with 
the more accurate scientific account now made possible by modern Darwinian 
evolutionary science. Darwinism, Singer suggests, could then be used as a source of 
new ideas and new approaches that could revive and revitalise the egalitarian left. 
This thesis defends and develops Singer’s arguments for a Darwinian left. It 
shows that much modern leftist opposition to evolutionary theory is misguided, and 
that Darwinism does not necessarily have the egregious political implications so often 
assumed by the egalitarian left – even in such controversial areas as possible 
‘biological’ differences between the sexes or between different human populations. 
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He who understands [a] baboon would do more towards metaphysics than Locke.  
Charles Darwin, Notebook M 
 
The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways – the point however is to change it. 
Karl Marx, Thesis on Feuerbach 
 
 
Foreword 
 
When I made a pilgrimage to Karl Marx’s tomb in Highgate Cemetery, London, the 
most human aspect that I noticed about his grandiose monument was the way in 
which the gravestones of lesser leftist revolutionaries appeared to jostle for position 
beneath their founding father’s imposing bust. It seemed as if the path of socialist 
glory had led but to this grave, and that, even in death, there was honour and acclaim 
to be gained through nearness to the left’s most dominant historical figure.  
If ever there is evidence of human beings’ inegalitarian desire for influence 
and status, it can perhaps be found in the grim irony of this commanding memorial to 
the champion of the proletariat. 
Those on the conservative right might use this to mock the very idea of 
creating a more egalitarian ‘socialist’ society. Human nature, they might argue, would 
not sustain a society in which each citizen was expected to give according to ability 
and to receive according to need. Human beings are just not like that. The very failure 
of Marxism when put into practice, they could say, clearly demonstrates that the left 
is mistaken in its beliefs about human malleability and, hence, about our ability to 
radically change the world. Given real human nature, it simply cannot be done. 
In ethical philosopher Peter Singer’s view, both sides are likely wrong: the left 
in its concept of an infinitely malleable human ‘species-being’, and the right in its 
belief that egalitarian social reform will always be stymied by constrained human 
nature. Singer lays out his argument in his slim manifesto, A Darwinian Left: Politics, 
evolution and cooperation. 
When I first read A Darwinian Left, I thought it contained a very simple and 
very useful message for the left: to realise our aspirations for how human society 
should be, we need to begin with an accurate understanding of what human beings 
actually are. Thus, the left must abandon its unrealistic Marxist concept of a 
malleable human nature in favour of the more realistic one provided by modern 
evolutionary science. Egalitarians could then use Darwinian reasoning to plan for a 
better and more equal future society, one that works with, rather than against, evolved 
human nature. What could be more straightforward than that? 
Having now completed a thesis on this ‘straightforward’ idea, I realise how 
naïve I had been. Not because I no longer think that Singer’s message is simple and 
useful; indeed, I believe more firmly than ever that a Darwinian perspective on human 
nature is essential to the left. Nor because I have concluded that evolutionary theory 
can tell us little that is politically relevant about modern human beings; in fact, I am 
increasingly aware of what evolutionary science (in the broadest sense) may reveal 
about the social and political behaviour of our fascinatingly complex and 
contradictory species.   
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Rather, I now appreciate how negatively many leftists, especially within the 
academic social sciences, continue to view ‘biological’ approaches to human 
behaviour. This has impacted on my thesis in ways that I had never initially 
envisaged. If the political manifesto presented in Singer’s A Darwinian Left is ever to 
gain traction, the left’s suspicions about Darwin must first be acknowledged and 
overcome – thus, much of the first half of my thesis is taken up assessing the left’s 
ongoing antipathy towards Darwinism. 
A problem with the whole nature/nurture debate, as I am now sadly aware, is 
that many of the protagonists on either side simply talk past each other. So, rather 
than accepting what evolutionists claim their opponents believe, I have focussed on 
what social scientists themselves actually say about Darwinism, most especially by 
examining the paradigm on human nature presented within introductory texts to the 
relevant disciplines.  
Having examined what many leftists fear must follow from a Darwinian view 
of human nature, I am able to argue that many of the standard leftist objections to 
Darwinism are premised on misunderstandings or misinterpretations of modern 
evolutionary theory.  
A major obstacle to the left even beginning to acknowledge the relevance of 
human evolution to modern social behaviour is how it inevitably appears to lead to 
suspect beliefs about human difference. Allaying these genuine and understandable 
fears, therefore, is a necessary task for any prospective Darwinian left.  
Two of the most problematic political issues that arise by taking human 
evolution seriously are the possibility of evolved differences between the sexes or 
between different racial populations. Any Darwinian approach to human social 
behaviour opens the door to these politically troubling issues, and while Singer 
largely ignores the question of sex and ‘race’ in A Darwinian Left, I have chosen not 
to shy away from this in my thesis.  
Here, I suggest that a Darwinian perspective on these subjects does not (or 
does not necessarily) carry the egregious political implications often assumed by the 
left, and, furthermore, that an evolutionary understanding of possible human genetic 
differences could be used to effect beneficial change for marginalised or oppressed 
people. 
In addition, the explosion in our knowledge of the human genome, and in our 
ability to manipulate human genes, has profound social and political implications. Yet 
if the left continues to distance itself from evolutionary science, egalitarian concerns 
and perspectives risk becoming increasingly sidelined. If nothing else, the left must 
become more conversant with evolutionary biology if it is to have any meaningful 
input into this debate; indeed, as I argue in Chapters 9-11, the left’s current 
uncertainty and confusion about human genetic diversity is potentially detrimental to 
the very people that egalitarians most wish to help.  
The first 11 chapters of my thesis, therefore, deal with the stumbling blocks to 
the left accepting Singer’s seemingly straightforward argument. In the final chapter, I 
turn to the issue with which Singer himself is most concerned: how a Darwinian 
appreciation of human behaviour may allow us to more fully critique modern 
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competitive capitalist societies, and, eventually, to move such societies in a more 
cooperative and more egalitarian direction. 
This informed critique of modern consumer society is, for me, the major 
appeal of Singer’s A Darwinian Left. Leftists are not faced with a choice between 
simply accepting competitive capitalism, on the one hand, or pretending that 
capitalism has not proved more successful than socialist alternatives, on the other. 
Rather, evolutionary-informed leftists could view capitalism as one means of 
channelling aspects of our nature in ways that provide some wider social good, but 
not necessarily the best one.  
The point is to change competitive capitalist society so that the benefits are 
more widely and more equitably shared, and so that our more cooperative 
predispositions are allowed to flourish. Yet we can only realise the dream of a more 
cooperative and more egalitarian future society by understanding what human nature 
really is. And for that we must turn to Darwin. 
 
 
 
 1 
What is man? This is surely one of the most important questions of all. For so much depends on our 
view of human nature. The meaning and purpose of human life, what we ought to do, and what we can 
hope to achieve – all these are fundamentally affected by whatever we think is the ‘real’ or ‘true’ nature 
of man.                                                                     
Leslie Stevenson, Seven Theories of Human Nature 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis examines, defends and develops the brief political manifesto presented in 
Peter Singer’s A Darwinian Left. The left, Singer claims, needs a new paradigm: 
weakened by the collapse of communism, the decline of the trade union movement 
and the adoption of market force principles by mainstream democratic socialist 
parties, the left has lost much of its former political power and intellectual influence. 
It is thus “urgently in need of new ideas and new approaches”.1  
Singer suggests a novel source of inspiration to revitalise the left, an approach 
based firmly on a modern evolutionary understanding of human social, political and 
economic behaviour: “It is time for the left to take seriously the fact that we are 
evolved animals, and that we bear the evidence of our inheritance, not only in our 
anatomy and our DNA, but in our behaviour too.”2 
To anyone ignorant of the dubious history of attempts to apply Darwinian 
reasoning to human society, this might appear a demand for the obvious: surely social 
theorists of all political hues must take the fact of human evolution seriously – after 
all, an understanding of our evolved nature appears crucial to answering what 
philosophers Michael Rosen and Jonathan Wolff call “the obvious question” at the 
heart of all political inquiry: “What are men, or rather, human beings, like?”3 Without 
a clear understanding of what human nature is, political planners cannot hope to 
adequately prescribe how human society ought to be.  
In an earlier critical discussion of ethics and human evolution, Singer 
highlights his belief that evolutionary theory “is absolutely essential for a proper 
understanding of human nature as well as human life and its conditions, laws, justice, 
and morality”.4 He extends this idea in A Darwinian Left, and argues that for his 
fellow leftists “an understanding of human nature in the light of evolutionary theory 
can help us to identify the means by which we may achieve some of our social and 
political goals, including various ideas of equality, as well as assessing the possible 
costs and benefits of doing so”.5 Here, Singer is not concerned with ‘the left’ as an 
organised political force, by rather with the broad body of thought about how to 
achieve a better and more equitable society.
6
 
In this thesis, I take Peter Singer’s Darwinian approach to human politics to be 
both sensible and reasonable. In other words, I fully accept Singer’s belief that if we 
wish to create a more egalitarian society we first need to understand what human 
beings are like, and that modern evolutionary theory is indispensable to answering the 
‘obvious question’ at the heart of all political thought.  
My defence of ‘leftist’ egalitarianism, therefore, is based on the belief that 
Darwinian evolutionary theory does not automatically preclude the hope of achieving 
a more equal society. This point must be emphasised – especially as many people (on 
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both the left and the right) assume that Darwinian theory is incompatible with 
egalitarian ideals. Furthermore, the left in particular often regards any Darwinian 
approach to politics, such as that advocated by Singer, not as simply sensible or 
reasonable, but as politically objectionable in and of itself.
7
 
This chapter provides an overview of why this is the case – why Singer’s call 
for the left to take human evolution seriously is more likely to appal than appeal to the 
very constituency at which it is aimed. Viewing human beings through a Darwinian 
lens (i.e., as evolved animals) is fraught with problems, most especially as any such 
approach appears to open the door to politically worrying ‘biological’ explanations 
for social inequity, most especially those regarding sexual or racial inequality. Singer 
himself skirts or ignores these issues. Nevertheless, before I can begin to discuss the 
potential political advantages of his Darwinian left, I first need openly acknowledge 
these troubling aspects of an evolutionary approach to human politics. 
I will begin by examining the underlying assumptions about human evolution 
held by many of the participants in this debate. An important point is that, unless we 
wish to explain human nature as arising from supernatural forces or through divine 
intervention, any adequate political theory must ultimately be compatible with an 
evolutionary account of human nature. The issue here is whether ‘human nature’ is 
still constrained by its evolutionary past or whether human beings have now evolved 
beyond their earlier biological shackles.  
I then turn to the odious history of political Darwinism and emphasise how the 
deeper we accept a Darwinian view of human nature, the more problematic it may 
become. I outline a range of potential ‘worst case’ scenarios for the left, from the 
(supposed) best case, in which desirable changes to human nature and to society are 
unconstrained by our evolved biology, to the worst extreme, in which social, sexual or 
racial inequalities could be explained in terms of a fixed and inflexible evolved 
human nature. My aim here is to indicate why the left appears to have good grounds 
to be concerned about Darwinian interpretations of human behaviour. The chapter 
ends with a brief overview of the issues addressed in each of the subsequent chapters. 
In this thesis, I use the term ‘Darwinian’ in a very broad sense to refer to all 
evolutionary theories of human nature (henceforth, ETOHN) that may be relevant to 
modern human social or political behaviour – human sociobiology, evolutionary 
psychology, human behavioural ecology, gene-culture co-evolution, and the like.
8
 In 
addition, I will take biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous maxim that “Nothing 
in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”9 to imply that specific aspects 
of genetic or biological theory are encompassed by wider Darwinian evolutionary 
principles. Here, therefore, the terms ‘Darwinian’, ‘evolutionary’ and ETOHN will be 
treated largely as synonyms, as too, unless otherwise indicated, will ‘biological’ and 
‘genetic’.  
 
≈ 
 
A useful account of the broad contemporary positions on human nature is provided by 
philosopher Janet Radcliffe Richards’ scale of ‘deepening Darwinism’, which ranges 
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“from anti-Darwinists at the conservative end, to ultra-Darwinists at the radical 
end”.10 
In Radcliffe-Richards’ scheme, a  ‘materialist boundary’ divides off those with 
religious or divine beliefs about the origins of life, at the conservative end of the 
Darwinian scale, from those, at the deeper or more radical end, who accept materialist 
(i.e., evolutionary) explanations for the living world. While non-materialist or 
religious attitudes towards evolutionary theory continue to cloud debate about human 
nature (e.g., anti-Darwinian Christian fundamentalism in the United States), these will 
not be further addressed here; for the purposes of this thesis, the relevant conceptions 
of human nature are those held by people who all accept the “materialist Darwinian 
view that life emerged from matter, and consciousness from life, by entirely 
Darwinian means”.11 
Radcliffe Richards distinguishes a further division in the materialist Darwinian 
camp itself. On one side, at the ‘Ultra-Darwinist’ end, are those who “think that an 
understanding of the evolutionary process that made us what we are is essential for 
understanding the nature of our deepest emotions and abilities”. On the other side, 
less deeply immersed in Darwinism, are those “[who] believe, in contrast, that we 
have now evolved to a state of being so much creatures of our culture that our 
evolutionary origins can tell us little or nothing about what we are now”.12  
The two broad positions on human nature that I am concerned with here, then, 
are either (a) that human evolutionary history still has an influence on, or still places 
constraints upon, modern human behaviour, or (b) that the course of human evolution 
has allowed modern humanity to escape the constraints or influences of its biological 
past. I will refer where necessary to these differing materialist conceptions of human 
nature as, respectively, the ‘constrained’ and the ‘unconstrained’ view. 
Singer’s Darwinian left, therefore, accepts the constrained view – in contrast 
to the traditional left’s belief that human nature is largely unconstrained by our 
biology. Moreover, the left’s position here reflects a long-held view of the human 
mind as a malleable ‘blank slate’, upon which the imprint of social experience or 
nurture, not biology or nature, is most evident. Thus, when Singer argues that the left 
must take human evolution seriously, he wishes to persuade the left to abandon the 
notion of a malleable human nature and accept the existence of evolved influences (or 
constraints) on our thinking and behaviour.  
It is not difficult to see why the notion of a malleable or blank slate human 
nature is attractive to political reformers. If human nature is indeed malleable, then 
social reforms – say, political policies aimed at reducing or eliminating inequalities – 
are likely to have an enduring influence on human behaviour. By contrast, a 
constrained human nature implies that social change, however desirable, will be 
difficult or impossible if it goes against biologically fixed tendencies or evolved 
predispositions. (It is worth noting here that alternative terms for the constrained and 
the unconstrained view of human nature are, respectively, the ‘realist’ and the 
‘utopian’ vision.13)  
Hence, as Radcliffe Richards highlights, the left’s understandable wariness 
about evolutionary theory: 
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Defences of many kinds of tradition – established hierarchies, war, hostility to 
other races and cultures, and the subjugation of women to men – typically 
appeal to the idea that certain aspects of human nature are too deeply 
ingrained to be eliminated, and some of those sound ominously like the 
characteristics for which [modern Darwinists] are claiming evolutionary 
origins. People of leftward leanings have therefore been inclined to resist the 
whole enterprise out of hand, as a suborning of science by the political forces 
of conservatism and authoritarianism.
14
  
 
Indeed, the belief that ETOHN are scientifically and socially misguided has 
been a consistent feature of left-wing attitudes towards modern Darwinian theory, 
beginning with the vocal opposition to E.O. Wilson’s seminal Sociobiology: The new 
synthesis and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene in the 1970s.15  
While many modern evolutionary theorists regard much of this opposition as 
ideologically motivated,
16
 it is nevertheless the case that Darwinism’s dubious 
political past – in which evolutionary ideas were indeed misused in socially egregious 
ways – provides the left with genuine grounds to be suspicious of Darwinism’s 
modern manifestations. Any contemporary attempt to apply evolutionary biological 
concepts to our species’ behaviour, therefore, must openly acknowledge this dark and 
shameful history.  
 
≈ 
 
When Darwin published On the Origin of Species in 1859 he was careful to avoid the 
subject of humankind, beyond the cautious suggestion that ‘light will be thrown on 
the origin of man and his history’. Nevertheless, Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
was immediately associated with the influential laissez faire political beliefs of 
leading 19
th
 century social theorist Herbert Spencer. (Indeed, Spencer’s phrase 
‘survival of the fittest’ was itself later adopted by Darwin.) According to historian 
Richard Hofstader, Spencer’s comprehensive ‘evolutionary’ worldview, which united 
“everything in nature from protozoa to politics”, ultimately “gave Spencer a public 
influence that transcended Darwin’s”.17  
Of most relevance to leftist attitudes, however, was Spencer’s opposition to 
state interference in the ‘natural’ organisation of society, including his rejection of the 
notion of welfare assistance to the poor or ‘unfit’: “The whole effort of nature is to get 
rid of such, to clear the world of them, and make room for better”.18 Such ideas, to 
which the term Social Darwinism was later applied, had immediate appeal to the 
leading capitalists of the day; industrialist Andrew Carnegie, for instance, defended 
nature’s ‘law of competition’ in his essay The Gospel of Wealth: “We accept and 
welcome … as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality 
of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands 
of a few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but 
essential to the future progress of the [human] race.”19  
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An obvious target for these arguments was the great figurehead of the left, 
Karl Marx.
20
 Carnegie, for instance, emphasises this contrast when he argues 
“civilisation took its start on the day when the capable, industrious workman said to 
his incompetent and lazy fellow, ‘If thou does not sow, thou shalt not reap’, and thus 
ended primitive Communism by separating the drones from the bees”.21  
It is thus unsurprising that Darwinian theory was also adopted by others whose 
sexist, racist or chauvinistic beliefs would repel the modern left. For example, as 
evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker points out:   
 
Darwin’s cousin Francis Galton had suggested that human evolution should be 
given a helping hand by discouraging the less fit from breeding, a policy he 
called eugenics. Within a few decades laws were passed that called for the 
involuntary sterilization of delinquents and the ‘feebleminded’ in Canada, the 
Scandinavian countries, thirty American states, and, ominously, Germany. The 
Nazis’ ideology of inferior races was later used to justify the murder of 
millions of Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals.
22
  
 
Given this horrific precedent, any even-handed discussion of the social or 
political implications of ETOHN must accept that Darwinian theory has been, and can 
be, badly misused. One criticism of Singer, therefore, is that he largely sidesteps this 
issue. Beyond brief reference to the likes of Spencer and Carnegie,
23
 Singer avoids 
mention of the past association between Darwinism and horrendous political 
programmes such as state-sponsored eugenics or Nazi racial biology. 
Of course, given that A Darwinian Left is only an outline manifesto (with 
fewer than 70 pages), there are constraints on what can and cannot be discussed. 
However, in failing to fully acknowledge the obvious (right-wing) misapplication of 
Darwinian ideas, Singer also fails to address an obvious source of left-wing 
opposition to his own Darwinian argument – that it is tainted by long-since 
discredited political beliefs.    
Furthermore, many of the issues central to the objectionable political beliefs 
historically associated with Darwinism – those concerning, say, class, sex or race – 
have not gone away. Recent media debate in New Zealand, for example, has included 
justifications for unequal pay rates for women on the grounds of biological sex 
differences, descriptions of the indigenous Maori people as inherently violent and 
anti-social, and calls to restrict the ‘underclass’ from breeding.24  
Such arguments are often based on the belief that observed inequalities 
between members of different races or classes, or between men and women, are the 
result of innate biological differences – and these arguments arouse huge controversy 
(and thus popular media attention) because they go against the modern liberal belief 
that such inequalities are solely the result of social or cultural factors, such as 
discrimination or prejudice.  
Significantly, Singer himself questions the contemporary liberal explanation 
for the causes of social inequality. In concluding his thesis, for example, he highlights 
some of the unique features that distinguish a Darwinian left from traditional versions 
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of the left and, in particular, that a Darwinian left would not “[a]ssume that all 
inequalities are due to discrimination, prejudice, oppression or social conditioning. 
Some will be, but this cannot be assumed in every case.”25  
Such a conclusion, of course, would be very worrying for the traditional left: if 
social inequalities are not solely the result of discrimination or social oppression, what 
else could be the cause? Given Singer’s emphasis on Darwinian evolution, leftists 
might mistakenly assume that, like the eugenicists and Social Darwinists of the past, 
he too is positing a biological explanation for the social disparities that are so obvious 
in the modern world. 
 
≈ 
 
The aim of the above discussion has been to describe the general nature of the left’s 
opposition to evolutionary theory and, hence, why it is likely to similarly oppose 
Singer’s Darwinian left. In particular, Singer’s insistence that we must not assume 
that social disparities are solely the result of social factors appears to open the door 
for the return of discredited biological explanations for existing inequalities. And 
Singer merely makes this obvious by questioning the traditional left’s exclusively 
environmental approach to social disparity.  
Yet because sexism, racism, and other undesirable social prejudices and 
practices all have historical associations with Darwinian thinking, Singer is entering 
academically toxic territory by advocating a Darwinian perspective on human social 
and political behaviour. As Steven Pinker points out: “The landscape of the sciences 
of human nature is strewn with these third rails, hot zones, black holes, and 
Chernobyls.”26 As an example, I will briefly outline one particular academic 
Fukushima that Singer’s Darwinian left must ultimately face: possible biological 
explanations for the causes of racial inequality (a topic to which three of this thesis’ 
chapters are devoted).  
Evolutionary accounts of human biological difference often provoke strong 
emotional responses, even among avowed Darwinists. For example, in reviewing 
psychologist Philippe Rushton’s controversial Race, Evolution and Behavior, in 
which intelligence, crime rates, cultural achievement, and the like are explained in 
terms of evolved differences between races, sociobiologist David Barash expresses 
the following opinion: “Rushton argues at length … that by combining numerous 
little turds of variously tainted data, one can obtain a valuable result; but in fact, the 
outcome is merely a larger than average pile of shit.” Barash concludes: “Bad science 
and virulent racial prejudice drip like pus from nearly every page of this despicable 
book.”27 
What is particularly noteworthy in this case, beyond the fact that these 
opinions were expressed as a peer review in an academic journal, is that David Barash 
has himself faced similar censure for his evolutionary-informed stance on human 
behaviour – for instance, being portrayed as a misogynist apologist for the biological 
‘naturalness’ of rape because of his own research into differences in male and female 
behaviour.
28
 
 7 
And of course thoughtful people become concerned, even deeply upset, about 
issues such as racial (or sexual) inequality. For example, what if the biological-
genetic opinions expressed by the likes of Philippe Rushton – that some racial groups 
are less intelligent or are more criminal than others – became generally held? Or if the 
belief was accepted that there are evolved genetic differences in intelligence or social 
behaviour between races, and that these, to a greater or lesser extent, explain 
observable inequalities in social outcomes, such as economic status, employment, 
education, or social cohesion? It is not implausible, indeed it appears very probable, 
that those holding such beliefs would conclude that there is little that can be done to 
ameliorate obvious social disparity.  
Or, perhaps worse for the prospects of an egalitarian Darwinian left, what if a 
detailed evolutionary analysis actually did indicate the existence of cognitive and 
psychological differences between ‘races’, or between men and women, or members 
of different social classes? What if peoples really could be classified (or stigmatised) 
in terms of cognitive ability or behavioural tendencies? In this case, it would seem 
inevitable that we must simply resign ourselves, by weight of scientific evidence, to 
the possibility that there really is little we can do to improve the lot of certain peoples 
relative to others.  
Given either of these possibilities – that accounts of cognitive or behavioural 
difference may come to be believed, or that such differences may actually be shown 
to exist – would it not be best to simply leave well alone? Philosopher Philip Kitcher 
suggests that this is a reasonable, and perhaps even necessary, option: that if certain 
areas of human biological research have the potential to revive unjust and damaging 
social beliefs, or to impose “considerable burdens” on particular groups, then it may 
be best to abandon these lines of enquiry altogether.
29
  
In the real social world that Kitcher refers to, the world peopled by real human 
beings, the anaemic sounding ‘considerable burdens’ can equate to horrendous or 
unbearable inequalities. In Peter Singer’s home country, Australia, for example, the 
most blatant disparities exist between indigenous Aborigines and latter arriving 
Australian peoples. 
Who can witness, or read about or watch documentary footage of the lives 
lived by many Australian Aborigines without feeling appalled? That such poverty and 
suffering can exist in one of the world’s richest countries merely adds to the outrage. 
Equally shocking are the stories of the casual and callous disregard for Aboriginal 
lives throughout Australia’s colonial history. The co-discoverer of natural selection, 
Alfred Russel Wallace, for instance, witnessed an Australian farmer shooting a baby 
off the back of a passing Aboriginal woman simply to demonstrate the accuracy of a 
new rifle.
30
 Perhaps this, and similar eye-witness experience of the attempted 
‘eradication’ of native populations in South America, was a source of Wallace’s deep 
socialist convictions, or can help explain why Wallace eventually came to reject the 
applicability to human beings of his and Darwin’s amoral theory of natural selection. 
Countless other distressing instances of racial prejudice could be provided, as 
could graphic examples of the misogynist mistreatment of women, or of the abuse and 
exploitation of people at the bottom of the social hierarchy. But the point is to 
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emphasise that the ideas and beliefs being analysed here – such as those concerning 
human capacities and behaviour – can and do relate to the real world. This discussion 
of social inequality is not just a philosophical thought experiment. It concerns real 
human beings, really suffering. 
An additional unfortunate complication to any attempt to address issues of 
social inequality or discrimination from a Darwinian perspective, therefore, is that 
these topics are so entwined with thinking people’s deepest moral convictions that 
rational discussion (including that of academia’s supposedly neutral, disinterested 
standpoint) becomes incredibly difficult. As Steven Pinker point out, people’s 
opinions on race, gender or class (or education or violence or sexual orientation or 
any of the other ‘hot buttons’ in the human sciences) “help define the kind of person 
that they think they are and the kind of person that they want to be”.31  
Yet Pinker as goes on to indicate:   
 
Unfortunately, folded into these opinions are assumptions about the 
psychological make-up of Homo sapiens. Conscientious people may thus find 
themselves unwittingly staked to positions on empirical questions in biology 
or psychology. … So when the facts tip over a sacred cow, people are tempted 
to suppress the facts and to clamp down on debate because the facts threaten 
everything they hold sacred. And this can leave us unequipped to deal with 
just those problems for which new facts and analyses are most needed.
32
  
 
If egalitarians do genuinely wish to create a better society, they must begin 
with an accurate understanding of what human beings are like, however unpalatable 
this may initially appear.  
Here, though, the relevant issues are too complex, and too politically 
important, to adequately address without the supporting detail and argument provided 
in this thesis’ subsequent chapters. For the time being, therefore, I will simply 
acknowledge that any Darwinian approach to egalitarian political ideals may, 
eventually, have to turn its evolutionary spotlight on some very uncomfortable areas 
of debate, areas that, on balance, may indeed be better off left in darkness. 
 
≈ 
 
Radcliffe Richards’ notion of deepening Darwinism can be co-opted to describe a 
descending scale of four levels of what evolutionary theory may say about the 
‘obvious question’ of what human beings are like. While this scale is to some extent 
arbitrary, it highlights certain of the most problematic political issues for the left in 
accepting a Darwinian perspective – especially as regards potential evolved biological 
aspects of sex and race.  
Level 1. The processes of Darwinian evolution have, in effect, allowed 
humans to break free from their evolved biological past. In this view, which is here 
equated with the blank slate or unconstrained vision of human nature, cultural and 
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environmental processes are those that most influence any politically relevant aspects 
of our behaviour.
33
  
The idea of a malleable, culturally-constructed human nature appears, at least 
initially, to be the best case scenario for leftist reformers. If a competitive self-
interested society produces competitive self-interested citizens, who themselves 
perpetuate the original society, then the role of leftist political reformers is to change 
society so that it produces cooperative altruistic citizens who will themselves create 
and sustain a cooperative altruistic society. 
Level 2. Human evolution has resulted in a relatively fixed but universal 
human nature. Of the modern ETOHN, evolutionary psychology in particular 
champions the idea that a suite of universal psychological traits are ‘species typical’ 
for human beings the world over, and that evolutionary processes have resulted in the 
‘psychic unity of humankind’. 
The Level 2 view of a universal human nature suggests that there are evolved 
constraints on what is socially or politically possible. Nevertheless, despite such 
possible constraints, the universalist belief that everyone is endowed with the same 
basic mental abilities implies that all humans begin on an equal footing. Differences 
in social outcomes (e.g., inequalities), therefore, are the result of different 
circumstances, not different ‘biologies’. This also suggests that any political policies 
(including egalitarian ones) aimed at changing the social environment would apply 
equally to all humans. 
Level 3. As we are descended from a long line (stretching for thousands of 
millions of years) of sexually reproducing organisms, behavioural differences 
between the sexes would appear deeply rooted in our animal heritage – thus, we could 
predict that women and men have different evolved psychological predispositions.  
Here, evolutionary reasoning suggests that sex roles are not, or not just, the 
result of cultural practices or conditioning but that, rather, they arise from the 
different psychological propensities of males and females. If this is the case, then 
evolved sex differences may have a bearing on attempts to address sex inequality by 
changing social practices. The worry for the left is the implication that sex 
inequalities are an inevitable and ineluctable feature of human society. 
Level 4. If humans are a biological species, then we might expect separate 
human populations to have diverged genetically over time as humans colonised the 
globe. That such genetic divergence has occurred between different populations at the 
physical level (skin colour, facial characteristics, etc.) appears obvious, as does the 
possibility of similar genetic changes in body chemistry (e.g., resistance to locally 
occurring disease). In principle, given time and isolation, continuing genetic 
divergence would lead to speciation – and, as indicated by the hominid fossil record, 
this has occurred numerous times in the human lineage, with several ‘human’ species, 
such as H. neanderthalensis and H. floresiensis, now known to have been coexistent 
with modern Homo sapiens.  
The political concern here is that the biological notion of divergent human 
populations overlaps with folk-biological concepts of ‘race’, and, further, that the 
obvious physical differences between racial populations may be matched by 
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behavioural or cognitive differences. A worrying implication here is that, if biology 
rather than culture is a root cause of racial disparities, political efforts to ameliorate 
inequalities may flounder. 
 
≈ 
 
I will have little to say about the legitimacy of the scientific theories upon which 
Singer’s argument is premised; after all, determining the validity or otherwise of any 
such scientific theories is a job for evolutionary biologists, not social or political 
scientists. At the same time, however, critically examining the implications of 
ETOHN, should they prove correct, is a task that political philosophers and social 
theorists can usefully pursue. That is, even if the question of human nature were to 
remain open, we could still usefully ask what hinges on different views – for example, 
whether egalitarian beliefs are dependent on an unconstrained or malleable human 
nature, or whether they are curtailed by a constrained or evolved one. 
This thesis’ chapters can be broadly divided into two related sections. In 
Chapters 2-5, I examine in more detail why, in addition to the historical association 
between Darwinism and odious political beliefs, the contemporary left appears 
reluctant to accept an evolutionary perspective on human social behaviour. In 
Chapters 6-11, I examine each of the ‘worst case’ levels of deepening Darwinism in 
turn. 
In A Darwinian Left, Singer suggests that if the left understood the obstacles in 
the way to its political goals, it would be better able to overcome them. Something 
similar may be said about the obstacles in the way to the left accepting Singer’s 
(albeit brief) political manifesto for a revived and revitalised left: for this manifesto to 
be adopted, it is necessary to fully understand, and hence to overcome, the left’s 
political and normative objections to Darwinian theory. 
In Chapter 2, I place Singer’s evolutionary-informed political argument into a 
wider academic context by examining the prevailing paradigm about human nature 
within modern political philosophy. As most contemporary political theories appear to 
overlook biological accounts of to human nature, I examine various Darwinian 
arguments for why they may be wrong to do so.  
The right in particular have often attempted to derive political arguments from 
the facts (or purported facts) of human evolution. In Chapter 3, I examine how the left 
has traditionally responded to these right-wing claims, beginning with Marxist 
criticisms of Darwinism and leading up to more recent relativist or ‘postmodernist’ 
rejection of evolutionary theory. I argue that much of the left’s contemporary 
opposition to ETOHN, including the belief that Darwinism is inherently right-wing, is 
based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of what modern evolutionary theory 
actually implies about human social organisation and behaviour.  
By reducing human existence to the purposeless replication of ‘selfish genes’, 
modern evolutionary theories appear to rob human life of dignity and meaning. 
Religious objections to such a view of human existence are therefore to be expected, 
but even secular-minded people may resist the apparent reductionism and 
 11 
determinism of evolutionary concepts of human behaviour. In Chapter 4, I argue that 
modern Darwinian theories are not deterministic or reductionist in the extreme sense 
implied by many left-wing thinkers, and that traditional leftist explanations for human 
behaviour may in fact be more problematic than evolutionary-informed alternatives. 
In Chapter 5, I return to the relationship between scientific facts and moral or 
political beliefs, and examine Peter Singer’s own arguments about how evolutionary 
theory can connect with ethics or politics. I use political scientist Larry Arnhart’s 
attempt to derive conservative moral values directly from evolved human biology as a 
case study of the fallacy of deriving ought from is. 
Chapter 6 begins the analysis of the levels of deepening Darwinism. Using 
anthropologist Margaret Mead’s influential Coming of Age in Samoa as a staring 
point, I examine why the left is seemingly committed to the Level 1 view that human 
nature is malleable and unconstrained by our evolved biology. In asking whether 
leftist political values are dependent on such a view of human nature, I conclude that 
the traditional leftist stance on human malleability is less politically liberating than 
social progressives often assume. 
In Chapter 7, I contrast the Level 1 ‘utopian’ view that social transformation is 
possible due to the malleability of human nature with the Level 2 ‘tragic’ view that 
social reform is likely constrained by a fixed human nature. Singer’s Darwinian 
argument initially appears to place him on the ‘tragic’ or conservative side of this 
debate. Nevertheless, after discussing various modern ETOHN, I suggest that 
Darwinian theory need not imply all-embracing constraints on desirable political 
change, and that Singer’s emphasis on the human capacity for reason as a means to 
overcome our evolved non-egalitarian predispositions places him firmly within the 
utopian current of political thinking. 
The possibility of evolved psychological differences between men and women 
is the Level 3 ‘worst case’ scenario for the left, especially if this implies a check to 
our ambitions for a more sexually equal society. In Chapter 8, I argue that applying 
Darwinian reasoning to the causes of sexual inequality may not necessarily be as 
politically deleterious as leftists often assume – and that, indeed, a refusal to accept 
the possibility of sex differences may itself prove detrimental to the feminist 
egalitarian cause. 
Chapters 9-11 address perhaps the most controversial aspect of a Darwinian 
approach to social inequality, the implications of possible evolved differences 
between racial populations. In Chapter 9, I examine arguments for and against the 
likelihood of evolved racial differences, beyond skin-deep physical dissimilarities. I 
conclude that, despite an apparent consensus view that human ‘races’ are not 
biologically real, the possibility of evolved racial differences remains an open 
question. While this does not derail our desire for racial equality, I further argue that a 
failure to acknowledge this possibility may prove counter-productive, especially if it 
hinders a clearer understanding of the genetic basis of health disparities between 
different racial groups. 
In Chapter 10, I turn to the wider social consequences of research into 
potential racial differences. I examine two arguments: that scientific research, such as 
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that into human diversity, should be pursued no matter what the social consequences; 
and that, such is the potential for deleterious social outcomes (such as a revival of 
racist beliefs), we should perhaps curtail evolutionary genetic research into our own 
species. Here, I advocate a pragmatic approach, that of steering an open and honest 
course away from the possible deleterious consequences of human genetic research 
and towards that which will provide genuine benefits to otherwise oppressed or 
marginalized people.  
I end Chapter 10 with two case studies of how a pragmatic approach to genetic 
diversity may be effected in practice (focussing on health disparities between Maori 
and non-Maori populations in New Zealand), and I then further develop this line of 
argument in Chapter 11, where I also reiterate my belief that treating the subject of 
‘race’ as taboo is detrimental to the leftist cause. I suggest that a more nuanced 
evolutionary analysis of racial differences would emphasise the effects of genes and 
environment on human behaviour, and that, contrary to leftist assumptions, a 
Darwinian approach to racial inequality could reinforce egalitarian attempts to 
improve marginalised people’s (or peoples’) social circumstances. 
The initial 11 chapters of this thesis are, to a large extent, an attempt to clear 
away the political and moral stumbling blocks to the left accepting an evolutionary 
perspective on human nature. In Chapter 12, I turn to Singer’s own central concern: 
how a Darwinian appreciation of human behaviour may provide the left with new 
ideas and new approaches to challenge the hegemony of competitive capitalism. In 
particular, Singer argues that, as a result of our evolutionary history, human beings 
possess both altruistic and cooperative traits and self-interested and competitive ones: 
the task for evolutionary-informed egalitarians is to foster the former while 
channelling the latter in socially desirable ways. 
I critique and develop Singer’s (albeit brief) suggestions about how an 
evolutionary understanding of our behaviour may help mitigate the undesirable 
aspects of social competition, and accept his claim that for the left to remain ignorant 
of our evolved nature is to risk disaster. I end the chapter by emphasising Singer’s 
belief that an appreciation of our evolutionary heritage may actually allow us to 
reason ourselves free of the constraints that our biological past has hitherto imposed 
upon us. 
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In 1906, Graham Wallas reported on a clergyman’s response to his remark that many people now 
accepted Darwin’s view of human evolution. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘we all accept it, and how little difference it 
makes.’                                                                    
Diane Paul, Darwin, social Darwinism and eugenics 
 
 
Chapter 2: The Paradigm on Human Nature 
 
Reflecting a philosophical tradition stretching at least as far back as Ancient Greece, 
modern social theorists such as Leslie Stevenson, Michael Rosen and Jonathan Wolff 
suggest that one of the most important questions of all is, ‘what are human beings 
like?’ As Stevenson argues, our ideas about what we ought to do, or what we can 
hope to achieve “are fundamentally affected by whatever we think is the ‘real’ or 
‘true’ nature of man”.1 According to Peter Singer, in A Darwinian Left, this ‘obvious 
question’ can only be adequately answered through a better understanding of human 
evolutionary history.  
Of course, as indicated in the previous chapter, many political theorists (and 
leftists in particular) are reluctant to take seriously the fact that we are evolved 
animals. While the subsequent chapters of this thesis will examine why this is the 
case, and whether the implications of ETOHN are indeed as politically egregious as 
many leftists seem to think, in this chapter I wish to place Singer’s Darwinian 
approach to politics within the wider context of contemporary approaches to political 
theory – that is, to assess how modern ETOHN are treated by those disciplines whose 
subject matter depends, implicitly or explicitly, on an answer to the question, ‘what 
are human beings like?’  
As part of this task, I will examine the prevailing paradigm, or set of 
underlying theoretical assumptions, about human nature within modern political 
philosophy. As will become apparent, the fact of human evolution and its possible 
bearing on modern social behaviour appears to play little part in contemporary 
political discourse; an additional aim of this chapter, therefore, is to indicate why and 
how Darwinian theory may be more relevant to political thought than modern social 
theorists assume. 
Indeed, at a ‘meta-theoretical’ level, taking the fact of human evolution 
seriously may have far-reaching implications for how political philosophy (the 
discipline that attempts to prescribe how society ought to be organised) is itself 
undertaken. For example, in his 1981 essay ‘Ethics and sociobiology’, Peter Singer 
indicates an important potential consequence of adopting an evolutionary approach to 
political theory: if Darwinian biology can in fact provide a valid account of human 
nature, then political philosophers may have to concede that “the efforts of Plato, 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and all the other 
great figures of the past to achieve this understanding have been built on ignorance”.2 
In other words, if Singer himself is correct with this sweeping judgement of 
the past two millennia of Western philosophising, then a Darwinian approach to 
human nature would require us to question (and very possibly reject) all theorising 
and speculation about human nature and society, from all cultures and all periods, that 
has been made in ignorance of modern evolutionary theory. Thus, while the overall 
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aim of this thesis is to examine the implications of Darwinism for egalitarian political 
theories, a more specific focus of this chapter is to assess what an evolutionary 
approach to human behaviour might mean for the very discipline of political 
philosophy itself. 
Before turning to modern political philosophy’s paradigmatic assumptions 
about what human beings are like, I will first flesh out the position hinted at by Singer 
above – that the findings of modern evolutionary science may render redundant much 
of the traditional theorising about human nature and society. 
Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, for example, openly derides pre-
Darwinian concepts of human nature and human existence. On the opening page of 
his seminal Selfish Gene, Dawkins opines that, given Darwinian theory, “We no 
longer have to resort to superstition when faced with the deep problems: Is there a 
meaning to life? What are we for? What is man?”3 And in response to the last of these 
queries, ‘What is man?’, he provocatively echoes fellow zoologist G.G. Simpson’s 
frank opinion that “all attempts to answer that question before 1859 are worthless and 
that we will be better off if we ignore them completely”.4 
Dawkins admits that this view might initially sound philistine or intolerant, but 
nevertheless argues:  
 
[R]eligious answers apart … when you are actually challenged to think of pre-
Darwinian answers to the questions ‘What is man?’ ‘Is there any meaning to 
life?’ ‘What are we for?’, can you, as a matter of fact, think of any that are not 
now worthless except for their (considerable) historic interest? There is such a 
thing as being plain wrong, and that is what, before 1859, all answers to those 
questions were.
5
 
 
This, then, represents an extreme implication of Darwinian theory to political 
philosophy’s obvious question about the nature of humankind; that, just as the 
theories of pre-Newtonian physics, say, are now viewed as little more than historic 
curiosities, so too should pre-Darwinian philosophical concepts of human nature. 
From this perspective, modern ETOHN render all earlier ideas (such as those of Karl 
Marx) irrelevant to a modern understanding of what human beings are like. 
In Dawkins’ and Simpson’s view, the best way to tackle the ‘deep problems’ 
of human existence would be to simply start over again with the only tenable and 
coherent account of human existence that we have: Darwin’s evolutionary theory of 
descent with modification. Furthermore, this is an argument that is implicit in Peter 
Singer’s call for the left to abandon the (non-Darwinian) Marxist view of a malleable 
human nature, unconstrained by its evolutionary past. 
Indeed, it is now over 150 years since Darwin first proposed his naturalistic 
account of the origins of life, and most educated people would now accept that 
humans share their ancestry with all other living beings. Singer’s belief that we need 
to take evolved human tendencies into account in our social and political planning, 
therefore, might appear to be simply stating the obvious. This is apparent, for 
example, in his 1981 appraisal of the (then-emerging) discipline of sociobiology: “As 
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long as we continue to study and cite Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx – none of whose 
views of human nature can today be ranked as scientific – it would be perversely 
backward looking to refuse to even consider sociobiology and what follows from it.”6 
Of course, three decades after Singer expressed this opinion (and 15 decades 
after Darwin first published his), we still continue to study and cite the non-scientific 
views of the likes of Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx. This raises an interesting question: 
is this because these thinkers continue to have relevant things to say about human 
nature? Or is it due instead to the dead weight of history – that political philosophers 
study these theorists simply because they are the theorists that have always been 
studied? And, if more the latter, would we not be better off simply starting afresh with 
an accurate Darwinian account of human nature?  
If little else, by following this line of reasoning, we could query certain 
philosophical arguments or beliefs about how society ought to be organised; for 
example, by asking whether these arguments are compatible with what modern 
Darwinian science might reveal about human nature and human potential. The issue 
here is succinctly (and amusingly) illustrated by an apocryphal comment by the 
founder of sociobiology, E.O. Wilson, who, when he first became acquainted with the 
tenets of Marxism, is reported to have replied: “Wonderful theory; wrong species”.7 
This is not (or not just) a facetious comment, for it raises the possibility that, if 
and when political philosophy’s analysis of competing social arguments is completed, 
and one particular theory is shown to be the most morally compelling or the most 
rationally coherent, that this too might prove a wonderful theory but for the wrong 
species. Singer himself highlights this issue: 
 
Political philosophers and the revolutionaries or reformers who have followed 
them have all too often worked out their ideal society or their reforms, and 
sought to apply them without knowing much about the human beings who 
must carry out, and live with, their plans.
8
  
 
Thus, rather than working out an abstract plan for an ideal society and 
attempting to apply it without regard for the people who will inhabit this pre-
conceived world, Singer instead argues that “those seeking to reshape society must 
understand the tendencies inherent in human beings, and modify their abstract ideals 
in order to suit them”.9 
Of course, providing an accurate account of ‘the tendencies inherent in human 
beings’ is a task for evolutionary biologists, not social scientists or philosophers 
(albeit that the role of the latter would be to assess the social or political implications 
of whatever view of human nature actually turns out to be sanctioned by Darwinian 
theory). My aim in this chapter, therefore, is not to evaluate if and how particular 
theories are consistent with Darwinism, but rather to identify the prevailing paradigm 
on human nature within modern political philosophy and political science, and to 
assess whether these disciplines’ approach to human nature is potentially misguided 
(or, as Dawkins puts it, ‘worthless’) given a modern understanding of human 
evolution. 
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≈ 
 
One method of identifying the prevailing paradigm within a discipline – in this case, 
the underlying assumptions about what constitutes a relevant system of belief about 
human nature, and about how we may best analyse and compare various rival theories 
of our nature – is to examine that subject’s introductory texts (i.e., those texts, aimed 
at neophytes, that define or circumscribe a particular discipline’s scope of intellectual 
enquiry). For example, we could ask how Rosen & Wolff address the question they 
themselves raise – ‘What are men, or rather, human beings, like?’ – in the 
introduction to their anthology of Political Thought. 
Here, Rosen & Wolff turn to the great figures of the past: 
 
If we are to take human beings as they are, first we have to know what they 
are. Rousseau had his own complex view; namely that man in a state of nature 
is innocent, and that the evil found in society is social in origin. We will look 
at Rousseau’s view, as well as the opposed views of Hobbes and Locke … 
these three towering figures of modern political philosophy …”.10 
 
This appears to be precisely the approach to human nature criticised by Singer 
(and, more forcefully, by Dawkins) above. That is, in light of the revolution in our 
understanding of the natural and human world that Darwinian theory has brought 
about, this armchair approach to human nature – here, through reference to 17th and 
18
th
 century theorists – comes across as ‘perversely backward looking’. Asking the 
question ‘what are human beings like?’ without reference to modern human 
evolutionary biology appears akin to someone wondering what stars are like and yet 
being uninterested in what modern astrophysics has revealed about the subject. 
Nevertheless, the belief that political philosophy’s ‘obvious question’ can be 
answered through analysis of the views of the towering trio of Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau is also apparent in Wolff’s Introduction to Political Philosophy, in which 
the discipline’s paradigmatic method of assessing various theorists’ claims about 
human nature is also revealed.  
For example, in a chapter on the origins of political institutions, Wolff 
prefaces his analysis of Hobbes’ ‘brutal, nasty and short’ vision of the original state of 
human nature by suggesting that “we could hardly abolish the state just to find out 
what life would be like without it, so the best we can do in practice is to carry out this 
process as a thought experiment”.11 Subsequently, he argues: “One way to avoid 
Hobbes’s pessimistic conclusions about the state of nature is to start from different 
premises. In particular, life without the state might seem a much more attractive 
possibility if we adopted a different theory of human nature and motivation” (say, 
Locke’s or Rousseau’s more positive views about what human beings are naturally 
like).
12
  
What, then, can we make of this approach to human nature? Given, say, 
modern palaeo-anthropological findings about ancestral human behaviour, 
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ethnographic studies of hunter-gatherer societies, psychological investigation of 
human motivation – indeed, the whole burgeoning field of evolutionary and 
psychological research into human behaviour – philosophical thought experiments do 
not appear the most appropriate means to discern the human state of nature. Or rather, 
it would appear more useful to begin the political discussion with modern science’s 
more accurate account of prehistoric human society (an account, moreover, that 
refutes both Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s belief that early man was a solitary animal). 
Similarly, critical analysis of Hobbes’, Locke’s or Rousseau’s 17th and 18th 
century views on human nature no longer appears a useful starting point for 
investigation into how human society should best be organised. Indeed, to the extent 
that higher level political arguments – say, Hobbes’ defence of a ‘Leviathan’ system 
of government, or Rousseau’s concept of the ‘general will’ – are premised on initial 
beliefs that are “plain wrong”, the idea of starting again with a more accurate 
scientific account of human nature (as Dawkins argues) appears simple common-
sense.     
In addition, Wolff here suggests that we could avoid the undesirable political 
conclusions that arise from one view of human nature by changing our initial 
premises. This appears a paradigmatic practice: that is, challenging one view of 
human nature, and of the political argument that arises from it, with another view of 
human nature with more desirable political consequences. But if none of the 
underlying theories actually accurately reflects human nature then this sort of analysis 
appears merely an academic exercise (in the pejorative sense). Once again, and while 
philosophy does has a valid role to play in assessing ‘what follows if?’ a particular 
theory of human nature is true, it would appear more productive to first determine the 
truth about human nature – via the best means available, Darwinian evolutionary 
theory – before developing more detailed philosophical arguments. 
This would not, of course, render Hobbes’ or Rousseau’s or Locke’s political 
thinking redundant, or invalidate all aspects of their political arguments. These three 
would remain towering figures in political philosophy even if their views on human 
nature were in many respects erroneous. The point is, though, that the traditional 
approach to determining ‘what human beings are’– by challenging the views of one 
armchair thinker with those of another – appears to overlook the fact that the obvious 
question of human nature is an empirical rather than a philosophical one, and that an 
accurate scientific account of what human beings are like is now a possibility. 
(Interestingly, in Leviathan, Hobbes attempts to provide a scientific explanation of 
human behaviour and motivation – in which case, his is an account that is several 
centuries out of date.)
13
 
This criticism – that much political argument overlooks empirical accounts of 
human nature and behaviour – can be extended to the manner in which philosophers 
such as Leslie Stevenson, Michael Rosen and Jonathan Wolff tackle different political 
ideas about human malleability.  
Rosen & Wolff, yet again, address the question of whether human nature is 
fixed or fluid in the paradigmatic manner: through reference to the contrasting views 
of important historical figures. For example, after first describing Jean-Jacque 
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Rousseau’s assumption that there are fixed limits to human nature, Rosen & Wolff 
comment: 
 
This is a major assumption, for is it so obvious – is it even true? – that human 
nature is fixed? Many have thought that if conditions on earth became 
properly fit for human beings then human beings will learn new ways of 
behaving and new forms of enjoyment. The thought is that we are constrained 
by social conditions. Change the social conditions and we will change too.
14
 
 
Revealingly, despite the empirical nature of the question, ‘is it true that human 
nature is fixed?’, Rosen & Wolff turn to 19th century political thinkers such as Robert 
Owen, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to provide an answer – i.e., to the sort of non-
scientific views about human nature criticised by Singer and Dawkins. Once again, it 
is surely worth asking how appropriate or useful it is to base political arguments on 
these sorts of theories, those made without reference to what modern evolutionary 
science can reveal about human nature.  
After all, unless we are to accept divine or transcendent explanations for our 
existence, human nature must be explicable in evolutionary terms. Thus, for instance, 
if there really is no essential human nature – if we are simply ‘blank slates’ upon 
which culture alone leaves its imprint (as Marx, Engels and Owen assumed) – we 
need an explanation of how, over the course of our species’ evolution, this has come 
about, and how modern humans have escaped the sort of biological constraints on 
behaviour that are evident in our closest primate relatives (with whom we share 
common ancestry). This is not a claim that all non-Darwinian political ideas should be 
rejected in toto; but it is the claim that any theory of human nature that underlies these 
political ideas must be compatible with what evolutionary science may tell us about 
the real nature of human nature. 
It is interesting to note that Rosen & Wolff also refer to the views of the 
anarcho-communist Peter Kropotkin, whose major work, Mutual Aid, was based 
firmly on Darwinian theory. Briefly, Kropotkin rejected the emphasis that then-
contemporary Darwinists had placed on competitive struggle, and, more especially, 
the manner in which this was held up as a mirror for the ‘naturalness’ of human 
competition.
15
 Kropotkin instead based his socialist argument for a more mutually 
supportive human society on the widespread cooperation within species evident in the 
natural world.  
Unfortunately, Kropotkin’s theory was based on a misconception about how 
Darwinian evolution actually operates. According to Singer, “[Kropotkin] went astray 
in trying to explain exactly how mutual aid could work in evolution, since he did not 
see clearly that for a Darwinian there is a problem in assuming that individuals 
behave altruistically for the sake of the larger group”.16  
The relevant point here, however, is that we can use modern evolutionary 
theory to reject the erroneous aspects of Kropotkin’s Darwinian argument – and, 
therefore, to question the political conclusions that he draws from it. But if we are 
able to do this with Kropotkin because his account of human nature happens to be a 
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Darwinian one, surely we can do the same with any other theorist’s non-Darwinian 
view of human nature; that is, to point out if and how such a view is ‘plain wrong’ 
from the perspective of modern ETOHN. 
 
≈ 
 
While cursory, the above discussion suggests that modern ETOHN do not play much 
part in answering political philosophy’s obvious question, ‘what are human beings 
like?’ And that this reflects the wider paradigm within political philosophy is further 
indicated in evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker’s wry comment: “Every student 
of political science is taught that political ideologies are based on theories of human 
nature. Why must they be based on theories that are three hundred years out of 
date?”17 
Nevertheless, while some introductory texts on political philosophy (such as 
Wolff’s) might continue to debate out-dated theories of human nature or to simply 
overlook the issue, other social theorists do accept the possible relevance of 
Darwinian theory to our understanding of modern human social behaviour. In Ten 
Theories of Human Nature, for instance, Leslie Stevenson posits three possible 
positions on whether “there is some ‘true’ or ‘innate’ nature of human beings and 
some objective value for human life”: 
 
Are we essentially products of evolution, programmed to pursue our self-
interest, to reproduce our genes, or fulfil our biological drives? Or, is there no 
such ‘essential’ human nature, only a capacity to be moulded by society and 
its economic, political, and cultural forces? Or, is there some transcendent, 
objective (perhaps divine?) purpose for human lives and human history?
18
 
 
Here, Stevenson presents these as open questions – and, in contrast to the 
opinion of evolutionary-minded scholars such as Dawkins, Pinker and Singer, he 
considers it worthwhile to seek answers in the non-scientific theories of the human 
condition provided by Confucianism, Hinduism and Christianity, or in the works of 
Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Marx, Freud and Sartre. Nevertheless, when he eventually turns 
to ‘Darwinian theories of human nature’, Stevenson acknowledges that some people 
might question the value of giving so much attention to the speculative philosophical 
and religious theories of the past: “Now that science has established itself as the 
proper way of understanding everything in the living world, including living beings 
like ourselves, should we not look to the methods of science to find out the truth about 
human nature?”19 
Initially, this would appear akin to the point made by Singer above – that we 
should perhaps place a question mark over speculation or theorising about human 
nature made in ignorance of modern Darwinian science. Moreover, if science can 
indeed reveal the truth about ourselves, this would allow us to decide which of 
Stevenson’s initial three positions on human nature is most likely correct: that is, 
 20 
whether our behaviour is determined (or at least heavily influenced) by our genes, by 
our culture, or by some transcendent or divine ‘will’.  
It is therefore worthwhile examining how Stevenson answers the question that 
he himself poses: why not simply turn to science to find out the truth about out 
nature? Indeed, if modern science does provide the only accurate account of human 
nature, it potentially renders the bulk of Stevenson’s own enquiry into different 
theories of human nature redundant – in addition, of course, to the theories 
themselves.  
In actual fact, Stevenson avoids addressing the possibility of a scientifically 
accurate (or ‘true’) account of our nature by defining a theory of human nature as one 
that would specifically “offer some sort of diagnosis and prescription for human 
problems”.20 In this way, Stevenson is able to argue that “when would-be scientists of 
human nature offer their secular schemes of salvation – or at least of progress – their 
claims go beyond empirical science and tend to be just as controversial as those of 
other ‘theories’ [i.e., those offered by Plato or Marx or Freud, or Confucianism, and 
so on]”.21  
Thus, far from ditching pre-Darwinian beliefs (as, say, Dawkins recommends), 
Stevenson concludes his assessment of modern Darwinian theories of human nature 
by claiming that our view of ourselves, and our sense of the ‘light’ and ‘dark’ sides of 
our nature, still “needs to be inspired and educated by the great religious and 
philosophical thought systems of the past”.22  
Here, however, Stevenson is switching the focus from empirical or factual 
claims about what human nature is to normative claims about what we ought to do. 
That is, while he may indeed be correct that the normative beliefs of would-be 
scientists of human nature can be as controversial as any other belief system, this says 
nothing about the factual worth (or worthlessness) of any purely descriptive theory of 
human nature. This simply skirts the challenge posed by evolutionary science: that it 
may lead us to conclude that the great theories of the past are indeed based on 
ignorance or  just plain wrong.  
Despite the sort of equivocal argument exemplified here by Stevenson, 
evolutionary science does indeed provide a serious threat to all other theories of our 
nature, including these theories’ ‘diagnosis and prescription’ of the problems we may 
face. In other words, if the diagnostics and prescriptions of any particular theory are 
predicated on a view of our nature that is incompatible with what modern 
evolutionary science tells us, then we have good grounds for rejecting (or, at the very 
least, being sceptical of) that theory’s recommendations about human life or 
behaviour.
23
  
Furthermore, by obscuring the point that a normative theory of what we ought 
to do must be based on a plausible descriptive theory about about how things actually 
are, Stevenson exaggerates the ongoing relevance of the great religions and 
philosophies of the past for those who otherwise accept a scientific Darwinian 
account of our origins. Instead, the importance of these historical systems of thought 
to our understanding of human nature can only be assessed in light of the facts that 
evolutionary theory can provide.  
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This is the approach Peter Singer adopts in respect of Marx; that is, while 
rejecting Marx’s theory of history (and the view of a malleable human nature that it is 
based upon), Singer does not advocate a complete rejection of Marxist ideas, which 
have had an immense influence on our social theories: 
 
In directing our attention to the links between a society’s economic base and 
its laws, religion, politics, philosophy and culture generally, Marx shattered 
the illusion of the independence of ideas and culture, and opened up new and 
very fruitful areas of research. We should not abandon Marx’s insight, but we 
should make it part of a much larger picture.
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Here, Singer accepts that changes in the ‘mode of production’ do indeed affect 
a society’s dominant ideas and culture, but he argues that they do not change 
everything; certain aspects of human nature remain constant. A more sophisticated, 
evolutionary-informed account of social behaviour and organisation, therefore,  
“[would] recognise that the way in which the mode of production influences our 
ideas, our politics, and our consciousness is through the specific features of our 
biological inheritance.”25 
Marxist ideas, in other words, need to be revised in light of what modern 
evolutionary theory can tell us about human nature. This sort of argument could then 
extend to all other non-evolutionary theories of human existence – that, for example, 
we need not abandon the useful perspectives on the human condition offered by the 
likes of Confucius or Jesus, or Kant or Freud, but rather, by revising that which is 
incompatible with ‘the specific features of our biological inheritance’, we should fit 
the ideas of the great figures of the past into the framework (or larger picture) 
provided by a Darwinian account of our nature. 
 
≈ 
 
The brief analysis of introductory texts in the preceding sections indicates that the 
relevance of ETOHN is under-appreciated within modern political philosophy or, 
even when acknowledged, that the wider implications are inadequately explored. 
Indeed, there is a further potential problem with traditional approaches to political 
theory: how much we can or should rely on rational introspection.  
In his Contemporary Political Philosophy: An introduction, for example, 
philosopher Will Kymlicka discusses the criteria by which ‘success’ in the enterprise 
of political philosophy is assessed. In Kymlicka’s view, “the ultimate test of a theory 
of justice is that it cohere with, and help illuminate, our considered convictions of 
justice”:  
 
If on reflection we share the intuition that slavery is unjust, then this is a 
powerful objection to a proposed theory of justice that it supports slavery. 
Conversely, if a theory of justice matches our considered intuitions, and 
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structures them so as to bring out their internal logic, then we have a powerful 
argument in favour of that theory.
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Kymlicka accepts the possibility that these intuitions may be baseless, and that 
many political philosophies are defended “without any appeal to our intuitive sense of 
right and wrong” – nevertheless, in Kymlicka’s view, there does not seem to be any 
other plausible method of proceeding: “the fact is that we do have an intuitive sense 
of right and wrong, and it is natural, indeed unavoidable, that we try to work out its 
implications”.27 
 In his Darwinian Conservatism, political scientist Larry Arnhart makes a 
similar claim (although here based explicitly on the belief that our moral intuitions are 
a feature of evolved human nature): “Despite the variability in our moral judgements 
in different circumstances, enduring standards of right and wrong are rooted in our 
natural instincts.”28 Arnhart’s attempt to derive political values from the (supposed) 
facts of an evolved human nature will be examined in a later chapter; the relevant 
question here, however, is how much trust we should place on ‘convictions’ or 
‘intuitions’ when it comes to our political theories or beliefs – whether, for example, 
we should accept Arnhart’s (conservative) claim that “emotional recoil at the thought 
of infanticide, for example, is one way that we know it is immoral”.29  
Ethicist Julian Savulescu provides an alternative evolutionary perspective on 
this issue. While accepting that many of our intuitive beliefs may indeed arise from 
our evolved psychology, Savulescu nevertheless questions their appropriateness to 
modern moral decision-making. For instance, our intuitive feelings of disgust – the 
so-called ‘Yuk! reactions’ – in response to practices such as cannibalism or incest or 
infanticide have possibly been “evolutionarily programmed in order to protect us from 
toxins or adverse situations”: 
 
For example, the revulsion to incest has a very good biological reason; you’re 
much more likely to have a genetically abnormal child with a relative. So, 
many of the taboos have a strong biological basis; if you like, a quasi-rational 
basis. Some of them embody a kind of intuitive social form of knowledge, of 
practices that we’ve found in the past to be disadvantageous to human 
beings.
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The point here is that while there may be good evolutionary reasons for our 
Yuk! reactions, they may now ‘misfire’ in situations that are no longer 
disadvantageous to us – for instance, in intuitive negative responses to the idea of 
human genetic engineering, say, or of creating embryos for stem cell research. 
According to Savulescu, our Yuk! reactions “are very crude rules of thumb that have 
served us in our primitive past, but are simply ill-equipped to deal with complexities 
and the nuances of particular situations in today’s life.”31  
Moreover, these Yuk! reactions form only a particularly obvious sub-set of 
possible evolved psychological traits that may have proved advantageous in the past. 
If we extend this line of reasoning, therefore, we might predict other evolved 
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psychological influences on our behaviour – most especially with behaviour that 
impacted on past survival or reproduction, such as our attitudes to sex, or towards kin 
or members of our social group.  
The possibility of evolved ‘intuitions’ or evolved biases on our thinking, 
therefore, has implications for Will Kymlicka’s claim that political reasoning must 
ultimately begin with the fact of an ‘intuitive sense of right and wrong’: at the very 
least, it suggests that we would need to take this into account whenever we turn to 
intuition to help in our political thinking. And this is especially relevant to some of 
the contemporary political theories that Kymlicka himself examines – for example, 
multiculturalism, communitarianism and feminism. As Darwinian reasoning would 
predict the existence of evolved biases in our attitudes to sex or sexual relations, or to 
group membership, these could very possibly influence our thinking about members 
of other ethnic or cultural communities, or members of the other sex. 
According to Julian Savulescu, “The challenge of modern ethics today is not 
simply to sit with our intuitions, because our intuitions are not necessarily reliable 
guides to what we should do”.32 This is very much in line with Singer’s wider 
political point in A Darwinian Left: that if we understand the undesirable aspects of 
our evolved nature, we will be in a better position to design policies to mitigate their 
effects (at the same time, of course, as promoting the desirable pro-social aspects of 
our nature). 
 
≈ 
 
While it is as yet unclear how much of an impact modern Darwinian theory may have 
on political philosophy were it to be taken seriously, the current situation is difficult 
to defend. How can we continue to base political debate on views of human nature 
that are centuries out of date, that have been constructed from the imaginations of 
armchair theorists, or that appeal to intuitions as the ultimate basis of our political 
judgements without asking how and why those intuitions may have arisen in the first 
place?  
In respect of the left’s ideas about human nature, leftist theorists have often 
struggled with what rightists would argue is the reality of ‘human nature’. For 
example, rightists can claim that consumer capitalism simply reflects self-interested 
human nature: and when leftists deny this, rightists can point to the hordes of people 
who descend on shopping malls each day, not just in the West, but also in emerging 
economies like China, India and Brazil. The problem here is the disconnect between 
what leftist theory says about human nature and what we observe in people’s actual 
behaviour.  
One option for the left here could be to invoke something like the Marxist 
concept of ‘false consciousness’: to claim, for instance, that people are actually 
deluded in their beliefs or in their actions. But such a move smacks more of 
explaining away unwelcome evidence than explaining it. And, ultimately, the 
credibility of leftist prescriptions for a more egalitarian society will be undermined 
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the less its theories match up with what people observe of others’ behaviour in 
everyday life. 
The point is that the left’s denial of these obvious human traits concedes the 
high ground to the simplistic rightist claim that the facts of human nature warrant, 
say, a capitalism society. It doesn’t. While capitalism very successfully targets certain 
aspects of our nature, this is not to say that these are the only features of our nature, 
nor, indeed, that they are the most important for a flourishing society. In many 
respects, capitalism corrodes those aspects of our social nature, such as cooperation 
and altruism, that the left quite rightly believe are essential to worthwhile human 
lives. 
Yet if the left were to adopt a realistic account of human nature, warts and all 
(as Singer advocates), they can challenge the rightists’ skewed vision of what human 
beings are actually like. And by being aware of traits that may hinder its social goals, 
the left will be better able to design policies to overcome them. The left’s core values 
will remain the same but its theory will more realistically match what is achievable in 
practice – and, importantly, its theories will be more credible in the eyes of those who 
may be searching for a viable alternative to seemingly all-pervasive capitalism. 
Furthermore, it should be clear from the discussion above why Singer 
dismisses the need for a detailed philosophical justification of egalitarianism in A 
Darwinian Left.
33
 After all, there appears little point in working out the fine details of 
an ideal egalitarian society if this is not a society in which real living human beings 
can flourish.  
Unfortunately, modern leftists, in common with their political brethren briefly 
examined in this chapter, often fail to recognise the relevance of human evolution to 
our modern social behaviour. Indeed, many leftists are openly opposed to applying 
Darwinian reasoning to human society and politics. The following chapters will 
examine why this is the case, and whether (especially given historical precedent) 
leftists have good grounds for being suspicious of modern evolutionary theories of 
human nature. 
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It is true that every social idea justified by reference to Darwin predated his work, and that many who 
invoked him lacked a firm grasp of his views. Darwinism’s main contribution to social theory has been to 
popularise certain catchwords. 
Diane Paul, Darwin, social Darwinism and eugenics 
 
Chapter 3: Swapping Marx for Darwin? 
 
According to philosopher and historian Jean Gayon, modern biologists have 
compelling reasons to avoid associating their work with Darwin’s: 
 
Among other things, neo-liberal economics, social Darwinism, racial 
anthropology, [and] Nazi ideology … had strong interactions with Darwinism 
in the first century of its history. Likewise, in more recent times, sociobiology 
(in its more ideological forms), American liberalism and the European right-
wing have been more thoroughly committed to Darwinism than their 
opponents.
1
  
 
Gayon’s point is that Darwinism is not simply a scientific theory but that “it 
also belongs to cultural and political history”. 
This (negative) cultural and political history is also alluded to in philosopher 
Raymond Tallis’ critique of ‘Darwinitis’ – the “grotesquely simplified” account of 
human existence that, he believes, is provided by modern sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology. According to Tallis, “Darwinitis might seem a harmless 
idiocy but harmless idiocies have a habit, as the 20th century told us, of turning from 
fluffy little puppies into Rottweilers with sharpened teeth that may shred their owners 
to death.”2 
Tallis’ Rottweilers, of course, equate to the social Darwinism, Nazi racial 
biology and other odious aspects of evolutionary theory’s political past that are 
emphasised by the likes of Jean Gayon. Significantly, these historical political 
associations are all right-wing (with Gayon himself implying that sociobiology, in its 
‘more ideological forms’, is also to the right of the political spectrum). 
Indeed, ever since the emergence of sociobiology, leftists have emphasised the 
apparent links between modern Darwinist thinking and right-wing political beliefs. In 
one (in)famous early critique of E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology, for example, Wilson’s 
ideas were equated with earlier pseudo-scientific theories about class, race and sex, 
and to the political ideology that eventually “led to the establishment of gas chambers 
in Nazi Germany”.3 Similarly, in their influential Not in Our Genes, left-leaning 
scientists Steven Rose, Richard Lewontin and Leon Kamin highlight how 
conservative politicians have used purported “biological facts” to oppose equal 
working rights for women
4
, and how the British National Front has justified its racist 
beliefs as being “a product of our ‘selfish genes’”.5 
From a purely logical perspective, of course, any apparent social or political 
connotations of Darwinism would be irrelevant to its status as a scientific theory. This 
relates to the crucial distinction that Peter Singer draws between (evolutionary) facts 
and (political) values – the claim that we cannot deduce what we ought to do from 
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what Darwinian science may reveal about what human nature actually is like. Singer 
argues that Darwinian thinking cannot tell us whether particular social policies or 
political beliefs are right or wrong: “Instead it leaves the ethical decision up to us, 
merely offering to provide information relevant to that decision.”6  
An unfortunate feature of Darwinism’s political past, however, is that many 
political theorists – particularly on the right – have been more than willing to draw 
moral conclusions from Darwinian evolution: for example, as Singer points out, using 
Darwin’s theory “as an ethical justification of the right of the strong to trample over 
the weak”.7 
Yet while the right clearly commits a logical fallacy in this belief that is 
justifies ought, the left’s response to this erroneous reasoning is, according to Singer, 
similarly at fault: 
 
The left’s understandable but unfortunate mistake in relation to Darwinian 
thinking has been to accept the assumptions of the right, starting with the idea 
that the Darwinian struggle for existence corresponds to the vision of nature 
suggested by Tennyson’s memorable (and pre-Darwinian) phrase, ‘nature red 
in tooth and claw’. From this position it seemed only too clear that if 
Darwinism applies to human social behaviour, then a competitive marketplace 
is somehow justified, or shown to be ‘natural’ or inevitable.8 
 
Has the left, then, simply made an ‘unfortunate’ mistake in its stance on 
Darwinism? Furthermore, if egalitarians were not swayed into rejecting Darwinism by 
the fallacious arguments of the right, but instead drew a more critical distinction 
between evolutionary facts and political values, could Darwinian theory indeed 
provide a source of new ideas and inspiration for the left?  
In this chapter, I examine the tendency by many Darwinists, especially in the 
past, to derive political arguments from the facts (or purported facts) of human 
evolution. I then turn to leftist criticisms of Darwinism, beginning with those of Marx 
himself, and examine how this has resulted, at an extreme, in a relativist rejection of 
the possibility of objective scientific ‘truth’. Here, I argue that relativist (or 
‘postmodernist’) interpretations of Darwinian theory are themselves misguided. Next, 
I examine the assumption highlighted above that Darwinism is inherently right-wing, 
and suggest that this, too, is an erroneous view. Drawing together these earlier 
arguments, I conclude that much of the left’s contemporary opposition to ETOHN is 
based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of what modern Darwinism actually 
implies about human social organisation and behaviour. 
 
≈ 
 
Karl Marx, while readily embracing Darwinism as a credible scientific alternative to 
teleological beliefs about society, was nevertheless critical of the way in which the 
theory of natural selection apparently reflected its author’s laissez faire cultural 
background. In a letter to his collaborator and friend Friedrich Engels, for example, 
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Marx noted: “It is remarkable how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his 
English society with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, 
‘inventions’, and the Malthusian ‘struggle for existence’. It is Hobbes’ ‘bellum 
omnium contra omnes’ [‘the war of all against all’].”9  
Engels himself then further developed Marx’s critique of evolutionary theory 
by arguing that Darwinists perform a “conjuring trick” in which their social theories 
are applied to nature, then “the same theories are transferred back again from organic 
nature into history, and it is now claimed that their validity as eternal laws of human 
society has been proved”.10 
This has become the classic Marxist (and wider leftist) attitude to Darwinism, 
at least in a human context: that when evolutionary theory is applied to society, it is 
largely a process by which entrenched political ideas (about competition, say, or 
hierarchy) are read into nature, and then read back from nature to justify the original 
political beliefs – the naturalness of dog-eat-dog capitalism or colonial expansion, 
say, or the unnaturalness of social welfare or of egalitarian or socialist reform.  
Historian Robert Young, for example, provides a Marxist interpretation of the 
way in which new evolutionary ideas came to replace established theological beliefs 
during the Industrial Revolution: that this was simply the change from “a theory 
suitable for a pastoral, agrarian, aristocratic world” to a belief system “which reflects 
a competitive, urban, industrial one” – that is, “the substitution of one form of 
rationalisation of the hierarchical relations among people for another”.11 
The influence of this (Marxist) attitude to Darwinism is also reflected by 
sociologist Ann Oakley, who, in Gender on Planet Earth, argues: “Natural selection 
was ‘genetic capitalism’, the biological version of economic competition, the 
representation of the living world … as a capitalist financial balance sheet; Adam 
Smith’s theories about selfish, profiteering men in cities writ large on the landscape of 
Mother Earth.”12 
Beginning with Marx, therefore, the charge against Darwinism is that, most 
especially where it relates to humans, evolutionary theory does not necessarily reflect 
a ‘truth’ about the world; rather, it merely mirrors the pre-existing beliefs and biases 
of Darwinists themselves. As a modern example, in a chapter entitled ‘Delusional 
Systems’, Anne Oakley focuses on the (supposed) socio-cultural background of 
evolutionary scientists when she derides the biological theory of ‘sperm 
competition’.13 According to Oakley: “In mainstream SB/EP [sociobiology/ 
evolutionary psychology], the free market system combines with the gonadal 
preoccupation to produce the notion of ‘sperm competition’, and with militaristic 
ideology to give the aggressively entertaining idea of ‘sperm wars’.”14 
In Oakley’s interpretation, therefore, the concept of sperm competition, as 
with other aspects of Darwinism’s ‘delusional system’, is not objective; it arises, not 
from empirical observations of the world, but from the competitive sexual obsessions 
of its male theorists. 
Similar attitudes towards science – say, that it is a social ‘construct’, reflecting 
the pre-existing values or beliefs of its practitioners – are a feature of many leftist 
criticisms of ETOHN. It is therefore important to examine this influential 
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epistemological position (epitomised by the Marxist critique of natural selection 
above) in more detail.  
 
≈ 
 
Socialist feminist Alison Jagger provides a clear exposition of classic Marxist 
epistemology: the claim that “all systems of conceptualisation reflect certain social 
interests and values”. 
  
In a society where the production of knowledge is controlled by a certain 
class, the knowledge produced will reflect the interests and values of that 
class. In other words, in class societies the prevailing knowledge and science 
interpret reality from the standpoint of the ruling class.
15
 
 
Jagger goes on to suggest that the ruling classes’ interpretation of social reality 
is distorted because they do not experience the suffering of those they exploit; as a 
result, she argues, the exploited have an “epistemologically advantageous position” – 
a standpoint that “provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than 
that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive”.16 
Jagger then logically extends this traditional Marxist argument into a ‘socialist 
feminist’ one: the claim that, because “women suffer a special form of oppression and 
exploitation”, women too will have a distinctive epistemological perspective. “From 
this standpoint,” Jagger concludes, “it is possible to gain a less biased and more 
comprehensive view of reality than that provided either by established bourgeois 
science or by the male-dominated leftist alternatives to it.”17 
Here, Jagger neatly illustrates an extreme relativist perspective on science: the 
view that established science (including Darwinian science), far from providing an 
accurate account of the natural world, simply reflects the social values of its 
practitioners. Indeed, this emphasis on the social matrix of science has led some 
sections of the left towards various forms of relativism, which, at an extreme, takes 
knowledge and truth to exist only in relation to a cultural, social or historical context. 
Ironically, however, this relativist refutation of science is itself open to 
‘relativist’ criticism. For example, according to the logic of this approach to 
epistemology, all systems of conceptualisation reflect certain social interests and 
values; therefore, it is not at all clear why, in the case of class differences, the 
experience of exploitation or oppression provides a less distorted view of reality. 
(Indeed, given that privilege may expose the ruling classes to a wider range of 
experiences, why would this not result in a more comprehensive view of reality?)  
Ultimately, if we follow the Marxist approach to epistemology to its logical 
conclusion, all ‘factual’ beliefs could be dismissed as mere distortions arising from a 
particular social context. And this demonstrates the ultimate incoherence of extreme 
forms of relativism: that is, the argument that ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ is nothing more than 
a socially-mediated distortion would itself be a socially-mediated distortion, one with 
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no more claim to ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ than the position it opposes. By its own logic, in 
other words, extreme relativism is not ‘true’, because ‘truth’ is only ever relative.  
However, despite the ironic contradictions of relativism (for example, its 
objective claim that there is no objective truth to objective claims), it appears to have 
attracted many on the left – a tendency that, according to left-leaning physicist Alan 
Sokal, marks “a profound historical volte-face”.18  
Ever since the Enlightenment, Sokal argues, the left has used rational 
scientific thought and analysis to combat obscurantism and “the mystifications 
promoted by the powerful”.  
 
The recent turn of many ‘progressive’ or ‘leftist’ academic humanists and 
social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays 
this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for 
progressive social critique. Theorizing about ‘the social construction of 
reality’ won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies 
for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, 
sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the notions of truth and 
falsity.
19
 
 
In a similar vein, Richard Dawkins indicates some of the absurdities to which 
relativism has (apparently) led. For example, Dawkins mocks a relativist claim that 
the “sexed equation” E = mc2 “privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are 
vitally necessary to us”, or the assertion that (male-dominated) science has difficulty 
with fluid hydraulics because of the male preoccupation with rigidity.
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Interestingly, Anne Oakley also endorses Sokal’s criticism of the 
‘postmodern’ relativism apparent amongst many academic leftists. According to 
Oakley, despite the fact that science and scientists can often be biased, science 
nevertheless provides “a set of systematic and explicit practices, whose emphasis on 
experiment and verification offers the best safeguard there is against ideological 
bias”.21 She goes on to argue: “French philosophy, the first major repository of 
intellectual postmodernism has a lot to say about scientific ideas and terminology. 
However, most of it misunderstands, confuses, jargonizes or otherwise misrepresents 
what scientists have done or are trying to do”. 
Given Marx’s relativist critique of a society’s systems of belief (including 
Darwinism), it is understandable that the political left has been influenced by relativist 
and by related postmodernist ideas. Yet as ‘the left’ are the very group that Peter 
Singer insists must take Darwinism seriously, it is necessary to examine the extent to 
which relativist or postmodern influences are evident in contemporary critiques of 
ETOHN. 
 
≈ 
 
Surprisingly, in light of her defence of science, Anne Oakley’s discussion of 
Darwinian biology commits many of the postmodernist offences that she herself 
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warns against. For example, immediately preceding her claim that the theory of 
natural selection is simply “genetic capitalism”, Oakley states: 
 
Once it was called eugenics, then sociobiology, now it’s rebranded as 
evolutionary psychology, though there are disputes about whether these last 
two are the same animal. Close to the beginning of it all, an ‘amiable but 
rather aimless’ young man called Charles Darwin spent five years on a ship 
called HMS Beagle, scribbling some observations about evolution in a small 
red notebook.
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Here, Oakley’s unwarranted conflation of eugenics and sociobiology is 
perhaps the least objectionable of these claims; it is her cavalier dismissal of Darwin 
and his evolutionary theories (i.e., those that provide the foundation of modern 
biological science) that is most staggering.  
Indeed, Oakley’s subsequent analysis of modern ETOHN provides a case 
study of those who ‘misunderstand, confuse, jargonize or otherwise misrepresent’ 
what evolutionary scientists have done or are trying to do. For instance, and in 
addition to her questionable interpretation of ‘sperm competition’, Oakley defines the 
Darwinian concept of sexual selection as “a subspecies of natural selection”, and 
claims: “Sexual selection says that men’s genetic interests are served by having as 
much sex with as many fertile women as possible, so as to spread their genes as far as 
possible, while women’s reproductive chances are enhanced by finding successful, 
resource-rich mates with good genes to look after them while they have babies.”23 
But this is not what sexual selection ‘says’. In brief, Darwin introduced the 
concept of sexual selection to account for characteristics, such as the peacock’s tail, 
that would not likely have arisen through natural selection. In this classic example, the 
peacock’s tail is an apparent hindrance in the ‘struggle for existence’; nevertheless, by 
attracting peahens, it aids the peacock in reproducing. Sexual selection thus focuses 
on reproduction in a broad sense, not simply on ‘sex’ as Oakley seems to think.  
Here, Oakley appears to have confused sexual selection with the theory of 
parental investment, which she then proceeds to ‘analyse’.24 Referencing behavioural 
ecologist Sarah Hrdy, Oakley comments: “It seems that male sex hormones are 
associated with something called ‘symmetry’, which women go for, though it’s not 
clear why, because ‘symmetrical’ men have sex earlier with more partners and invest 
less in romantic relationships than their non-symmetrical counterparts.”25 
It is instructive to examine what Hrdy herself actually says about ‘this 
something called’ symmetry. On the page to which Oakley refers, Hrdy describes 
how “environmental insults” that interfere with an organism’s development (parasites, 
diseases, food shortages, and the like) are assumed to cause lopsidedness in an 
otherwise symmetrical body plan – that is, “small, random deviations from perfect 
bilateral agreement in what should be perfectly symmetrical traits” (such as peacock 
plumage, scorpionfly wings, or corresponding sides of the human face).
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 Such 
‘fluctuating asymmetries’ are therefore a potential indication of how an individual 
organism has coped with environmentally induced stress.  
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According to Hrdy, the degree of fluctuating asymmetry in a range of 
organisms, including humans, can correlate with body size, freedom from parasites, 
and success in competition for resources or mates:  
 
In short, the brightest, most ornamented or symmetrical males are likely to be 
those best suited to prosper in the environment where they grew up or 
developed breeding plumage. For females who don’t have the option of 
running lab tests on potential fathers, such up-to-the-minute indices of 
physical condition provides the next best thing.
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Hrdy goes on to acknowledge that, despite ever more data on human 
fluctuating asymmetries, we still do not know exactly how these asymmetries are 
registered by observers, nor how important they actually are in human mate choices. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that humans are able to register barely perceptible 
signs of others’ physical condition and self-confidence.  
This comparison of Oakley’s sceptical analysis of evolutionary theory and 
what evolutionary theorists actually say is significant because Oakley is not simply an 
obscure academic: she is a Professor of Sociology and Social Policy, and Director of 
the Social Science Research Unit at the University of London. The point is, then, that 
if Oakley so blatantly misunderstands (or misrepresents) these Darwinian ideas, what 
are we to make of her extended critique of other aspects of modern evolutionary 
theory? How can we trust what she has to say? And, perhaps more importantly, what 
impact will this have on the attitudes towards modern ETOHN of those academics 
and students who read her work? 
Indeed, similar (if not always as blatantly dismissive) beliefs about 
evolutionary biology appear reflective of the mainstream paradigm within many of 
the social sciences.
28
 One common feature of these criticisms is the belief that 
ETOHN present untestable hypothesises or, as sociologist Michael Kimmel suggests, 
“assume that only one interpretation is possible from the evidence”.29 
For instance, Kimmel, also a Professor of Sociology, examines the question of 
why parents “would ‘invest’ so much time and energy in their children when they 
could be out having a good time”. In proposing an alternative to the (supposed) 
sociobiological claim that “we are ‘hard-wired’ for such altruistic behaviour, because 
our children are the repository of our genetic material”, Kimmel suggests instead that 
“it may be simple economic calculation: In return for taking care of our offspring 
when they are young and dependent, we expect them to take care of us when we are 
old and dependent – a far more compact and tidy explanation.”30 
Is this, though, really ‘a far more compact and tidy explanation’ for why 
parents care for their children? For a start, Kimmel’s argument would mean that 
human parental care is qualitatively different from similar behaviour in other animal 
species that also care for their young but are unable to make such economic 
calculations (or, indeed, benefit from them in old age). Yet if Kimmel is correct, then 
at some stage during human evolution, our species switched from the sort of 
instinctive or ‘hard-wired’ parental behaviour of our more animal-like ancestors to the 
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rational, consciously ‘calculating’ form of behaviour that (he claims) is the case 
today. Providing an explanation for how this may have occurred would be anything 
but ‘compact’. 
Furthermore, Kimmel’s explanation for parenting behaviour can itself be 
empirically tested using the standard methods of sociology: observations of the 
relevant human social behaviour, interviews with parents, and the like. (Speaking as a 
parent, and having observed other parents’ behaviour, I would reject Kimmel’s 
explanation on anecdotal grounds: an explicit economic calculation, I would suggest, 
is not the reason why most parents care for their children.) 
To be blunt: Kimmel does not provide a very credible alternative to the idea 
that humans may have evolved predispositions for parental behaviour; rather, he 
assumes that the evolutionary hypotheses can simply be countered with any 
‘plausible’ counter argument, without further examination of the evidence supporting 
either position. (Indeed, Kimmel’s perfunctory dismissal of the empirical basis of 
‘parental investment’ is akin to Oakley’s similar disregard for the mass of evidence 
supporting the theories of ‘sperm competition’ or ‘fluctuating asymmetries’.)   
Fellow sociologist Hilary Lips, meanwhile, argues that it is difficult to verify 
the Darwinian “assumption of greater investment by females in producing eggs and 
gestating embryos than by males in producing sperm”.31 Lips instead refutes this idea 
with the rhetorical question: “How does one quantify the amount of energy involved 
in the production of a lifetime supply of seminal fluid and sperm, for instance?” Here, 
Lips apparently assumes that there is no empirical way to calculate the energy costs of 
pregnancy or of sperm production, when this is clearly not the case.  
Similarly, Anne Oakley uses a rhetorical question to highlight a ‘problem’ 
with a related aspect of modern ETOHN – the concept of kin selection (i.e., that 
organisms favour their genetic relatives). “Without a shared instinct for mathematics,” 
Oakley suggests, “how could anyone compute the coefficients of consanguinity 
needed to support kin selection theory?”32 Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker 
provides a wry (and withering) response to this oft-expressed criticism of kin 
selection: that it is like claiming that “people can’t see in depth, because most cultures 
haven’t worked out the trigonometry that underlies stereoscopic vision.”33 
Importantly, if the attitudes towards evolutionary science briefly highlighted 
above are at all indicative of the paradigm within disciplines such as sociology and 
gender studies, then ETOHN are likely to be ignored or dismissed by many social 
scientists and, moreover, evolutionary ideas are unlikely to be incorporated into 
(potentially) relevant areas of social science research. In relation to egalitarian 
political ideals, and as Singer himself makes clear, if the left deliberately blinds itself 
to the possibility of evolved influences on our behaviour, then it may also remain 
blind to (potentially avoidable) obstacles to its egalitarian goals.
34
 
In its more extreme forms, the contemporary left’s dismissal of ETOHN on 
relativist grounds (or through an ill-informed scepticism about the scientific validity 
of evolutionary concepts) appears to be misguided. At the same time, however, it is 
obvious that unacknowledged social biases have been a feature of Darwinism – both 
as regards the substance of the scientific theory itself and on how it has been 
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perceived in a wider social context. Darwin’s own work, for example, is replete with 
the social snobbery of an upper middle class Victorian English gentleman (especially 
in his descriptions of women, the lower classes, and other races).  
Thus, even if we were to reject the extreme ‘epistemic relativism’ that 
characterises some leftist critiques of evolutionary theory, how should we deal with 
the clear evidence of past bias in Darwinian theory?  
 
≈ 
 
Sarah Hrdy notes that many women have long  been aware of male bias within 
science, particularly biology. According to Hrdy, this critical view of biology, which 
is taught in many university courses today, serves to “reinforce the alienation many 
women, especially feminists, feel towards evolutionary theory”.35 (A brief analysis of 
introductory texts to gender studies supports Hrdy’s claim about feminist attitudes to 
biology: of the six books examined
36
, five were critical of modern ETOHN, and three 
extremely so.)  
Gender scientist Anne Fausto-Sterling similarly highlights the fact of this 
gender bias in biology, most especially male biologists’ traditional beliefs about sex 
differences. Fausto-Sterling argues that it was only after increasing numbers of 
women entered the discipline in the 1970s, and particularly the field of animal 
behaviour, that the real nature of sexual relationships and male-female behaviour was 
recognised.  
According to Fausto-Sterling, these researchers, armed with a new feminist 
perspective on the world, soon demonstrated that female animals actively create their 
own social environments – a conclusion that ran contrary to established beliefs about 
female passivity. Fausto-Sterling goes on to ask why earlier observers failed to 
recognise this, and suggests: “It is possible their a priori notions about sex roles 
hindered their ability to observe. It was not the feminists who were blind to the 
scientific truth. Rather, their male-biased predecessors made one-sided accounts of 
sex difference.”37 (Oakley, commenting on the same example, provides the relativist 
suggestion that “it simply depends on who’s doing the observing”.38) 
Significantly, Sarah Hrdy (one of the very women who entered the field of 
animal behaviour in the 1970s) provides a different perspective on men’s and 
women’s approach to her discipline: “Although male and female researchers do 
science in the same way, they may be attracted to different problems.”39 One 
consequence of women’s input into biological research was, as Fausto-Sterling also 
points out, that the importance of female behaviour was soon recognised – but this, 
according to Hrdy, then motivated male scientists to correct the “inadvertent 
machismo” of their discipline.40 As she notes in the preface to Mother Nature:  
 
Unlike superstition or religious faith, a good scientist’s underlying 
assumptions are subject to continuous challenge. Sooner or later in science, 
wrong assumptions get revised. Nevertheless, some take longer to get 
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corrected than others, as was the case with overly narrow stereotypes about 
women.
41
 
 
In Hrdy’s field of behavioural ecology, then, the bias of one set of scientists 
(those with a male-centred outlook) was eventually revised due to insights from 
another set of scientists (those with a feminist bias) – a process that, according to 
historian of science David Hull, is a ubiquitous feature of scientific enquiry: “The 
self-correction so important in science does not depend on scientists presenting 
unbiased results but on other scientists, with different biases, checking them.”42  
Thus, critics such as Fausto-Sterling are quite justified in indicating the bias of 
past Darwinian accounts of human behaviour. However, these criticisms are less 
justifiable to the extent that they imply that contemporary theories are incapable of 
recognising or addressing prejudiced assumptions. Hrdy, by contrast, provides a more 
balanced approach to the evidence of male bias in biology, using it to highlight how 
our knowledge of human sexual behaviour has deepened and broadened over time – 
for instance, as in her own experience, how different biases and perspectives have 
helped to overturn erroneous assumptions, and how this has itself led to an enhanced 
understanding of the natural world and of humanity’s place within it. 
The evidence of bias in biology, and more especially human biology, 
therefore, is not in itself a reason to reject the science in its entirety (as some on the 
left have been wont to do). To dismiss Darwinian science as irrevocably biased by its 
socio-cultural context is to erroneously assume that science has no self-corrective 
mechanisms or practices. Yet, as Anne Oakley herself suggests, science’s emphasis 
on experiment and verification offers the best safeguard there is against such 
ideological bias.  
The (Marxist) emphasis on the socio-cultural environment within which 
scientific beliefs are developed is an important means to reveal possible biases within 
scientific theories. Nevertheless, in the case of leftist attitudes towards ETOHN, the 
influence of Marxist, relativist or postmodern ideas, even if not taken to the absurd 
extremes highlighted by Dawkins above, appears to have resulted in a great deal of 
scepticism – and, most especially, to the belief that Darwinian explanations for human 
social behaviour invariably reflect the political prejudices of Darwinists themselves. 
One result is the apparent misrepresentation of modern ETOHN in mainstream social 
science. 
Be this as it may, are there not still other grounds for the left to be suspicious 
of ETOHN? For example, even if we accept Singer’s claim that the left have made an 
understandable but unfortunate mistake in relation to Darwin, why is it that Darwinian 
ideas appear far more attractive to the political right than to the left; say, to the neo-
liberal economists, Social Darwinists, racial anthropologists, Nazi ideologues, and 
modern right-wing extremists mentioned by Jean Gayon above? 
Here, I turn to another element of the leftist opposition to ETOHN: the idea 
that Darwinism is inherently right-wing.   
 
≈ 
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Of course, and to repeat the point made at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
nonsensical to ask about the political ‘nature’ of Darwinism: the scientific theory of 
evolution carries no political loading whatsoever, it just is. Nonetheless, it is 
understandable why many people have assumed that Darwinian theory has rightist 
implications. 
For example, because Darwin’s original notions of struggle and competition in 
nature were derived in large part from laissez-faire economics, it is not surprising that 
many rightists readily accepted ‘Darwinian’ justifications for their pre-existing 
political beliefs – nor why the left, following Marx, so readily rejected them.  
Or rather, this is not surprising given the benefit of hindsight. That is, one of 
the key elements of Darwinism’s social and political matrix is its odious history: any 
modern appraisal of evolutionary theory (at least, in respect of human social 
behaviour) is therefore likely to be filtered through a historical lens of awareness 
about the horrific excesses that were later justified with reference to Darwin. Our 
modern view of Darwinism, in other words, is likely to be influenced by knowledge 
about how it was misused; and the fact that much of this political misuse occurred in 
the name of right-wing ideologies, such as Nazism, potentially colours our view of its 
political implications (i.e., causing us to assume that it is inherently right-wing or 
conservative). 
What is often overlooked is that many left-wing political beliefs, at least 
before World War II, were also bolstered by Darwinian (or pseudo-Darwinian) 
arguments. According to Diane Paul, for example: “Darwin’s followers found in his 
ambiguities legitimation for whatever they favoured: laissez-faire capitalism, 
certainly, but also liberal reform, anarchism and socialism; colonial conquest, war and 
patriarchy, but also anti-imperialism, peace and feminism.”43  
For instance, the socialist co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel 
Wallace, argued that human evolution would ultimately favour the spread of 
rationality and altruism. For Wallace, given that culture and technology had 
apparently eased many of the physical pressures on human evolution, natural 
selection would instead focus increasingly on mental qualities, such as the capacity to 
behave cooperatively and morally with members of one’s own group. Those groups 
whose members had these qualities, he believed, would flourish at the expense of 
those lacking them.
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Similarly, the eugenics movement, now most often associated with the 
extreme right, was originally a cause favoured by many on the progressive left: wider 
social good, it was believed, could be achieved through government intervention in 
human reproduction, informed by a Darwinian understanding of sexual behaviour. As 
Paul notes: “To those who had faith in disinterested expertise and the virtues of state 
planning, control of breeding seemed only common sense.”45 Steven Pinker argues 
the same point – that for much of the 20th century eugenics was a favoured cause of 
the left: “Progressives loved eugenics because it was on the side of reform rather than 
the status quo, activism rather than laissez faire, and social responsibility rather than 
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selfishness. Moreover, they were comfortable expanding social intervention in order 
to bring about a social goal.”46 
Those leftist critics of modern ETOHN who identify a historical continuity 
with political justifications for social inequality, or for beliefs about the naturalness 
and inevitability of competitive struggle, are only half correct. Darwinian concepts 
were indeed (mis)used by many with right-wing political agendas, but the same was 
also true of many advocating leftist political policies. Much of the perception that 
Darwinism is inherently right-wing, therefore, does not reflect the actual history of 
how Darwinian ideas were incorporated into social and political arguments. As Diane 
Paul notes: “Darwinism merely provided window dressing for social theories that 
predated it and would surely have flourished in its absence.”47 
The modern association of Darwinism with the right, then, is in part due to 
historical happenstance: for example, to the fact that many of the pre-existing right-
wing ideologies most appalling to modern eyes – sexism, say, or imperialism or 
racism – were often justified using Darwinian rhetoric. But whether Darwinian 
science actually directly influenced particular political ideologies is questionable; 
according to Paul, many of those who appealed to Darwinism simply misunderstood 
or misinterpreted its principles (although, admittedly, “Darwin’s own ambiguities, 
hesitations and waverings made that easy”):  
 
But the social power of a theory has never depended on a detailed or correct 
understanding by its interpreters. In particular contexts, the Darwinian 
discourse of struggle and selection gave old ideas about competition, race and 
gender a new credibility. In Germany, [for example] … what the Nazis 
obtained from Darwin was not a coherent set of ideas or well-developed 
ideology but a language.
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The automatic link that many leftists make between Darwinism and right-wing 
political beliefs, therefore, is misleading.
49
 Thus, while Darwinian language has 
certainly been a feature of influential right-wing ideologies (such as nationalism or 
capitalism), Darwinian rhetoric was also historically employed by those prompting 
progressive or socialist social reforms. 
 
≈ 
 
A case study of how Darwinian approaches to politics are often interpreted by the left 
– in this case, leftist criticisms of science writer Matt Ridley’s evolutionary-informed 
Origin of Virtue – can here serve to bring many of the arguments presented above 
together. 
According to sociologist Hilary Rose (one of the central figures in the 
contemporary opposition to ETOHN): “Right-wing libertarian Matt Ridley sees 
Darwinian theory as pointing to the unnaturalness of welfare benefits for single 
mothers, which therefore should be abolished.”50 Following Rose’s lead, Anne 
Oakley similarly refers to Ridley’s Origin of Virtue to back up the claim that 
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“evolutionary psychology has specifically been used to justify conservative social 
policies, especially a reduction in state support and intervention for disadvantaged 
groups”.51 
Is this, though, an accurate summation of Ridley’s political argument in 
Origins of Virtue? The obvious way to check the assertions made by Rose and 
Oakley, of course, is to refer to Ridley’s book, and thus engage in one of the 
important safeguards against possible ideological bias – verification. 
In this particular case, while I have been unable to find any comment about the 
‘unnaturalness of welfare benefits for single mothers’ in his book, it is at least true 
that Ridley criticises the welfare state, and, indeed, that he holds libertarian political 
views. In his defence, however, this is done as part of a wider critique of (what Ridley 
believes to be) a naïve view of humans as ‘noble savages’, corrupted by ignoble 
society – that is, the “soft left” belief that all negative aspects of human behaviour are 
socially imposed upon an inherently ‘nice’ human nature.52 
Ridley, expressing the same evolutionarily-informed sentiment as Peter 
Singer, suggests instead: “Human beings have some instincts that foster the greater 
good and others that foster self-interested and anti-social behaviour. We must design a 
society that encourages the former and discourages the latter.”53 In Ridley’s view 
(again reflective of Singer’s broad Darwinian left argument) the left’s unwillingness 
to accept “humankind’s propensity for self-interest”54 may undermine its attempt to 
bring about a more cooperative society.  
Ridley applies this analysis of human nature to state government: 
 
[I]f you fail to recognize the basic opportunism of human beings, then you fail 
to notice how government is composed of self-interested individuals rather 
than saints who only work for the greater good. Government is then just a tool 
for interest groups and budget-maximizing bureaucrats to bid up each other’s 
power and reward at the expense of the rest of us. It is not a neutral, 
motiveless machine for delivering social benefits.
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Here, while egalitarians might, quite rightly, question the libertarian 
alternative to the state that Ridley later presents, surely he has a point about the 
dangers of too naïve a view of an all-beneficent state bureaucracy? No-one who has 
worked in a large organisation, for instance, can be ignorant of how clashes of interest 
between individuals can impact on the work that is being done, nor believe that this 
could not also be a feature of government bureaucracies.
56
  
Indeed, for those wishing to promote more state involvement in areas such as 
welfare, a realistic appreciation of human behaviour is important; if we wish to 
maximise the benefits of government intervention in the welfare of its most needy 
citizens, then we need to recognise and overcome the detrimental effects of the 
possible self-serving behaviour of bureaucrats (and this would be the case regardless 
of whether such behaviour were shaped more by nurture or more by nature). 
Ridley’s libertarian critique of the welfare state is indeed scathing: for 
example, he argues that “giant, centralized Leviathans like the National Health 
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Service, nationalized industries and government quangos, all based on 
condescension” have destroyed peoples’ strong sense of community, and that the 
welfare state’s mandatory nature has “encouraged in its donors a reluctance and 
resentment, and in its clients not gratitude but apathy, anger or an entrepreneurial 
drive to exploit the system.”57 
Of course, Ridley is here trotting out the standard libertarian objections to the 
welfare state. Nevertheless, unless we believe that state bureaucracy is sacrosanct or 
that its operation is beyond improvement, surely there is an element of truth to at least 
some of these criticisms? This does not mean that Ridley’s subsequent call for a 
scaling down of the welfare state is the only option; egalitarians could also use such 
an analysis of the limitations of existing state bureaucracy to design a more 
efficacious welfare alternative. (Indeed, egalitarians could themselves critique multi-
national corporations in the same way that Ridley does the government: that, say, the 
greed and self-interest of those running such corporations is socially destructive.) 
How, then, does this relate to the wider enquiry into leftist attitudes to 
ETOHN?  
Oakley suggests that the evolutionary approach to politics exemplified by 
Ridley is “culturally pernicious”.58 From the above analysis of the actual arguments 
that Ridley presents, though, this appears an unwarranted claim. While Ridley’s 
libertarian beliefs may indeed be wrong-headed to many on the left, his evolutionary 
explanation for human behaviour is independent of the political beliefs that he later 
expounds. That is, he believes that certain political policies will promote desirable 
human behaviour at the expense of the undesirable; but, regardless of the soundness 
of these political beliefs, the fact that humans have desirable and undesirable 
tendencies still remains. 
Oakley and Rose, moreover, clearly imply that Ridley’s evolutionary 
arguments involve a callous disregard for the poor or the disadvantaged. This, too, is 
an unfair criticism. Of course, in Ridley’s (libertarian) political opinion, the current 
state welfare system hinders rather than helps society to flourish. But Ridley is not 
arguing that the disadvantaged should simply be left to fall by the wayside; rather, he 
argues, rightly or wrongly, that such groups would be better served by the libertarian 
policies that he advocates.  
Why, then, do the likes of Oakley and Rose provide such skewed and 
unjustified criticism of Ridley’s argument? To paraphrase Fausto-Sterling’s point 
about ideological blinkering above, it is possible that their a priori notions about the 
inherent right-wing nature of ETOHN hinders their ability to observe. In other words, 
these critics of evolutionary theory – like those discussed above – appear 
ideologically inclined to dismiss evolutionary theory without any real attempt to give 
a balanced assessment of what the theorists themselves actually say. 
Indeed, because the paradigm in the social sciences is largely negative towards 
ETOHN, many researchers seem predisposed by their disciplines’ prevailing set of 
beliefs to react sceptically (and perhaps unfairly) to evolutionary approaches to 
human behaviour. Furthermore, such a paradigm appears self-reinforcing: if new 
entrants into the field of gender studies are exposed to the sort of distorted account of 
 39 
evolutionary theory presented by Oakley or Rose, then they are unlikely to approach 
ETOHN with an open mind.  
An unfortunate irony here is that many of those on the left who focus on the 
(real or apparent) ideological bias of science, appear to be themselves ideologically 
blinkered in respect of ETOHN. 
 
≈ 
 
In an area as politically charged as the debate about human nature, it is often difficult 
for outsiders to know which side to believe. For example, according to evolutionary 
psychologist Geoffrey Miller, left-wing critics “such as Stephen Jay Gould, Steven 
Rose, and Richard Lewontin have convinced a substantial portion of the educated 
public that evolutionary psychology is a pernicious right-wing conspiracy, with the 
hidden ideological agenda of reviving biological determinism, sexism, racism, and 
elitism”.59  
Of course, here Miller himself is likely to be biased in his attitude towards his 
own discipline. Nevertheless, to the extent that this chapter’s discussion of beliefs 
about evolutionary theory is indicative of a wider paradigm within the social sciences, 
the view that Darwinian ideas are inherently right-wing does indeed appear to be 
widely held. Furthermore, many (though not necessarily all) contemporary leftist 
attitudes towards ETOHN appear based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of 
Darwinian ideas.
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The left, following Marx, has justifiably drawn attention to obvious bias in 
earlier Darwinian accounts of human behaviour; however, the potential for prejudice 
within science is not an adequate reason to reject Darwinian theory: as an empirical 
science, (human) evolutionary biology is able to self-correct in the light of new 
evidence and to amend or discard erroneous assumptions.  
Moreover, as an empirical science, Darwinism is a source solely of facts, not 
of political values. The idea that Darwinism is inherently right-wing, therefore, is 
nonsensical, and the association between Darwinian ideas and right-wing political 
ideology is misleading. 
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Even if it were true that evolution, or the teaching of evolution, encouraged immorality, that would not 
imply that the theory of evolution was false. It is quite astonishing how many people cannot grasp this 
simple piece of logic. The fallacy is so common it even has a name, the argumentum ad consequentiam 
– X is true (or false) because of how much I like (or dislike) its consequences. 
Richard Dawkins, The Greatest Show on Earth 
 
 
Chapter 4: Deterministic & Reductionist. Not 
 
In one of the most famous passages from On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin 
suggested of his theory of natural selection that “There is grandeur in this view of 
life”. A half century or so later, William Jennings Bryan, the creationist state 
prosecutor in the infamous Scopes ‘Monkey Trial’, described natural selection just as 
lyrically, but with a entirely opposed sentiment: Darwin’s theory, Bryan believed, was 
“a dogma of darkness and death”.1 
This latter view of evolutionary theory is shared by many fundamentally-
minded religious believers who would reject the materialist Darwinian claim that life 
emerged from matter, and consciousness from life. It is not difficult to appreciate 
why. If all life, including human life, simply arose through chemical reactions in 
some primeval ‘warm little pond’, as Darwin initially speculated, does this not rob our 
lives of all real meaning? Indeed, in the absence of a Divine Creator with some higher 
purpose to human existence, just what is the point of life? From the Darwinian 
perspective, life (and love and joy and fear and hope, and all the other meaningful 
aspects of it) appears futile. 
Richard Dawkins, the most outspoken of Darwin’s modern heirs, would agree 
– both with the grandeur of an evolutionary view of life and with life’s ultimate 
purposelessness. For example, in The Greatest Show on Earth: The evidence for 
evolution, Dawkins (suffering from a cold as he writes) ruminates on the futility of the 
common cold virus existing solely to replicate itself, and splutters: “Futility? What 
nonsense. Sentimental human nonsense.  Natural selection is all futile. It is all about 
the survival of self-replicating instructions for self-replicating.”2 
This view of life as nothing but replication for replication’s sake is most 
memorably expounded in Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene. Here, in fleshing out Darwin’s 
idea of life’s origins in some warm little pond, Dawkins speculates about a ‘primeval 
soup’, some three or four billion years ago, within which simple chemical compounds 
combine into more complex molecules, and eventually into amino acids (the building 
blocks of proteins).
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“At some point”, Dawkins suggests, “a particularly remarkable molecule was 
formed by accident … [with] the extraordinary property of being able to create copies 
of itself.”4 This self-replicating molecule eventually gave rise to further, more 
complex and more efficient replicators, which eventually built themselves “survival 
machines” in which to live: 
 
Now they [modern replicators] swarm in huge colonies, safe inside lumbering 
robots, sealed off from the outside world, communicating with it by tortuous 
indirect routes, manipulating it by remote control. They are in you and me; 
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they created us, body and mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale 
for our existence. They have come a long way, these replicators. Now they go 
by the name of genes, and we are their survival machines.
5
 
 
Here, Dawkins is presenting to a popular audience the gene-centred view of 
evolution that had begun to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet while the basic tenets 
of this gene-centred view are now accepted as biological orthodoxy,
6
 in a wider 
context, Dawkins’ metaphorical concept of the ‘selfish gene’, and most especially its 
application to human beings, has met with fierce resistance. As Dawkins himself 
acknowledges, some critics even accuse him of “advocating selfishness as a principle 
by which we should live”.7 
And just as it is not difficult to see why religious people may object to 
Darwinism’s materialist account of the origins of life, so it is easy to understand why 
many secular people may feel qualms about the gene’s-eye view of human life and 
behaviour. After all, the desire for life to have some ultimate value is not the 
prerogative of the pious; even the non-religious might feel that human meaning or 
worth is stripped away if human beings are nothing more that lumbering robotic 
‘survival machines’, the end product of a blind process of self-replication with no 
ultimate purpose beyond further reproduction.
8
  
From this new evolutionary perspective, seemingly selfless behaviour merely 
masks self-interest, and even something as deeply felt as a parent’s love for a child 
could be explained in terms of ‘selfish genes’: this ‘love’ being merely an emotional 
trick by which genes get one organism to care for another organism that carries copies 
of the same genes.   
Indeed, for sociologist Hilary Rose, “the flashpoint” in her opposition to 
ETOHN came with “the claim that parental love is reducible to genetics”.9 Fellow 
sociologist Howard Kaye similarly expresses a wider disquiet about the Dawkinsian 
image of humans ultimately controlled by selfish genes: “Dawkins’s myth of the 
selfish gene and it hellish creation [survival machines] is, of course, scientifically 
false, as well as being morally abhorrent”.10 Comparable views are apparent in many 
criticisms of modern evolutionary thinking, at least where it applies to human 
behaviour.
11
 
But do opponents of modern ETOHN (i.e., theories themselves premised on 
concepts such as kin selection and ‘selfish genes’) not have a point – say, about the 
morally or socially pernicious nature of theories that apparently posit selfishness as 
the be all and end all of human existence? 
For example, as philosopher Leslie Stevenson argues, a great deal depends on 
whichever theory of human nature we accept: “for individuals, the meaning and 
purpose of our lives, what we ought to do or strive for, what we may hope to achieve, 
or to become; for human societies, what vision of human community we hope to work 
towards, what vision of social change we favor.”12 Yet these crucial individual and 
social questions appear meaningless when we accept that humans are, as Stevenson 
describes it, “essentially products of evolution, programmed to pursue our self-
interest, to reproduce our genes, or fulfil our biological drives”.13  
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And not only does meaning and purpose appear to evaporate with the 
evolutionary view of life, but so too, apparently, does any hope or vision of a better 
society towards which we could strive. If we truly are genetically ‘programmed’, then 
however much we may delude ourselves (or, rather, be deluded by our own selfish 
genes), our behaviour and our social outcomes would appear largely beyond our 
control. Resistance is futile.  
For the left, therefore, the apparent reductionism and determinism of modern 
ETOHN appears to deny the possibility of a more just or more equitable future 
society – a point clearly articulated in Rose et al..’s aptly titled Not in Our Genes: 
 
For if human social organisation, including the inequalities of status, wealth, 
and power, are a direct consequence of our biologies, then, except for some 
gigantic program of genetic engineering, no practice can make a significant 
alteration of social structure or of the positions of individuals or groups within 
it. What we are is natural and therefore fixed. We may struggle, pass laws, 
even make revolutions, but we do so in vain.
14
 
 
If a Darwinian account of human nature, and especially the gene-centred (or 
‘selfish gene’) view of evolution, really does doom our egalitarian aspirations, then 
Singer’s call for the left to take human evolution seriously would appear simply a call 
for the left to admit defeat.  
In this chapter, I assess the apparent reductionism and determinism of 
evolutionary concepts of human behaviour. After examining the claims made by 
ETOHN’s critics, and the rebuttals issued by evolutionists, I argue that modern 
Darwinian theories are not deterministic or reductionist in the extreme sense implied 
by the likes of Rose et al. In addition, I assess some of the ‘conceptual’ problems that 
often arise due to Darwinian perspectives on human behaviour – for example, the idea 
that this robs human life of dignity and meaning – and suggest that, in the absence of 
religious or transcendental beliefs, alternative non-Darwinian points of view are 
themselves equally problematic. 
As part of my discussion, I provide case studies of modern Darwinian 
accounts of parental love and on maternal behaviour. I argue that much opposition to 
these evolutionary perspectives are misguided, and that a Darwinian approach to 
human behaviour is, in fact, compatible with standard sociological or 
environmentalist arguments. I extend this argument to suggest that the insights 
potentially made available by ETOHN could and should be integrated into egalitarian 
political policy-making. 
 
≈ 
 
Rose et al.’s claim that “Sociobiology is a reductionist, biological determinist 
explanation of human existence”15 is widely accepted by critics of ETOHN.16 
Similarly, Rose & Rose highlight the supposed “biological fatalism” that runs through 
modern sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, and argue that “the claims of 
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biology-as-destiny are as old as history itself, a continuing and powerful cultural 
strand in an old narrative”.17 The sense of irreversibility or inevitability in ETOHN’s 
apparent determinism is neatly captured in a parallel criticism by palaeontologist 
Stephen Jay Gould: “If we are programmed to be what we are, then these traits are 
ineluctable. We may, at best, channel them, but we cannot change them either by will, 
education, or culture.”18  
Nevertheless, especially in light of the apparent misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of Darwinian concepts highlighted in the previous chapter, it is 
necessary to ask whether modern evolutionary theories of human nature are, as these 
critics suggest, deterministic in this strong ‘irreversible’ or ‘inevitable’ sense. 
Normally, of course, it is not political science’s or philosophy’s role to settle 
this sort of question, and a more useful task for these disciplines would appear to be 
assessing what follows if ETOHN really are deterministic. However, it is quite 
obvious – say, from everyday observation of how human behaviour develops – that 
any belief in extreme biological or genetic determinism is absurd. No sensible 
biologist would claim that genes alone determine human behaviour or that ‘biology is 
destiny’.19 
In responding to the charge of determinism, Richard Dawkins argues that 
genes ‘determine’ behaviour only in a statistical sense, much as the generalisation ‘a 
red sky at night’ might provide a statistical forecast of good weather. “We don’t see 
red sunsets as irrevocably determining fine weather the next day,” Dawkins points 
out, “and no more should we think of genes as irrevocably determining anything.”20 
As regards the notion that genetic ‘determination’ equates to ineluctability, Dawkins 
further argues “it is perfectly possible to hold the view that genes exert a statistical 
influence on human behaviour while at the same time believing that this influence can 
be modified, overridden or reversed by other influences.”21 
Sociobiology’s founder E.O. Wilson, meanwhile, contrasts the genetic 
determination of an insect “automaton” (like the mosquito), controlled by “a sequence 
of rigid behaviours programmed by the genes to unfold unerringly from birth”, with 
the indirect and variable genetic influences on human behaviour: “Rather than specify 
a single trait, human genes prescribe the capacity to develop a certain array of traits. 
In some categories of behaviour, the array is limited and the outcome can be altered 
only by strenuous training – if ever. In others, the array is vast and the outcome easily 
influenced.”22 
The claim that proponents of ETOHN are peddling extreme deterministic 
beliefs, therefore, would appear unwarranted. The real issue, as pointed out by 
zoologists Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown, is not about genetic determinism, “but 
rather genetic constraints and propensities”.23 Here, Wilson’s famous phrase, “the 
genes hold culture on a leash”24, captures this issue neatly: the claim is not that human 
culture or behaviour is irrevocably fixed by our genes, but rather that our genes may 
restrict or constrain what is culturally or behaviourally possible. 
Importantly, from the perspective of Singer’s Darwinian left, one consequence 
of the repeated but seemingly unjust claim that modern ETOHN are inherently 
deterministic is that it becomes easy for egalitarians to dismiss all such theories out of 
 45 
hand. Singer instead advances “the entirely unoriginal proposition” that some areas of 
human behaviour show great diversity, while in other areas, human behaviour stays 
fairly constant or predictable, even across the whole range of human cultures.
25
 He 
goes on to argue that this range of behaviours, from the variable to the relatively 
fixed, can be analysed in evolutionary or biological terms, and that, by accepting the 
possibility of some evolved constraints on our behaviour, the left may gain “a better 
understanding of what it may take to achieve the goals we seek”.26 
Further, by erroneously equating the possibility of genetic influences on our 
behaviour with the notion of biological or genetic determinism, the left may fail to 
realise that many such influences (especially if acknowledged and understood) could 
still be countered or changed. For example, as Dawkins argues, “there is no general 
reason for expecting genetic influences to be any more irreversible than 
environmental ones”.27 In the popular consciousness at least, genes appear to have 
accrued a reputation for fixity or inescapability that, according to Dawkins, is 
undeserved: “Educational, or other cultural influences may, in some circumstances, be 
just as unmodifiable and irreversible as genes … are popularly thought to be.”28 
Singer’s desire for the left to acknowledge the relevance of human evolution 
(and thus to accept the role of genes) is not, therefore, an admission of defeat: even if 
our genes influence or constrain our behaviour in certain ways, this does not 
necessarily deny the possibility of changing this behaviour – and hence changing 
society – in desirable ways. Singer’s Darwinian argument, in other words, like that of 
Wilson, Dawkins and most other credible evolutionary theorists, is not a genetic 
determinist one; similarly, the notion of genetic influences or constraints on our 
behaviour is not the extreme genetic determinism that many critics impute. 
What, then, of the related oft-made criticism that modern evolutionary theories 
are ‘reductionist’? 
 
≈ 
 
If reductionism is defined as the process by which complex phenomena (such as 
social behaviour) are analysed or described in terms of phenomena at a simpler or 
more fundamental level, then modern evolutionary science is indeed ‘reductionist’. 
Yet, as Laland & Brown point out, “This method of understanding the world is 
applied throughout science, and it would seem more a virtue than a sin”.29 
Nevertheless, another sense of reductionism is that lower level analysis or description 
can provide sufficient or complete explanation for higher level phenomena (such as 
human behaviour). To many critics of ETOHN, modern evolutionists are reductionists 
in this second, pejorative, sense. 
Rose et al., for example, illustrate both senses of the term in their critique of 
the (apparent) reductionism of evolutionary accounts of human nature. They begin by 
arguing that, broadly, “reductionists try to explain the properties of complex wholes – 
molecules, say, or societies – in terms of the units which these molecules or societies 
are composed”. Rose et al. then go on to claim that evolutionary reductionists “would 
also argue that the properties of a human society are … no more than the sums of the 
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individual behaviors and tendencies of the individual humans of which that society is 
composed”.30 As an example of this latter sense of reductionism, sociobiologists 
(according to Rose et al.) would explain ‘aggressive’ societies as the product of 
‘aggressive’ individuals. 
This pejorative sense of reductionism (that, say, a complex phenomenon such 
as society can be explained simply as the ‘sum of its parts’) is a charge that most 
evolutionists themselves strongly dispute. For example, in a (scathing) review of Not 
in Our Genes, Richard Dawkins argues that the ‘in terms of’ sense of reductionism 
“covers a multitude of highly sophisticated causal interactions, and mathematical 
relations of which summation is only the simplest”; by contrast, reductionism in the 
‘sum of the parts’ sense “is obviously daft, and is nowhere to be found in the writings 
of real biologists.”31  
Here, E.O. Wilson’s concept of ‘consilience’ neatly illustrates a wider aspect 
of the dispute about reductionism. Wilson initially suggests that the boundaries 
between academic disciplines, each with “its own practitioners, language, modes of 
analysis, and standards of validation”32 – and, especially, the disjunct between the 
social sciences and the natural sciences – hinders the flow of information and ideas 
that are most needed to tackle real world problems (such as poverty or environmental 
degradation).  
Wilson demands instead a ‘conceptual unity’ or ‘consilience’ across academic 
disciplines, so that intellectual enquiry can move between different levels or domains 
of explanation, as and where necessary. Such unity, as Wilson points out, is a 
cornerstone of the natural sciences; and in respect of reductionism, scientific analysis 
ranges across many levels of complexity, from physics, say, to chemistry to molecular 
genetics to ecology. Wilson goes on to argue: “Given that human action comprises 
events of physical causation, why should the social sciences and humanities be 
impervious to consilience with the natural sciences? And how can they fail to benefit 
from that alliance?”33 
The idea of consilience or unity between the natural and the social sciences, 
however, has been greeted with suspicion by many social scientists, most especially 
because it implies social or cultural phenomena being reduced to human biology. 
Here, evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker acknowledges the fear “that 
consilience is a smokescreen for a hostile takeover of the humanities, arts, and social 
sciences by philistines in white coats”.34 Pinker, though, suggests that this reflects a 
misguided concern about ‘greedy reductionism’, analogous to the ‘sum of the parts’ 
sense of the term above, in which sociology or literature or history is replaced by 
biology. And in pointing out that this is an unreasonable fear, Pinker asks 
(rhetorically), “why stop there?” 
 
Biology in turn could be ground up into chemistry, and chemistry into physics, 
leaving one struggling to explain the cause of World War I in terms of 
electrons and quarks. Even if World War I consisted of nothing but a very, 
very large number of quarks in a very, very complicated pattern of motion, no 
insight is gained by describing it that way.
35
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Pinker contrasts this ‘daft’ form of reductionism with a more sensible version, 
which “consists not of replacing one field of knowledge with another but of 
connecting or unifying them”.36 Like Wilson, then, Pinker believes that the social 
sciences can only but benefit by greater integration into the natural sciences. For 
instance, he argues that “our understanding of ourselves and our cultures can only be 
enriched by the discovery that our minds are composed of intricate neural circuits for 
thinking, feeling, and learning rather than blank slates, amorphous blobs, or 
inscrutable ghosts”.37  
It is useful to compare two different views of the value of ‘consilience’ 
between the natural and the social sciences. E.O. Wilson believes that any such 
consilience would greatly assist attempts to address real world problems. 
 
Most of the issues that vex humanity daily – ethnic conflict, arms escalation, 
overpopulation, abortion, environment, endemic poverty, [etc.] – cannot be 
solved without integrating knowledge from the natural sciences with that of 
the social sciences and humanities. Only fluency across the boundaries will 
provide a clear view of the world as it really is, not as seen through the lens of 
ideologies and religious dogmas or commanded by the myopic response to 
immediate need.
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Hilary Rose, by contrast, in her tellingly titled article ‘Colonising the social 
sciences?’, expresses a much less positive view of consilience, and most especially on 
(what she believes is) its attempt to ‘reduce’ social problems to the biological level:   
 
[A]ttempting to explain genocidal conflict, globalization, the ecological crisis, 
mass rape as a weapon of war, famine and disaster, new infectious diseases or 
the growing gap between the rich and the poor requires an array of analytic 
tools from many disciplines. Confronting such horrors and finding a political 
route through them requires both social courage and imagination. In this 
situation giving up responsibility for grappling with cultural and social 
complexity and embracing facile evolutionary universalisms is a moral and 
intellectual cop out.
39
 
 
Initially, then, Wilson and Rose both agree that solving or explaining the 
problems that beset the world requires a cross-disciplinary approach. However, 
whereas for Wilson ‘fluent’ discourse across subject boundaries could provide a 
clearer picture of global problems, for Rose this could be disastrous, especially if 
‘facile’ evolutionary concepts are employed at the expense of a deeper appreciation of 
the true intricacies of the situation. For Rose, evolutionary biology can only but 
provide simplistic or superficial explanations for complex cultural and social 
problems.  
Yet are evolutionary explanations indeed simply ‘facile’? Even if non-
scientists were unable to directly address this issue, they could still argue that the 
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usefulness or otherwise of an evolutionary perspective on social issues remains an 
open question – ironically, one resolvable only through the very consilience (or cross-
disciplinary unity) advocated by Wilson. Thus, in principle, and even if Rose is 
correct about the failings of many contemporary ETOHN, this does not mean that all 
evolutionary-informed approaches to social problems are inherently superficial or 
simplistic. 
Indeed, Rose’s position here on ‘cultural and social complexity’ appears to 
reflect the “obscurant holism” that, according to Laland & Brown, “afflicts many of 
the social sciences”40 – the view of culture as “an amorphous, interwoven 
conglomerate of knowledge, behaviour, and tradition” that, for many social scientists, 
makes it resistant to reductionist scientific modelling or analysis.
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Laland & Brown, however, dismiss the idea that cultural processes are 
unanalysable in terms of lower level phenomena. Instead, they suggest that, while 
culture is indeed a complex and interconnected system, “the fundamental lesson of 
science is that patient chipping away at such perplexingly intricate problems yields 
dividends in the long run.” Thus, Laland & Brown argue that “the bottom line is that 
biologists and human scientists alike will not be able to understand cultural processes 
unless they are prepared to break them down into conceptually and analytically 
manageable units.”42 
How, though, does this relate to the evolutionary theories that underpin 
Singer’s Darwinian left? To the extent that these theories are ‘greedily reductionist’, 
or equate complex phenomena to ‘the sum of the parts’, they should be rejected. 
However, to the extent that these theories attempt to explain complexity in terms of 
lower level or simpler phenomena, this should be accepted as a scientifically valid (if 
not necessarily straightforward) approach. Indeed, a similar stance could be adopted 
over the wider reductionist/determinist dispute: as Laland & Brown point out, while 
most social scientists are content to assume that biology or genetics is largely 
irrelevant to human behaviour, “[t]here is nothing reductionist or deterministic about 
the challenging of this assumption”.43 
To relate this more closely to A Darwinian Left: Singer wishes to challenge 
the left’s assumption that human evolutionary history is irrelevant to modern social 
behaviour, and therefore irrelevant to our political policymaking. His argument 
broadly reflects the notion of consilience – that to more fully understand human social 
behaviour we must examine it from the wider perspective provided by evolutionary 
science. At the same time, however, this is not to dismiss the role of culture, which, 
Singer argues, “does have an influence in sharpening or softening those tendencies 
that are most deeply rooted in our human nature”.44 
As with the charge of genetic determinism, then, Singer (like Wilson, 
Dawkins, Pinker and most other credible evolutionists) is not a reductionist in the 
sense imputed by many critics of ETOHN. This, though, does not mean that the left 
have no genuine grounds for concern about evolutionary approaches to human 
behaviour – indeed, a number of problematic issues still remain (for example, to what 
extent is Singer’s talk of evolved ‘tendencies’, ‘predispositions’ or ‘influences’ 
simply a politically correct rewording of earlier notions of ‘drives’ or ‘urges’, or 
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‘biological imperatives’?). These on-going leftist concerns, however, will be 
addressed in a later chapter. 
Here, I will draw together many of the arguments presented above with a case 
study of both the evolutionary claim that parental love is reducible to genetics and the 
leftist objections to this kind of Darwinian reasoning. This will also raise some of the 
‘conceptual’ problems that many on the secular left (in common with those on the 
religious right) often have with evolutionary theory – for example, the idea that 
Darwinism robs human life of meaning or purpose.
45
 
 
≈ 
 
Leslie Stevenson’s introductory text on Theories of Human Nature has gone through 
numerous editions since it was first published in 1973. The most poignant change 
(and, indeed, the most human) between these editions is the dedication: in 1973, 
Stevenson dedicates his book “To my parents”. By 2004, this has become “To my 
daughters”. An obvious explanation for this change (if indeed any is needed) is 
simply time – that Stevenson was a young man in 1973, and his parents were clearly 
still a major influence in his life; thirty years later, he is in the parental role, and his 
daughters are now a main focus of his attention.  
How is this at all relevant to the subject matter of this chapter (or indeed this 
thesis) – the relationship between egalitarian political theory and Darwinian science? 
For a start, there is a definite political element to our relationship with kin – 
for example, as terms such as ‘nepotism’ indicate, those in positions of power may 
favour close relatives in non-egalitarian ways.
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 The potentially detrimental political 
aspects of kinship were recognised by Plato, who, in his design for an ideal Republic, 
required children to be raised communally, without knowledge of their biological 
parentage. And this idea, of erasing or reducing parent/child bonds, was later put into 
practice in socialist kibbutzim, whose founders were clearly aware of the non-
egalitarian potential of members favouring their own children. 
What, though, of a possible evolutionary ‘explanation’ for the change in 
Stevenson’s dedication, from parents to children? In this respect, popular science 
writer Robert Wright examines how the genetic ‘utility’ of our parents alters over 
time, as seen from the amoral perspective of natural selection: “As we pass through 
adolescence, [parents] are less and less critical databanks, providers, and protectors. 
And as they pass through middle age, they are less and less likely to further 
promulgate our genes. By the time they are old and infirm, we have little if any 
genetic use for them.”47 
And while, according to Wright, no strong evolutionary reason exists for us to 
care for our parents once they are old or dying, the fact that we do reflects a “stubborn 
core of familial love [that] persists beyond its evolutionary usefulness” – an 
illustration of “how imprecise the genes can be in turning on and off our emotional 
spigots”.48 
Yet if Wright’s Darwinian interpretation of a child’s feelings towards its 
parents makes uncomfortable reading, it gets worse when he provides a similar 
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analysis of a parent’s love for a child. Seen through the ‘pitiless eyes’ of natural 
selection, for instance, emotional attachment should correlate with the child’s genetic 
prospects: “Specifically, parental devotion should grow until around early 
adolescence, when reproductive potential peaks, and then begin to drop” – which, 
according to Wright, explains why parents grieve more over the death of an 
adolescent than a much younger (or, indeed, much older) child: 
 
Just as a horse breeder is more disappointed by the death of a thoroughbred the 
day before its first race than the day after its birth, a parent should be more 
heartbroken by the death of an adolescent than by the death of an infant. Both 
the adolescent and the mature racehorse are assets on the brink of bringing 
rewards, and in both cases it will take much time and effort, starting from 
scratch, to get another asset to that point.
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This Darwinian perspective, then, suggests that the change in Stevenson’s 
dedication, from ‘to my parents’ to ‘to my daughters’, is more than simply a 
consequence of elapsing time: if the evolutionary story is correct, this is itself an 
example (to use Stevenson’s own terms) of evolved ‘programming’ ‘to pursue our 
self-interest, and to reproduce our genes’. In other words, in 1973, Stevenson’s 
genetic self-interest still lay with his parents; by 2004, it aligns with those who bear 
his genes in the next generation and, thus, ensure his genetic stake in the future (a.k.a. 
his daughters).  
But hold on. Even if we take Wright’s analogy between thoroughbred horse 
breeding and human ‘breeding’ to be a rhetorical flourish, is this not an unnecessarily 
cynical misreading of human emotions such as parental love? As indicated earlier, this 
is the sort of reasoning that sparked Hilary Rose, one of the most trenchant and 
influential left-wing critics of ETOHN, in her opposition to Darwinian theory. And is 
this not understandable?  
Certainly if you are a parent (as I am), then Wright’s interpretation of 
parent/child relationships is awful to contemplate – surely, we love our children 
because they are worth loving (well, at least most of the time), and not because we are 
manipulated by genes that turn our emotions on or off. I certainly want to believe that 
I love my daughter because she is a wonderful person, not just because she carries my 
genes.
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But hold on (again). If we reject a Darwinian interpretation on the grounds that 
we find its implications objectionable, are we not now in danger of confusing facts 
and values? (As Dawkins’ argues at the beginning of The Selfish Gene, “however 
much we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true”.51) In this case, we 
have the (possible) fact of biological influences on emotions such as love, and we 
have the value that we place on love in and of itself. The conceptual difficulty is the 
notion that, if our genes determine our emotions, then this seems, in some way, to de-
value our genuine feelings of love.  
For example, do I really love my daughter if this is simply what my genes 
dictate I must do – say, through controlling the release of various emotion-affecting 
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chemicals into my brain? Indeed, if our deepest feelings of love are, ultimately, just 
the product of genetic cost/benefit calculations, then ‘love’ in any wider (or more 
human) sense seems sentimental nonsense; it is simply an evolved emotional response 
to those who may best help us pass on our genes – a response, moreover, that can be 
further reduced to the neuropsychological or to the bio-chemical level. Thus, are the 
likes of Howard Kaye – who regards the notion of selfish genes as ‘morally 
abhorrent’ – not to some degree warranted in warning against the de-humanising 
potential of a biological view of human nature?  
Unfortunately, an objective Darwinian analysis is difficult when the subject 
being analysed is ourselves – and, especially, when we are dealing with aspects of our 
behaviour, such as ‘love’, that have strong emotional content. One possible way to get 
around this problem is to examine the alternatives to a biological explanation for our 
behaviour (in this case, alternatives to an evolutionary explanation for parental love). 
Here, Leslie Stevenson identifies two alternative possibilities to evolutionary 
‘programming’: cultural conditioning and divine or transcendental intervention.  
As my focus here is on those who accept a materialist Darwinian explanation 
for humankind’s origins (even if they disagree about the relevance of these origins to 
modern human behaviour), I can ignore the last of these, the possibility of 
supernatural influences on our behaviour. (And I will also, for the time being, ignore 
the far more likely possibility that both genes and culture influence behaviour.) The 
relevant alternatives here, then, are that either our genes or our culture is the major 
determinant of behaviour such as parental love. Once again, I will sidestep the 
scientific question of which of these alternative positions is likely to be correct, and 
instead examine what follows should either of these explanations for parental 
behaviour turn out to be true.  
As already suggested, it is unsettling to think about our children as genetic 
‘assets’, or the possibility that our love for them simply corresponds to them bearing 
our genes. An equally upsetting thought is that the level of grief we would feel for the 
death of a child can be measured as a correlate of that child’s level of reproductive 
potential. However, as unsettling as this may appear, is it actually any worse than the 
alternative, the possibility that such love is conditioned by society? That is, according 
an extreme cultural determinist view, the reason we would love our children is that 
society conditions us to do so. This, though, also seems to de-value love. Do I really 
love my daughter only because I happen to have been brought up in a society that 
inculcated such attitudes? And would I not love my child, say, if I had grown up in a 
society with less ‘loving’ beliefs about children? 
In other words, it is not immediately obvious why the notion of socially 
conditioned ‘love’ is any less (morally) abhorrent than the idea of genetically 
programmed ‘love’. Indeed, in this case, the thought that parents might love their 
children despite social conditioning seems more comforting. And much the same 
would be true of an example discussed in the previous chapter, the suggestion by 
sociologist Michael Kimmel that parents simply make a rational economic decision to 
care for their children in return for similar care when they, the parents, are old: is not 
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the cold logic of Kimmel’s explanation less human (or more de-humanising) that the 
evolutionary alternative?
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To the extent, then, that opposition to ETOHN arises from the (often 
understandable) belief that such theories are dehumanising or that they are morally 
abhorrent, the alternative ‘social conditioning’ explanation seems equally (if not 
more) objectionable – at least in respect of parental love. But before drawing wider 
conclusions from this, it is useful to examine how evolutionary accounts of parental 
behaviour, and, most especially, the notion of ‘maternal instincts’, are addressed by 
critics within the social sciences. Indeed, a great deal of the antagonism towards 
ETOHN, and therefore a great deal of the potential political opposition to Singer’s 
Darwinian left, comes about as a result of disputes over this very issue; that is, about 
human sexual or reproductive behaviour.  
 
≈ 
 
In challenging biological approaches to maternal behaviour, Michael Kimmel 
suggests that some evolutionary arguments “are just plain wrong in light of empirical 
evidence”. As an example, he asks: “And what about that ‘maternal instinct’? How do 
we explain the enormous popularity of infanticide as a method of birth control 
throughout Western history and the fact that it was women who did most of the 
killing? Infanticide has probably been the most commonly practised method of birth 
control throughout the world.”53 Here, Kimmel’s dismissal of the evolutionary 
evidence for a ‘maternal instinct’ appears premised on the following argument: if 
women did indeed have a maternal instinct, they wouldn’t commit infanticide; women 
do commit infanticide, therefore women cannot have such an instinct. 
Using the same examples – parental instincts and infanticide – Hilary Rose 
points to another apparent flaw in evolutionary reasoning, that of trying to concoct 
adaptionist explanations for conflicting behaviours. A classic example, according to 
Rose, is Steven Pinker’s ‘just-so story’ attempt to explain both the behaviour of 
loving mothers and the behaviour of murderous mothers in evolutionary terms.  
 
[Pinker] discussed women killing their newborn babies and delivered himself 
of the view that such an act, where resources where minimal, could be an 
adaptionist response. He argued that the psychological modules that normally 
produced protectiveness in mothers for their newborns might be switched off 
by the challenge of an impoverished environment. At this point, evolutionary 
adaptionist reasoning becomes an absurd Catch-22 proposition: Both killing 
and protecting are explained by evolutionary selection. Used like this selection 
explains everything and therefore nothing.
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Rose’s rejection of ETOHN here appears premised on the belief that 
evolutionary theory can explain either infant care or infant murder; it cannot do both. 
In addition, like Kimmel, Rose implies that evolutionary accounts of maternal 
behaviour are deterministic – that if such behaviour is evolved, then these evolved 
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instincts dictate how women must behave; but because women actually display a 
range of behaviours, the (deterministic) evolutionary account must be false.  
As suggested above, the charge of determinism is often unwarranted. Is this 
also the case here? With regard to Pinker’s (albeit speculative) arguments about 
infanticide, he seems only to be suggesting that evolved behaviours may be 
contingent – that is, that certain behaviours may be more or less likely, depending on 
prevailing conditions. Far from being an ‘absurd Catch-22’, this appears a reasonable 
suggestion – behaviour does vary depending on circumstances, and it is at least 
plausible that this may be influenced by evolved predispositions. Put another way, the 
onus should to be on Rose (and Kimmel) to explain how and why people behave 
differently in different contexts, and why there would be no evolved tendencies to 
behave in particular ways (especially with behaviour such as childbirth and child-
rearing where strong selective pressures would have operated for millions of years).  
In the case of infanticide, anthropologist William Irons suggests that the need 
to assess if infants are worth caring for or if they should be abandoned is common to 
all females within the mammalian line. Thus, he argues, modern human females likely 
come equipped with contingent psychological ‘mechanisms’ that allow them to assess 
the costs and benefits of caring for a newborn.
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Behavioural ecologist Sarah Hrdy similarly argues that the manner in which 
human mothers respond to their infants “is influenced by a composite of biological 
responses of mammalian, primate, and human origin.”56 And, in contrast to the charge 
of just-so story telling, the evidence for these ‘biological responses’ ranges across 
biochemistry, physiology and comparative anatomy, behavioural ecology, 
primatology and anthropology, psychology, and social and cultural history. 
Furthermore, and in addition to the biochemical and physical changes that occur 
during pregnancy and after childbirth, for which there are numerous analogues 
elsewhere in nature, Hrdy also points out that, in humans, “maternal investment in 
offspring is complicated by a range of utterly new considerations: cultural 
expectations, gender roles, sentiments like honor or shame, sex preferences, and the 
mother’s awareness of the future”.57 
From Hrdy’s evolutionary perspective, therefore, ‘maternal instincts’ are 
actually a composite of biological, psychological and socio-cultural influences, none 
of which irrevocably dictate the behaviour of human mothers. Indeed, contra the 
charge of biological determinism, Hrdy’s account emphasises how maternal 
behaviours are contingent on the mother’s personal circumstances and the wider 
socio-cultural context within which she finds herself. 
According to Hrdy, “to interpret variation in the way mothers respond to 
infants as meaning that somehow a woman’s biology is irrelevant to her emotions, or 
that there are no evolved maternal responses, is to misread both the human record and 
the vast amount of evidence for other animals”.58 In other words, to summarily 
dismiss this mass of evidence for ‘that maternal instinct’, as Kimmel does, itself 
appears facile. But so too is Rose’s claim that evolutionary reasoning simply presents 
an absurd Catch 22; that it explains everything and therefore nothing.  
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Indeed, just like standard sociological explanations for infanticide, an 
evolutionary explanation would emphasise the environmental factors affecting an 
individual’s behaviour. At the same time, the evolutionary account would also try to 
explain this ‘higher level’ behaviour in terms of ‘lower level’ phenomena, such as 
evolved psychological predispositions. ETOHN, then, no more ‘explain everything 
and therefore nothing’ than other possible alternate explanations for ambivalent 
behaviour; they do, however, attempt to anchor these explanations more deeply in the 
evolved psychology of human beings. 
Furthermore, in respect of infanticidal behaviour, an evolutionary perspective 
that explicitly highlights the importance of context (the mother’s health, social 
network, wider social circumstances, future prospects, and so on) is itself compatible 
with sociological explanations that similarly highlight these contextual factors. An 
evolutionary account, therefore, may help to explain why, in certain circumstances a 
mother may behave protectively towards a child, or why, in other circumstances, she 
may abandon or even kill her child. Thus, far from denying environmental influences 
(as critics imply), ETOHN could in fact play a part in developing policies and 
practices to identify and assist women who may struggle with the conflicting demands 
of motherhood. And this argument could be extended to other aspects of human 
behaviour and to policies designed to address them. 
Of course, this is not to deny the misuse or misinterpretation of Darwinian 
accounts of human behaviour in the past; for example, as psychologist Vivien Burr 
argues in respect of the study of gender: “Given that biological accounts have often 
been used to support and legitimate inegalitarian practices …, many feminists have 
understandably been keen to develop fully social accounts of gender differences, and 
this move has been welcomed by likeminded psychologists.”59 But what is significant 
here is the implicit acknowledgement of potential bias in a ‘fully social’ alternative to 
biological accounts of sex/gender – that is, that the former are motivated as much by 
an (understandable) attempt to explain away potential biological influences on 
behaviour as by the attempt to adequately explain that behaviour. 
Burr nevertheless acknowledges that any comprehensive theory of gender and 
of gender roles (and, therefore, of ‘maternal’ behaviour) must somehow take human 
biology into account. For example, in summarising various explanations for gender 
differences, and after reiterating her concerns “about the political and ideological uses 
of [biological] arguments”, she suggests: “we need to develop theories that look at the 
role of biology in gender without recourse to essentialist, reductionist and determinist 
ideas”.60  
Clearly, Burr’s assumption is that current biological theories are themselves 
inherently flawed. But this leads to a (real) Catch 22 impasse: a full account of human 
behaviour can only be achieved through taking human biology into account; but 
because biological accounts are thought to be reductionist, determinist or otherwise 
ideologically biased, they must be rejected; however, a full account of human 
behaviour can only be achieved through taking human biology into account; but 
because … and so on and so on. In short, the sort of non-reductionist, non-
deterministic biological accounts of female behaviour advocated by the likes of Hrdy 
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– theories that, moreover, may lead to the more comprehensive understanding of 
gender that is currently lacking – are overlooked due to a priori assumptions about 
the nature and ideological content of evolutionary biological theories. 
The unfortunate irony here is that the dismissal of modern ETOHN on the 
grounds of bias is itself informed by unwarranted (or, at least, unexamined) bias. For 
instance, after acknowledging the need to explain human behaviour in both social and 
biological terms, Burr quotes (what she believes to be) the “commendably cautious 
position” of Rose et al.: “[A]though all future as well as past forms of relationship 
between men and women, both individually and within society as a whole, must be in 
accord with human biology, we have no way of deducing from the diversity of human 
history and anthropology or from human biology or from the study of ethology of 
non-human species the constraints, if any, that such a statement imposes.”61  
But this is not a cautious approach, commendable or otherwise; rather, it is a 
claim that we cannot ever hope to understand the complex links between human 
biology and human culture. Rose et al. themselves make this clear immediately prior 
to the quotation that Burr selects, when they argue: “We do not know the limits that 
biology sets on the forms of human nature, and we have no way of knowing.”62 What 
is not made clear, however, is why any such understanding, or even partial 
understanding, is impossible. 
Furthermore, Rose et al. go on to claim: “We cannot predict the inevitability 
of patriarchy, or capitalism, from the cellular structures of our brains, the composition 
of our circulating hormones, or the physiology of sexual reproduction”.63 Their 
intention is clearly to imply that evolutionary theorists make these sorts of ‘daft’ 
reductionist and deterministic assertions. A great deal of the opposition to ETOHN, it 
appears, is the result of social scientists, such as Vivien Burr, Anne Oakley or 
Michael Kimmel, accepting on face value these sorts of claims about the nature of 
ETOHN. 
The arguments raised in Sarah Hrdy’s Mother Nature, by contrast, based on 
evidence from human history, anthropology and biology, and from animal ethology 
(as well as from the numerous other branches of biological science mentioned above), 
surely provides some insight into what human beings are as a species, and some 
understanding of why we have become the way we are. And while Hrdy’s 
conclusions may eventually prove to be wrong, her biologically-informed approach to 
maternal behaviour surely demonstrates that some degree of reconciliation between 
human biology and human culture is possible. 
Furthermore, while it is obvious here that my personal sympathises lie with 
evolutionists, this is not necessarily a question of taking sides: modern evolutionary 
accounts of human behaviour, including maternal behaviour, are based on (ever-
increasing amounts of) scientific evidence. The interpretation of this evidence might 
turn out to be erroneous or, as in the past, inadvertently biased; nevertheless, it cannot 
reasonably be dismissed in the off-hand manner so often evidenced by ETOHN’s 
detractors.  
Sarah Hrdy herself provides an even-handed overview of many of these 
issues; for instance, in analysing why many feminists and social scientists continue to 
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oppose biological explanations for maternal behaviour, she suggests much of the early 
biological research into motherhood was indeed built on moralistic and patriarchal 
‘wishful thinking’ rather than objective observation:  
 
It has taken a long time to correct these errors and revise old biases, … [and] 
widen the evolutionary paradigm to include both sexes. But by the time this 
happened, feminists, social historians, and philosophers were convinced that 
they knew what evolutionists had to offer, that it was necessarily flawed, 
determinist, and uninsightful. Natural selection, and with it the most powerful 
and comprehensive theory available for understanding the basic natures of 
mothers and infants, was rejected, as social scientists and feminists took 
another route. That path, which led away from science, led them to reject 
biology altogether and construct alternative origin stories, their own versions 
of wishful thinking about socially constructed men and women, and infants 
born with more nearly a desire for mothers than a need.
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And a further, unfortunate, consequence of the ‘alternative itinerary’ adopted 
by many feminists and social scientists, according to Hrdy, is that they remain 
unaware of the much more complex and multi-faceted view of mothers and of female 
behaviour that is now offered by modern biology. Similar comments could be made 
about those social theorists whose appreciation of human evolutionary theory does not 
extend beyond the discredited ideas of early 20
th
 century Social Darwinists and racial 
anthropologists. 
 
≈ 
 
Both sides in the debate about the relevance of human biology to modern social 
behaviour accept the fact of human evolution: surely, then, those who deny that this is 
at all relevant to modern human behaviour need to explain how we humans have 
escaped the constraints of our biological past.  
Sarah Hrdy’s evolutionary-informed analysis of maternal behaviour, for 
example, demonstrates that, while these behaviours are contingent upon 
environmental circumstances, they can still be explained in terms of the deep 
evolutionary history of human females. A greater understanding of these influences 
on behaviour can only but be beneficial to individuals, groups and agencies involved 
with the care of mothers and of infants. And we can generalise from this: a greater 
understanding of the possible evolved influences on humans’ social and political 
behaviour can only but be beneficial to social and political policymaking. 
This is in keeping with Peter Singer’s point that the range of human social 
behaviours, from the variable to the relatively fixed, can be analysed in both 
evolutionary and cultural terms. Yet by applying a Darwinian perspective on these 
behaviours in addition to the existing cultural one, Singer argues that the left may be 
better informed about how to bring about its desired social and political goals. 
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The case study of parental and, especially, maternal behaviour suggests that 
many of the standard leftist concerns or assumptions about ETOHN are misplaced. 
For example, most evolutionists reject the charge that their theories are deterministic 
or reductionist in the sense imputed by critics, instead arguing that genetic influences 
on behaviour are ‘deterministic’ in a statistical not in an absolute or irreversible sense 
– and, moreover, in the case of humans, that any such genetic determination reflects 
the (hugely variable) capacity to develop a range of behavioural traits. Similarly, 
ETOHN’s reductionism – an attempt to explain complex behaviour in terms of lower 
level phenomena – is the same methodology that is taken for granted elsewhere in 
science; it is not the ‘daft’ attempt to reduce complex social phenomena solely to 
biological mechanisms. 
Moreover, a Darwinian approach to maternal behaviour – and, by extension, 
other aspects of human social or political behaviour – appears compatible with 
sociological or environmental perspectives. If so, this indicates the potential benefits 
of greater unity or ‘consilience’ between various branches of human intellectual 
enquiry – again, a concept that has been met with (unwarranted) suspicion by some 
sections of the left. Thus, if leftists abandoned the belief that ETOHN equate solely to 
genetic determinism and greedy reductionism, the possibility of a more insightful and 
beneficial consilience, and of more fluent dialogue between social scientists and 
natural scientists, appears much more realisable.  
The modern gene-centred view of evolution – and, perhaps most especially, 
Richard Dawkins’ metaphorical ‘selfish gene’ – in which life, including human life, is 
explained in terms of the self-replication of genes, undoubtedly exacerbates much 
latent opposition to Darwinian theory. Robert Wright’s (cold and amoral) gene’s-eye-
view of parent/child ‘love’, for example, is a clear illustration of this: it is emotionally 
upsetting to think that our behaviour (and, indeed, our emotions themselves) may be 
‘controlled’ by our genes. (At the same time, it is not immediately obvious that 
alternative explanations for human behaviour, such as social conditioning, are 
necessarily less problematic.) 
The belief that evolutionary ideas are somehow ‘immoral’, though, is to 
confuse facts with values. This, the so-called is/ought gap, is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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The advancement of the welfare of man is a most intricate problem. 
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 
 
 
Chapter 5: Ought and Is (and Can) 
 
According to Peter Singer, “Darwin himself rejected the idea that any ethical 
implications could be drawn from his work.”1 This is debatable. For example, in the 
Descent of Man, Darwin peppers his ‘General Summary’ with a mixture of factual 
observations and moral recommendations about human reproductive behaviour and 
marriage: 
 
Both sexes ought to refrain from marriage if they are in any marked degree 
inferior in body or mind; but such hopes are Utopian and will never be even 
partially realised until the laws of inheritance are thoroughly known. … 
 
[A]ll ought to refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject poverty for their 
children; for poverty is not only a great evil, but tends to its own increase by 
leading to recklessness in marriage.  
 
[I]f the prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless marry, the inferior 
members tend to supplant the better members of society.
2
  
 
Contrary to Singer’s claims, therefore, Darwin’s position on the implications 
of evolutionary theory may best be described as ambivalent.
3
 And given the apparent 
difficulty that Darwin himself faced in divorcing his biological beliefs from his social 
prejudices, it is little wonder that his theory was quickly seized upon by others keen to 
justify their own social or political ideals with the weight of scientific ‘fact’.  
Singer, for example, notes how Darwinian theory became “a high fashion 
item” with late 19th and early 20th century capitalists: “These ideas did not all come 
from Darwin. Herbert Spencer, who was more than willing to draws ethical 
implications from evolution, provided the defenders of laissez-faire capitalism with 
intellectual foundations that they used to oppose state interference with market 
forces.”4 A century later, therefore, when conservative political scientist Larry 
Arnhart attempts to use Darwinism “as an intellectual weapon supporting traditional 
morality – and conservative principles generally”5, he is following a well-worn (and 
by now slippery) political path.  
This chapter examines the relationship between the scientific theory of 
(human) evolution, on the one hand, and moral or political beliefs, on the other. In A 
Darwinian Left, Singer relies heavily on this distinction, and, in particular, on the 
fallacy of deducing values from facts.
6
 That is, and in contrast to many historical 
attempts to derive political principles directly from Darwinian theory, Singer argues 
that a Darwinian understanding of human nature need not determine our political 
decision-making (although evolutionary theory could provide information useful to 
these decisions). 
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Nonetheless, Singer acknowledges that Darwinian thinking can connect with 
ethics or politics in many different ways, and in addition to its potential role in 
providing information for policy-makers, Singer highlights three other ways in which 
ETOHN can be invoked in political debate – some of which, he suggests, are more 
defensible than others. 
Below, I assess each of the connections that Singer identifies between 
Darwinism and politics, critiquing and extending his argument where necessary. 
Larry Arnhart’s attempt to derive conservative moral values from evolved human 
biology will then be used as a contemporary case study of the application of 
Darwinian ideas to politics. I argue that Arnhart fails in this attempt – a failure that 
underscores Singer’s emphasis on maintaining the fact/value distinction.  
 
≈ 
 
Singer begins with a widespread (mis)conception about Darwinism: the idea that the 
direction of evolution is itself ‘good’ or ‘right’. According to Singer, it was this idea 
that led many on the right to fallaciously assume that “if Darwinism applies to human 
social behaviour, then a competitive marketplace is somehow justified, or shown to be 
‘natural’, or inevitable”.7 The left’s unfortunate mistake, he goes on to argue, was also 
to accept these fallacious assumptions, and thereby to reject Darwinism in its entirety. 
Much of the contemporary left’s opposition to modern ETOHN, as evidenced in the 
preceding chapters of this thesis, appears based on this sort of misunderstanding of 
Darwinism’s implications. 
In emphasising the fact/value distinction, Singer instead makes clear that 
because evolution just happens, we will never discover ethical premises in the bare 
details of our evolved nature. As illustration, he posits two potential facts about 
human nature: (1) that we may have an evolved disposition “to repay favours one has 
received”, and (2) that we may also have evolved tendencies “to join in group acts of 
violence against people who are not members of our own group”.8 His point is that 
even if such tendencies exist, this in itself does not tell us what we ought to do – that, 
for instance, we ought to foster the first of these traits, or that we should restrain the 
second.
9
 
From the standard leftist perspective, however, Darwinism could not be true 
because, if it were, a more egalitarian or socialist society might prove unattainable. In 
effect, the left are here mirroring the right’s fallacious belief that is implies ought 
(e.g., ‘competition is natural, therefore society ought to be competitive’) with the 
equally fallacious idea that what ought to be the case with nature therefore is the case 
(e.g., ‘society ought to be cooperative, therefore human nature is cooperative’ or 
‘society ought not be competitive, therefore human nature is not competitive’).  
Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker dubs this latter idea the ‘moralistic 
fallacy’, in which “Nature, including human nature, is stipulated to have only virtuous 
traits (no needless killing, no rapacity, no exploitation), or no traits at all, because the 
alternative is too horrible to accept”.10 Rejecting modern evolutionary theory’s 
‘selfish gene’ concept on moral rather than scientific grounds, for instance, illustrates 
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this sort of fallacious moralistic reasoning. Science writer Matt Ridley, meanwhile, 
describes the widespread tendency to argue from ought to is more prosaically (and 
more provocatively) as simply ‘political correctness’.11  
Although Singer does not use these terms, he too points out that the left’s view 
of what human nature is appears to be based on moral beliefs about what it ought to 
be. For example, in his analysis of Marx’s concept of human nature, Singer highlights 
the influential belief that undesirable traits such as selfishness, egoism or ambition are 
not inherent aspects our nature but simply the result of existing social conditions. 
According to Marxists, therefore, the advent of communism would end the socially-
induced “antagonism between man and man” of earlier epochs, and humans instead 
“would find happiness in working with others for the communal good”.12 A 
Darwinian view of unchanging or unchangeable human nature, by contrast, would 
seemingly deny this possibility: “Hence the resolute determination of many on the left 
to keep Darwinian thinking out of the social arena.”13 
Singer uses the pseudo-science of Soviet agronomist T. D. Lysenko as an 
extreme example of the attempt to make nature conform to Marxist precepts. 
According to Singer, Lysenko rejected the Darwinian idea of competition within 
species as merely a capitalist justification for human social inequality. Lysenko 
argued instead that there “is no intraspecific competition in nature. There is only 
competition between species: the wolf eats the hare; the hare does not eat another 
hare, it eats grass.”14 When translated into practice, Lysenko’s pseudo-scientific ideas, 
which relied heavily on the erroneous Lamarckian concept of the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, were a disaster.  
Given that the ideological appeal of Marxism appears to have diminished in 
the decades since the collapse of communism, it could appear anachronistic of Singer 
to continue to critique the Marxist stance on Darwinism. However, much of the initial 
negative reaction to ETOHN was informed by Marxist ideology, and contemporary 
opposition to Darwinism remains heavily influenced by these earlier, ideologically 
based arguments.
15
 Moreover, as Singer makes clear, the modern left’s standard view 
of a malleable human nature still reflects that posited by Marx – i.e., that which arises 
almost entirely from the ‘ensemble of the social relations’.16  
In relation to Singer’s initial discussion of the links between Darwinism and 
politics, therefore, the following points can be emphasised: that it is nonsensical to 
regard the course of evolution as right or good; that it is therefore fallacious to derive 
political values from the facts of evolution (as the right often did historically); that 
many on the left have mistakenly rejected Darwinism by accepting the right’s 
erroneous view of the implications of evolved human nature; and, finally, that the left 
has itself often committed the fallacy of conflating how human nature ought to be 
with how it is. 
 
≈ 
 
The second connection between Darwinian thinking and political ideas identified by 
Singer is the view “that social policies may, by helping the ‘less fit’ to survive, have 
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deleterious genetic consequences”.17 Singer himself is sceptical of the merits of this 
argument: “[It] is, to put it charitably, highly speculative”. According to Singer, 
concern about the possible social costs of the ‘unfit’ surviving (and reproducing) 
relates most strongly to life-saving intervention for those with genetically linked 
diseases. The discovery of insulin, for example, has allowed many people with early 
onset diabetes, who otherwise would have died, to pass on this genetic disorder to 
their own children. “But no one would seriously propose withholding insulin from 
children with diabetes in order to avoid the genetic consequences of providing 
insulin.”18 
Furthermore, he argues that cases of specific genetic disorders are very 
different from “the vague suggestions sometimes heard from the political right” that, 
say, providing social welfare for the unemployed merely allows them to reproduce 
and thus maintain ‘deleterious’ genes in the population: “Even if there were a genetic 
component to something as nebulous as unemployment, to say that these genes were 
‘deleterious’ would involve value judgements that go way beyond what the science 
alone can tell us.”19 
Here, Singer is being somewhat disingenuous. His earlier argument, for 
instance, focuses on the need to maintain the distinction between political values and 
scientific theories; that certain value judgements “may go beyond what science can 
tell us”, therefore, is in keeping with his own Darwinian left thesis, and it is thus 
inconsistent for him to dismiss the arguments of the political right on these grounds. 
Furthermore, as evidenced in the quotations from the Descent of Man above, Charles 
Darwin too was concerned about supposedly ‘inferior’ members of society 
outbreeding the ‘better’ ones.20  
In addition, while Singer is undoubtedly correct that any genetic component to 
something like unemployment is ‘nebulous’, it is not quite as straightforward to 
dismiss suggestions of a possible ‘genetic component’ to anti-social behaviours such 
as aggression or drug addiction, or that this may be a factor, say, in intergenerational 
family dysfunction. Of course, this is not to suggest that there actually is a strong 
genetic component to such behaviours, just that Singer has chosen a tenuous example 
that is relatively easy to dismiss. 
Unfortunately, extending this argument, which includes the politically 
interesting but highly controversial question of eugenics, would take me too far from 
the current argument (and this, too, may be why Singer himself skirts the issue). Here, 
it is sufficient to indicate that Singer’s discussion of the possible genetic 
consequences of pursuing certain social policies is lacking in details – most 
especially, in any adequate discussion of some of the more problematic aspects of this 
topic. Yet in an age where genetic screening for medical and behavioural traits is 
becoming more and more practicable, this is obviously an area that requires careful 
ethical and political consideration. In relation to the social implications of genetic 
research, for example, it is not inconceivable that advances in genetic technology may 
be exploited by the wealthy to ensure advantageous traits in their children – thus 
potentially adding a distinct ‘biological’ element to present day social inequality. If 
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nothing else, if the left maintains its distance from Darwinian science, it will be 
increasingly marginalised in the debate over genetic technologies.  
 
≈ 
 
The third link that Singer identifies between Darwinism and politics is the idea that 
understanding our nature in the light of human evolution could help identify potential 
obstacles to achieving our social and political goals. Philosopher Leslie Stevenson 
acknowledges a similar point: “If our biological nature predisposes us to think, feel, 
and act in certain ways, then we had better take realistic account of that in individual 
choices and in social policy.”21 Of course, Stevenson expresses this as a hypothetical 
– if we have such biological predispositions – and he also indicates the implications of 
the (equally hypothetical) alternative view of human nature: “If, on the other hand, we 
are products of society, and if we find that many human lives are presently 
unsatisfactory, then there can be no real solution until human society is 
transformed.”22 
The crucial issue, therefore, is over the facts of the matter: whether or not 
evolved human biology still exerts an influence over human behaviour. Obviously, as 
a political philosopher, Singer is not in a position to decide on the veracity of the 
science of human behaviour, and he concedes that “[t]he usefulness of the 
evolutionary information will, of course, vary in proportion to its reliability”.23 Singer 
himself clearly believes that modern human behaviour is still likely to be influenced 
by our evolutionary history, and his philosophical argument concerns what follows 
from any such Darwinian view of a relatively fixed human nature. For the purposes of 
this thesis, which also accepts the likelihood of the on-going influence of human 
evolution, Singer’s broad Darwinian argument – that ETOHN may inform, but not 
determine, our political decision-making – will be accepted without further detailed 
discussion.  
  
≈ 
 
Singer discusses a fourth, and (for him) final, way in which Darwinism may be 
relevant to political thinking: the argument that “All pre-Darwinian political beliefs 
and ideas … be examined to see if they contain factual elements that are incompatible 
with Darwinian thinking”.24 Here, Singer is most concerned with another, and more 
personal, ethical issue – the welfare of animals. Briefly, he argues that, “[b]y 
knocking out the intellectual foundations of the idea that we are a separate creation 
from the animals, and utterly different in kind”, Darwinism could allow us to 
recognise, and base policies on, “the similarities we identify between human and non-
human animals”.25 While Singer may indeed be correct in his evolutionary-informed 
view of the rights of animals, this aspect of his Darwinian left argument will not be 
examined further in this thesis.  
Here, however, I would also extend Singer’s argument by suggesting that the 
concept of pre-Darwinian (or non-Darwinian) ideas be extended to contemporary 
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‘folk’ conceptions of human nature, those that are based on everyday observations of 
human behaviour, and which might indeed accurately identify certain aspects of our 
evolved nature. Specifically, I would argue that some widespread views of human 
nature – for example, the rightist idea that humans are self-interested or competitive – 
are partially correct, and that the left’s (wishful) denial of such facets of our nature is 
politically counter-productive.  
For example, while the ‘success’ of present-day consumer capitalism may in 
fact be premised on certain evolved aspects of human nature, this does not mean that 
consumer capitalist society is therefore the best sort of society for human beings – 
most especially because such a society limits more meaningful human flourishing. 
The problem is that if leftists deny capitalism’s basis in human nature, this simply 
plays into the hands of free market ideologues: shopping malls and mindless (over-) 
consumption do satisfy some of our basic evolved desires, and to deny this is to run 
the real risk of being dismissed as unrealistically utopian.  
The left’s current reluctance to accept Darwinian reasoning concedes the 
intellectual high ground to the (capitalist) right, even though the latter’s position may 
not be particularly ‘high’ or ‘intellectual’. A more effective argument would be to 
challenge the right’s supposedly ‘common sense’ view of human nature with a more 
complex and nuanced alternative – that is, one based on a Darwinian appreciation of 
the multi-faceted and often contradictory nature of our evolved behaviour. Yes, 
humans can often be egotistical and desirous of status, and these aspects of our nature 
can indeed be satisfied in a consumer capitalist society; at the same time, such a 
society cannot easily satisfy the equally evolved human desires for fulfilment and 
happiness that may arise, for example, through camaraderie or selfless social 
engagement.  
Singer’s argument that pre-Darwinian political ideas must be made compatible 
with modern evolutionary thinking, therefore, can be expanded to include informed 
criticism of the simplistic ‘Darwinian’ beliefs about human nature sometimes put 
forward by those wishing to defend modern-day consumer capitalism. 
 
≈ 
 
Singer’s Darwinian left argument – or, more specifically, his emphasis on the 
fact/value distinction – contrasts directly with that put forward by Larry Arnhart in the 
latter’s Darwinian Conservatism (2005). Indeed, Arnhart’s evolutionary-informed 
political beliefs are those that many on the left fear would inevitably result from the 
application of Darwinian reasoning to human social behaviour. Here, therefore, 
Arnhart’s Darwinian argument will provide a useful case study of a contemporary 
attempt to derive political values directly from the (supposed) facts of human nature.  
Like Singer’s A Darwinian Left, Arnhart’s Darwinian Conservatism is a 
polemic, aimed at convincing a sceptical political audience of the merits of an 
evolutionary perspective on human social behaviour. However, unlike the left’s 
traditional opposition to ETOHN, which focuses on Darwinism’s historical role in 
justifying inequality and the political status quo, traditional conservative disquiet 
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towards evolutionary theory also has religious overtones – as Arnhart himself 
acknowledges: “Many conservatives regard Darwinian evolution as a key idea for a 
scientific materialism that is morally and politically corrupting because it denies the 
moral dignity of human beings as created in God’s image.”26 
Arnhart, then, faces a difficulty that Singer does not (or, at least, does not face 
nearly as strongly): that the constituency at which his Darwinian argument is aimed is 
unlikely to accept evolutionary theory in general, let alone its application to human 
beings. In attempting to overcome this difficulty, Arnhart emphasises the way in 
which (in his opinion) a Darwinian view of human nature supports traditional 
conservative values – for example, by arguing that Darwinism confirms the traditional 
religious view that human nature “is imperfect because human beings are limited in 
their knowledge and their virtue”.27 
A crucial claim in Arnhart’s Darwinian Conservatism is that “there are at least 
twenty natural desires that are universal to all human societies because they are rooted 
in human biology, and these twenty natural desires provide a universal basis for moral 
experience”:  
 
Human beings generally desire a complete life, parental care, sexual identity, 
sexual mating, familial bonding, friendship, social status, justice as 
reciprocity, political rule, war, health, beauty, property, speech, practical 
habituation, practical reasoning, practical arts, aesthetic pleasure, religious 
understanding, and intellectual understanding.
28
 
 
This selection of natural and universal desires, according to Arnhart, is 
supported by anthropological evidence of “hundreds of human universals, which are 
clustered around the twenty desires on [this] list”; psychological studies which 
“recognize these twenty desires as manifesting the basic motives for human action”; 
data from surveys of what is psychologically important to people, which “confirms 
the primacy of these twenty desires”; Aristotle’s review, in the Nichomachean Ethics 
and the Rhetoric, of “the common opinions of human beings about what is desirable 
in life, [which] includes the twenty desires”; and, the recorded history of human 
civilisation since the development of agriculture, which “shows human beings as 
motivated by these desires”.29 
While this collection of apparent universal human desires could be challenged 
on various grounds (for example, how does one equate a child’s ‘desire’ for parental 
care, say, with the supposed group ‘desire’ for political rule or for war), I will here 
assume that Arnhart has identified certain facets of human behaviour that may, in 
turn, be based on an underlying evolved human nature. The relevant issue here is how 
Arnhart attempts to justify these desires as the ‘universal basis of morality’, and how 
this relates to Singer’s emphasis on the fact/value distinction.  
According to Arnhart, these particular universal desires allow individual 
humans to distinguish good from bad, with the ‘good’ simply being that which 
satisfies these desires, and the ‘bad’ being that which denies these desires. He is 
aware that this claim apparently conflicts with the fact/value distinction – the 
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philosophical argument, as he put it, “that we cannot infer moral values from natural 
facts because what we ought to do is not the same as what we actually do. So from the 
fact that we desire something, we cannot infer that it is good for us to desire it”.30 
Arnhart counters this philosophical point by claiming that “there is no merely 
factual desire separated from a prescriptive desire, which would create the fact/value 
dichotomy”: 
 
Whatever we desire we do so because we judge that it is truly desirable for us. 
… Whenever a moral philosopher tells us that we ought to do something, we 
can always ask, Why? And ultimately the only final answer to that question is, 
Because it’s desirable for you as something that will fulfil you or make you 
happy.
31
  
 
The morally good society, in this account, is one in which our natural desires 
are satisfied; in this state we are happy or fulfilled, with this happiness or fulfilment 
having meaning only in relation to the satisfaction of our evolved desires. Given this, 
Arnhart suggests: “If the good is the desirable, then the satisfaction of our natural 
desires constitutes a universal standard for judging social practice as either fulfilling 
or frustrating human nature”.32 
Arnhart’s claim that our natural desires motivate moral judgment, in other 
words, equates to the claim that our desires both determine and define our moral 
sense: that which leads to the satisfaction of the desirable is morally good, that which 
frustrates the desirable is morally bad. At this point, Arnhart’s argument appears to 
touch upon concepts of desire satisfaction that are central to many consequentialist 
moral theories, such as the (classic) utilitarian belief that ‘right’ or ‘good’ actions are 
those that, ultimately, produce the most happiness.
33
 In Arnhart’s case, the state of 
having satisfied our natural desires would, presumably, equate to utilitarianism’s 
desired end result of greater happiness, and as such, this would be a morally good 
state. 
However, as indicated in the classic utilitarian phrase, ‘The greatest good to 
the greatest number’, a crucial aspect of such consequentialist beliefs is the 
maximisation of happiness (or desire satisfaction). This provides one means to 
evaluate conflicting desires – that which brings about the most happiness is the most 
good. Arnhart, however, fails to provide such a mechanism for evaluating between 
conflicting desires: his claim is simply that “something is good insofar as it is 
desirable”.34  
The problem that arises here can be illustrated by considering Arnhart’s 
description of the natural ‘desire for sexual mating’: 
 
Human beings generally desire sexual coupling. In every human society, there 
is intense interest in sexuality. Social regulation is needed to manage the 
conflicts created by sexual competition. For example, the prohibition on incest 
is universal. Incest between mother and son is so rare as to be almost 
inconceivable for most people.
35
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In Arnhart’s scheme, satisfying the evolved desire for sexual mating is morally 
good. Thus, presumably, the general human desire for sexual coupling and the intense 
interest in sexuality is also morally good (although, here, traditional conservatives 
might disagree about the ‘morality’ of a keen interest in sex). What though of the 
‘social regulation’ of ‘sexual competition’? That is, if morally good sexual desire 
sometimes leads to sexual competition, on what moral basis would anyone accept the 
social regulation that would deny this desire? Or, if social regulation is itself a natural 
desire (perhaps an aspect of the ‘desire for practical habituation’), by what means 
does this desire morally outweigh the individual desire for sex? Indeed, denying 
sexual desire would, in Arnhart’s scheme, apparently constitute morally bad 
behaviour.  
A consequentialist emphasis on maximisation of desire satisfaction could 
perhaps overcome these objections – for example, if social regulation of sexual desire 
brought about greater overall happiness/satisfaction, this would be preferable – but, as 
already indicated, Arnhart fails to discuss different degrees or levels of satisfaction. 
Nor indeed does he discuss how conflicts of interest between individuals with 
different desires may be evaluated (in utilitarianism, each person’s happiness counts 
the same). Furthermore, for Arnhart to introduce such consequentialist reasoning into 
his system of morality would require him to qualify his argument that “twenty natural 
desires provide a universal basis for moral experience”. For example, he would have 
to suggest that a ‘desire for’ utilitarian outcomes, say, was also a feature of human 
moral nature (which would appear implausible) or that human reason also plays a 
crucial role in our moral decision-making. 
This latter, acknowledging that reason may be used in moral decisions, 
appears sensible, and Arnhart elsewhere highlights the use of “prudential judgement 
to make trade-offs between competing goods or between lesser and greater evils”.36 
However, this is not how he defines his system of morality, which is based solely on 
evolved feelings or desires. Appealing to reason would undermine his claim that we 
derive our moral beliefs directly from our evolved nature – for example, an appeal to 
reason would allow us to question why the fact of having certain desires or emotions 
thereby justifies the ensuing beliefs as moral. In other words, use of reason would lead 
to the very is/ought distinction that Arnhart wishes to avoid – the point, emphasised 
by Singer, that facts do not determine values. This, then, is a major flaw in Arnhart’s 
account of morality: whence our ability for ‘prudential judgement’ if our ethical sense 
is derived solely from evolved emotions? 
To continue with the analysis of ‘the desire for sexual mating’: why Arnhart 
choses to comment specifically on mother/son incest is unclear, but that such 
behaviour is ‘almost inconceivable for most people’ does not mean that, if necessary, 
we cannot morally judge it. Indeed, even if someone desired to behave in a manner 
that was ‘inconceivable’ to others, by Arnhart’s own reasoning, this would be morally 
good. Here, he does not appear to take into account that what is desirable, and 
therefore morally good, for one person, may be undesirable, and hence morally bad, 
for another. 
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Similar problems arise with his subsequent bald statement about 
father/daughter incest (for which he provides no further explanation): “Incest between 
father and daughter is a more common problem. In comparison to women, men, on 
average, tend to be more violent in their sexual jealousy and more promiscuous in 
their sexual interests.”37 In this case, the moral claim that such incest is a ‘problem’ is 
not sanctioned by Arnhart’s own definition of morality as merely the satisfaction of 
desire. Furthermore, in addition to implying that male sexual promiscuity is natural 
and therefore good, Arnhart elsewhere emphasises the universality of male dominance 
over females (see below); thus it appears to follow from Arnhart’s own logic that if a 
male desires to sexually dominate a female, even his daughter, then this is morally 
virtuous. 
Arnhart’s conservative Darwinian perspective on male/female relations – that 
which epitomises what many on the left assume is an inevitable consequence of 
evolutionary reasoning – highlights similar problems with his simplistic account of 
(supposed) biological facts and political values. In his discussion of the evolved 
nature of political rule, for example, Arnhart states: 
 
Human politics is also a sphere for male dominance. No political community 
has ever been a true matriarchy. Even though women often exercise great 
power, and even dominance, in other areas of life, and even though women 
often enter the political sphere, the public arenas of political life, and 
especially highest positions, are generally dominated by men.
38
 
 
Most modern evolutionary theorists would agree with Arnhart that evolved 
biological differences between males and females may underlie observed social 
differences between the sexes or, as in this case, the observed differences in male and 
female political behaviour. Peter Singer, for example, uses an evolutionary argument 
to explain why males outnumber females in high status position in politics and 
business. 
Mindful of the fact/value distinction, however, Singer does not use this 
evolutionary argument to justify observed sex inequality. Arnhart, by contrast, 
dismissive of this distinction, commits the same fallacy as earlier Social Darwinists – 
that is, he assumes that observed human behaviour is ‘natural’, and that what is 
‘natural’ is therefore right. For example, in his extended discussion of ‘Why men 
rule?’, he concludes that “male dominance of politics is rooted in human biological 
nature”39 – and hence, given that morality too (in his view) is rooted in human 
evolved biology, that this male desire for political dominance is naturally ‘good’. In 
this clear example of a fallacious ‘appeal to nature’, therefore, Arnhart uses observed 
facts of human behaviour (here, that men often seek to obtain dominant social 
positions) to defend the naturalness/rightness of male political hegemony.  
And if men’s nature leads them to dominate, what of women’s nature? It 
would come as no surprise to leftists that Arnhart argues: “Women tend by nature to 
be more nurturing, more attentive to children, and less physically aggressive. Most 
women find their greatest happiness in being married and having children.”40  
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It might be factually true that women, in general, are less aggressive than men, 
but this fact tells us nothing about the social roles that women ought to adopt – 
indeed, it could be used as an argument for why women might make better political 
leaders than men, especially if the latter’s ‘evolved nature’ may make conflict more 
likely. Thus, while Arnhart uses many (plausible) evolutionary facts in his political 
arguments, the point is that his moral or political beliefs simply do not follow from 
these facts. 
As a further example, Arnhart claims that: “On average, men desire to mate 
with young beautiful women, while women desire to mate with men who have social 
resources and high status.”41 Such a claim is apparently supported by modern 
evolutionary research – for example, by the evolutionary psychology finding that, 
across cultures, men tend to be more sexually attracted by visual indications of youth 
and fertility than women, with the reverse true for indications of status and resources. 
(While this could be further qualified – both sexes are more attracted by kindness and 
humour, for example – this is not germane to the present argument.) 
But what possible moral or political conclusions could we draw from this 
apparent sex difference? That men should ‘mate with young beautiful women’? Or 
that women ought to ‘mate with men who have social resources and high status’? If 
we follow the logic of Arnhart’s argument, this is exactly the ‘moral’ conclusion we 
may have to reach. Such a conclusion, of course, is not reflective of the conservative 
values that Arnhart wishes to promote, thus he is forced to concede: “Most men 
restrain their restless and thus disruptive desire for promiscuous mating to satisfy their 
desire for monogamous fidelity and parental care.”42 Again, while this appears a 
common-sense claim that competing desires should be traded off against each other, 
Arnhart’s own moral argument fails to provide a mechanism for doing so. (And 
indeed, a cursory glance at actual human behaviour might lead one to question the 
existence of a ‘desire for monogamous fidelity’.)  
Similar criticisms may be made of Arnhart’s discussion of the supposed 
evolved human ‘desire for war’. According to Arnhart: 
 
Human beings generally desire war when they think it will advance their 
group in conflicts with other groups. Human beings divide themselves into 
ethnic and territorial groups, and they tend to cooperate more with those 
people who belong to their own group than those outside their group. So when 
competition between communities becomes severe, violent conflict is likely. 
Human beings desire war when fear, interest or honor move them to fight for 
their community against opposing communities.
43
 
 
Here, Arnhart’s broad observations appear factually true. However, Arnhart is 
not merely describing the fact that humans go to war in certain circumstances, his is 
also making a normative claim: that because we often desire war, and because (as he 
earlier emphasises) the desirable is the morally good, that we therefore ought to go to 
war, or that war is a good thing if it is what we desire. (By which reasoning, 
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depending on whose perspective we adopt, the 9/11 attacks are as morally justifiable 
as the subsequent USA invasion of Iraq, or indeed the Nazi conquest of Europe.) 
An alternative interpretation of human history, based on similar general 
observations of human behaviour, is that humans have the potential for aggressive 
behaviour; that, in certain circumstances, human beings act or react violently; and, 
that violence or the threat of violence is a possible strategy adopted by individual 
humans or by groups of humans to further their aims. This, though, is very different 
from the claim that a desire for war (which Arnhart does not differentiate from other 
forms of violence) is an inevitable and even desirable aspect of human behaviour.  
Here again, Arnhart takes what is quite possibly a universal aspect of human 
societies – violent conflict – and, without more detailed definition, interprets it as an 
inherent facet of human nature. Among numerous other objections to this argument is 
the point that, if the desire for war were inherent to all humans, then large and largely 
peaceable societies, such as those of the affluent West, would be near-impossible. 
Further, Arnhart’s simplistic argument allows little room for moral judgement about 
war; in his account, it is simply a natural human behaviour (one of his clearly 
identified ‘20 natural desires’), and thus a moral one.  
Despite the obvious inadequacy of Arnhart’s analysis, many leftists may here 
assume that this sort of conservative or right-wing interpretation of human behaviour 
is all that a Darwinian perspective can provide. Unfortunately, in rejecting this sort of 
pseudo-Darwinian argument, those concerned with conflict resolution, say, or sexual 
inequality may reject all insights that a Darwinian perspective may provide on the 
ultimate causes of human conflict or inequity. Arnhart is not wrong that there may be 
a biological basis to the behaviours that lead to war or to sexual inequality; he is 
wrong to suggest that this in some way justifies that behaviour or its outcomes.  
In summary: Larry Arnhart’s Darwinian Conservatism is significant in being a 
contemporary attempt to apply modern ETOHN to right-wing political beliefs. As 
such, Arnhart’s work epitomises many of the left’s deep misgivings about what 
Darwinian theory implies for human social behaviour. Yet, while Arnhart’s political 
conclusions (especially those concerning the ‘natural’ roles of men and women, and 
the ‘naturalness’ of war) may be pernicious if they became widely accepted, this is 
not because these arguments follow from the facts of an evolved human nature.   
At most, Arnhart’s twenty ‘natural desires’ may identify a core of common 
human predispositions, but his attempt to equate morality with the satisfaction of 
these ‘desires’ is a disaster. In addition, Arnhart’s conservative conclusions, 
apparently sanctioned by science, demonstrate why an unwary left can so easily come 
to reject Darwinian science in its entirety. 
 
≈ 
 
Larry Arnhart’s failure to derive a ‘conservative morality’ from the (supposed) facts 
of human nature further validates Peter Singer’s emphasis on the fact/value 
distinction. Historically, both the right and the left have been wrong to assume that 
the facts of our nature must dictate our political beliefs. Rather, the point is that if we 
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want to realise our political goals, we must begin with a clear understanding of the 
facts of human nature.  
Nevertheless, while I broadly accept Peter Singer’s analysis of biological facts 
and political values, and of the various ways in which Darwinian thinking connects 
with political debate, a number of problematic issues remain – most notably, the 
question of eugenics. To forestall further discussion, however, I will simply argue 
that, for the left to provide meaningful input into debate about the genetic 
consequences of intervention in human reproduction, it must first accept the relevance 
of biological theory to modern human behaviour.  
A further, more abstract, issue is the relationship between is, ought and can. 
That is, while Singer argues that the facts of what human nature is do not directly 
determine what we ought to do, these facts nevertheless affect what we can (or 
cannot) do. According to Singer, evolved constraints on human nature suggest that 
the Marxist vision of a perfectly harmonious socialist society is unattainable; given 
what our nature is, it seems, humans simply cannot achieve such a society.  
As Singer acknowledges in his final chapter, anyone who accepts a Darwinian 
left perspective on human nature would not “[e]xpect to end all conflict and strife 
between human beings, whether by political revolution, social change, or better 
education”.44 He goes on to admit, his is “a sharply deflated vision of the left, its 
utopian ideas replaced by a coolly realistic view of what can be achieved”.45  
Singer’s pessimistic but (apparently) realistic conclusions are premised on 
accepting the facts of human evolution. Thus, even if leftists were to acknowledge 
that is does not imply ought, another concern immediately arises from the fact that 
ought implies can. If human nature is infinitely malleable, as the left has traditionally 
assumed, this is not an issue: human nature (and human society) can become as it 
ought to be. This, then, is the subject of the next chapter – the traditional leftist belief 
that a malleable human nature presents few constraints on what can be achieved. 
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We are, as Simon de Beauvoir said, “l’être dont l’être est de n’être pas” – the being whose essence lies 
in having no essence. 
Stephen Jay Gould, Ever Since Darwin 
 
 
Chapter 6: Infinite Malleability 
 
Anthropologist Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa is wonderful to read. 
Despite being first published in 1928, it is surprisingly modern – not (or not just) in 
its exuberance and enthusiasm, but in its subject matter: the trials and tribulations of 
adolescence. Aside from a few dated references to buying stocking or coveting hats, 
Mead’s description of the rebelliousness of the typical teenage American girl in the 
1920s, for example, could just as easily refer to the 2010s: “Parental disapproval of 
extreme styles of clothing … a taste for cigarettes and liquor … going to the movies, 
buying books and magazines of which her parents disapprove … the desire for clothes 
and for amusement …”.1  
Furthermore, given the popular cultural image of a more staid and more chaste 
past, Mead’s attitude to adolescent sex seems more appropriate to the post-‘Swinging 
60s’ generation than to that which had just lived through The Great War (as it was 
then still called): “The present problem of the sex experimentation of young people 
would be greatly simplified if it were conceived of as experimentation instead of as 
rebellion, if no Puritan self-accusations vexed their conscience.”2  
Yet why should we find the seeming modern-ness of Mead’s subject matter at 
all surprising? Could we not just conclude from these continuities in attitudes and 
behaviours, despite the massive cultural and technological changes that have occurred 
in the eight decades or so since Coming of Age was written, that teenage ‘angst’ is 
simply a stage that all youngsters (and their parents) go through? Ironically, if we did 
so, we would contradict the entire thesis that Mead herself presents – a thesis, 
moreover, that was (and is) hugely influential on leftist notions about human nature. 
Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa provides some of the strongest evidence that human 
nature is infinitely malleable, and thus unconstrained by humanity’s biological past. It 
therefore epitomises the concept of human nature that Peter Singer explicitly rejects 
in A Darwinian Left.  
In Chapter 1, I raised the idea of successive levels of ‘worst case scenario’ for 
the left in respect of human nature. At Level 1, in the ‘best case scenario’, is the view 
widely held by the left: essentially, that human nature is solely the product of social 
environment, and that desirable changes to this environment will result in desirable 
changes to human nature. This chapter examines two inter-related questions about this 
Level 1 scenario: why the left is seemingly committed to the view that human nature 
is malleable, and whether leftist political values are dependent on such a view of 
human nature. 
I begin with brief background discussion of Margaret Mead’s Samoan 
research, and the evidence she presents to defend the concept of human malleability. 
Next, I assess the scientific basis of Mead’s claims by examining how her supporters 
have responded to subsequent criticisms of her research. I then address the 
assumption that a malleable human nature is indeed a ‘best case scenario’ for the left, 
and I conclude that such malleability may have political implications that would be 
decidedly unattractive to egalitarians. I use the human tendency to form status 
hierarchies as a case study of the dangers of overlooking our evolved nature, before, 
finally, turning to anthropologist Christopher Boehm’s thesis on the evolution of 
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egalitarianism to illustrate that Darwinian accounts of human behaviour need not be 
inimitable to leftist aspirations as often assumed. 
 
≈ 
 
Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa was written to refute the then-prevailing idea that 
the causes of  “conflict and distress” amongst young people could be ascribed to a 
defined developmental stage called ‘adolescence’ – “the period in which idealism 
flowered and rebellion against authority waxed strong, a period during which 
difficulties and conflicts were absolutely inevitable.”3 (Indeed, the founder of modern 
anthropology, Franz Boas, notes this pervasive belief in his foreword to Mead’s work: 
“When we speak about the difficulties of childhood and adolescence, we are thinking 
of them as unavoidable periods of adjustments through which everyone has to pass.”4) 
Working at a time when Social Darwinist and eugenic theories were politically 
prominent, Mead wished to test the established belief that ‘nature’ not ‘nurture’ 
determined human behaviour. Given the impossibility of conducting a “human 
experiment” in the laboratory to evaluate alternative theories of adolescent 
development, Mead turned instead to field-based anthropological observation “of 
human beings under different cultural conditions in some other part of the world” – 
i.e., people from “primitive groups who have had thousands of years of historical 
development along completely different lines from our own, whose language does not 
possess our Indo-European categories, whose religious ideas are of a different nature, 
whose social organisation is not only simpler but very different from our own”. Mead 
opted to study the Polynesian people of the Pacific Islands, and in particular “to 
concentrate upon the adolescent girl in Samoa”.5 
As is evident in her anthropological description of ‘A Day in Samoa’, Mead 
discovered an incredible contrast between the lives of Samoan youngsters and those 
of their stressed and rebellious American peers. To understand why her work 
subsequently provided so popular and influential, it is worth quoting from her 
account, which begins at first light: 
 
As the dawn begins to fall among the soft brown roofs and the slender palm 
trees stand out against a colourless, gleaming sea, lovers slip home from trysts 
beneath the palm trees or in the shadow of beached canoes, that the light may 
find each sleeper in his appointed place. 
 
She details how the day progresses: 
 
Girls stop to giggle over some young ne’er-do-well who escaped during the 
night from an angry father’s pursuit and to venture a shrewd guess that the 
daughter knew more about his presence than she told. The boy who is taunted 
by another, who has succeeded him in his sweetheart’s favour, grapples with 
his rival, his foot slipping in the wet sand. 
 
And concludes as evening draws in:  
 
Half the village may go fishing by torchlight, and the curving reef will gleam 
with wavering lights and echo with shouts of triumph or disappointment, 
teasing words or cries of outraged modesty. Or a group of youths may dance 
for the pleasure of some visiting maiden. … Sometimes sleep will not descend 
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upon the village until long past midnight; then at last there is only the mellow 
thunder of the reef and the whisper of lovers, as the village rests until dawn.
6
 
 
How can one not be stirred by such a vivid and idyllic picture of the 
uncorrupted life in a simpler society, especially in contrast to life in an industrial (or, 
today, post-industrial) one? 
Yet Mead was not simply describing the free and promiscuous lives of 
Samoan youths compared to that of repressed Western adolescents. Rather, hers was 
also a scientific account of the reason for observed dissimilarities between human 
societies. According to science writer Matt Ridley: “[Mead] brought back from 
Samoa apparently hard evidence of a society in which a different culture had 
produced a very different human nature. … For fifty years Mead’s Samoans stood as 
definitive proof of the perfectability of man.”7 
Significantly for leftist beliefs about the possibility of desirable social change, 
Mead believed that her findings provided an alternative to what many in her own 
society saw as the inevitable “turbulent manifestations”8 of growing up in a Western 
society:  
 
The strongest light will fall upon the ways in which Samoan education, in its 
broadest sense, differs from our own. And from this contrast we may be able 
to turn, made newly and vividly self-conscious and self-critical, to judge anew 
and perhaps fashion differently the education we give our children.
9
 
 
Of course, re-fashioning behaviour through deliberate changes to children’s 
up-bringing is more feasible if the human mind itself is ‘re-fashionable’ – that is, if 
human nature could be moulded by the social environment within which humans 
developed. Contrary to the prevailing hereditarian emphasis on fixed instincts and 
inherited behaviours, therefore, the Samoan evidence proved that human nature was, 
in fact, socially determined – and in Boas’ influential opinion, Mead’s research 
forcefully demonstrated “that much of what we ascribe to human nature is no more 
than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by our civilisation”.10 Indeed, the findings 
from Samoa indicated that human nature was malleable even at the most fundamental 
level; according to Mead, “neither race nor common humanity can be held responsible 
for many of the forms which even such basic human emotions as love and fear and 
anger take under different social conditions”.11 
Eight decades later, similar beliefs about the socio-cultural determinants of 
human behaviour remain prominent in the social sciences; for instance, professor of 
sociology Michael Kimmel, in summarising his critical discussion of biological 
approaches to gender, comments: “Scientists – social, behavioural, natural, biological 
– will continue to disagree as they hunt for the origins of human behavior. What they 
must all recognize is that people behave differently in different cultures and that even 
similar behaviours may mean different things in different contexts.”12 Kimmel, 
moreover, uses Mead’s later research in New Guinea as evidence of the social 
construction of gender.
13
 
Science journalist Robert Wright, who (in contrast to Mead and Kimmel) 
presents a biological perspective on human nature, nevertheless acknowledges the 
intellectual significance of Coming of Age in Samoa: 
 
It is hard to exaggerate the influence of Mead’s findings on twentieth-century 
thought. Claims about [fixed] human nature are always precarious, vulnerable 
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to the discovery of even a single culture in which its elements are 
fundamentally lacking. For much of [the 20
th
] century, such claims have been 
ritualistically met with a single question: ‘What about Samoa?’14 
 
Coming of Age in Samoa, therefore, provides an answer to why the left are 
wedded to the concept of a malleable human nature: if human nature really is, as 
Mead’s research indicates, infinitely malleable, then social reformers could indeed 
fashion a fairer or more harmonious society than that which currently exists. This is 
the sort of inspiring vision that motivates many on the left. The following discussion 
will examine why this stirring vision is very probably wrong.  
 
≈ 
 
Peter Singer, while acknowledging that beliefs about human nature tend to vary along 
the political continuum, from malleable at the leftist end to fixed at the rightist, makes 
the point that these “are beliefs about a matter of fact and should be open to revision 
in the light of evidence.”15 Thus, while political scientists may be unable to decide 
which of the conflicting claims about human nature are scientifically valid, they can 
still determine whether these claims are actually scientific – for example, if and when 
new facts emerge, any theories that are closed to revision can be regarded as non-
scientific. 
In this respect, Singer notes the reaction to critical re-evaluation of Mead’s 
Samoan research by anthropologist Derek Freeman:  
 
Freeman compiled a convincing case that Mead had misunderstood Samoan 
customs, which did not allow the kind of easy-going adolescent sexuality that 
Mead described. For this he was pilloried by his fellow-anthropologists, and 
the American Anthropological Association passed a motion denouncing his 
refutation of Mead’s work as ‘unscientific’.16 
 
Commenting on the same issue, Matt Ridley argues: “The reaction of 
anthropologists to Freeman’s revelation was itself the perfect refutation of Mead’s 
creed. They reacted like a tribe whose cult has been attacked and shrine desecrated, 
vilifying Freeman in every conceivable way except by refuting him.”17 According to 
evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker, meanwhile, the Mead/Freeman controversy 
merely exemplifies the critical reaction in the social sciences to research that 
questions the notion of a malleable human nature – indeed, in Pinker’s view, the 
response to Freeman was comparatively mild compared to other examples of 
anthropologists who posit fixed aspects to human nature.
18
 
Furthermore, Pinker suggests that many social scientists simply pay lip service 
to the commonsense idea that genes or biology play some role in human development 
and behaviour, while retaining the (Mead-esque) belief that the influence of culture is 
of overwhelming importance. As illustration, Pinker notes the heated debates arising 
from challenges to the ‘social constructionist’ consensus on topics such as intelligence 
or parenting or sexual violence. Pinker’s point is not to unreservedly endorse this 
research, but to highlight the widespread unwillingness to include human biology as 
part of a wider analysis of these topics: “For invoking nurture and nature, not nurture 
alone … authors have been picketed, shouted down, subjected to searing invective in 
the press, even denounced in Congress. Others expressing such opinions have been 
censored, assaulted, or threatened with criminal prosecution.”19  
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Thus, while Pinker acknowledges that any modern evolutionary claim about 
human nature “should be scrutinized and any logical and empirical flaws pointed out, 
just as with any scientific hypothesis”, in his opinion, the criticisms of modern 
ETOHN often go beyond the conventions of ordinary academic debate.
20
 Other 
writers similarly document the caustic nature of the modern academic arguments 
about human nature.
21
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, evolutionary or biological explanations for 
human behaviour do indeed appear unacceptable to many on the left – for instance, 
sociologist Hilary Rose’s summary dismissal of ‘facile’ Darwinian perspectives on 
global problems such as war, famine, disease or growing economic disparities.
22
 
Michael Kimmel similarly (and sarcastically) presents the issue in terms of a mutually 
exclusive biology or culture: “Scientists have yet to discover the gene that carries the 
belief in nature over nurture; it is not yet clear which half of the brain blots out 
evidence of cultural or individual variation from evolutionary imperatives. Is human 
gullibility for pseudoscientific explanation carried on a particular chromosome?”23 
Again, there appears no allowance for interaction between nature and nurture here: if 
we accept Darwinian explanations, then we must also accept that evolutionary 
imperatives will ‘blot out’ any meaningful role for culture. 
Be this as it may, the focus here is on the scientific assumptions that underpin 
particular concepts of human nature. Unlike faith-based religious beliefs, scientific 
theories are (or should be) open to continuous challenge and, in principle, to potential 
falsification. The aim of Mead’s own research, after all, was to test the dominant 
hereditarian theories of a fixed human nature, with the evidence that she uncovered 
challenging those particular assumptions. That many social scientists are apparently 
unwilling to accept subsequent criticisms of Mead’s work suggests an ideological 
commitment to the notion of human malleability, in addition to any scientific 
justification.   
Obviously, the huge controversy that arose over Freeman’s work does not 
settle the case about the malleability of human nature (nor, indeed, does it ‘prove’ that 
Freeman’s re-evaluation of Mead was necessarily correct). Nevertheless, if the desire 
to refute prevailing biological determinist ideas did indeed colour Mead’s perceptions 
of Samoan society, she would have committed the very ‘sin’ often laid at modern 
Darwinists’ door – that of reading particular political beliefs into human nature. And 
it appears probable that this was indeed the case; for example, while otherwise 
defending Mead’s work, sociologist Michael Kimmel concedes: “Critics such as 
Derek Freeman have suggested that Mead, like the biologists she was criticising, 
simply found what she was looking for, especially in Samoa, where she apparently 
fabricated some details.” 24 
 
≈ 
 
Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa provides a particularly vivid example of why the left 
are attracted to the concept of a malleable human nature – not only is hers an 
aesthetically appealing account of a freer, easier way of life, but it also (supposedly) 
confirms the leftist hope that human beings and human society are perfectable. 
According to Singer, this is the crucial element of the leftist commitment to a 
malleable human nature; “the left’s Great Dream”, he suggests, is “The Perfectability 
of Man”:  
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Since Plato’s Republic at least, the idea of building a perfect society has been 
present in Western consciousness. For as long as the left has existed, it has 
sought a society in which all human beings live harmoniously and 
cooperatively with each other in peace and freedom.
25
 
 
In Singer’s opinion, Darwinism, and especially its emphasis on an unceasing 
struggle for existence, denies this Great Dream – and this, he suspects, provides “the 
ultimate reason why the left rejected Darwinian thought”. 
According to Singer, the dream of human perfectability was central to Marx’s 
influential vision of a future communist society. Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 
therefore, created a dilemma for Marx and his followers. On the one hand, Darwinism 
provided a useful non-teleological explanation for the natural world, one that could 
scientifically challenge established religious justifications for the social status quo 
(and, in addition, the very idea of evolution appeared to match Marx’s reformist 
beliefs about social progress and political change). On the other hand, Darwinism’s 
emphasis on competition was incompatible with communism’s supposed resolution of 
human antagonism and conflict.  
Hence, in Singer’s view, the ideological determination by Marxists to keep 
evolutionary explanations for the natural world distinct from socialist interpretations 
of the human world: the idea that “Darwinism is the science of biological evolution 
[and] Marxism of social evolution”.26 Yet, as Singer points out, if we accept the 
evolutionary continuity between modern humans and their nonhuman ancestors, “it 
seems implausible that Darwinism gives us the laws of evolution for natural history 
but stops at the dawn of [human] history”.27 At the very least, for the Marxist view of 
human beings to be scientifically credible, the apparent disjoin between humans and 
the rest of the natural world needs to be explained in Darwinian terms.  
While philosophical enquiry cannot elicit the actual facts of human nature, it 
can indicate inconsistencies with the (supposedly) factual accounts that are presented 
(e.g., the implausibility of an abrupt disconnect between modern humans and their 
nonhuman ancestors). In principle, this would be part of the process by which human 
knowledge progresses, with claims and counter-claims being successively advanced 
to develop an increasingly accurate account of, in this case, human nature.  
This process does not appear to have occurred with respect to leftist beliefs 
about ETOHN: despite huge advances in scientific understanding of human 
behaviour, the leftist view of human nature still appears to reflect that of pre-
Darwinian Marxist theory. The assumption that motivates much leftist opposition to 
ETOHN is that to deny human malleability is to deny the possibility of desirable 
social and political change. Steven Pinker points to a inherent danger in such an 
assumption: “If we are not to abandon values such as peace and equality … then we 
must pry these values away from claims about our psychological makeup that are 
vulnerable to being proven false.”28 
The important question that arises here, of course, is what it would mean for 
leftist values if human nature is not, in fact, malleable. Indeed, is a malleable human 
nature really the best case scenario for the left?  
 
≈ 
 
The broad leftist position on ETOHN is that, if our biology or our genes ‘determine’ 
our behaviour, then social inequality is pretty much fixed. At first glance, the 
alternative, that our nature is malleable (through social conditioning, say) appears a 
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more appealing prospect – it suggests that changes to the social environment can 
change human nature for the better, and hence lead to a positive feedback of 
increasingly improved nature and society.  
However, the malleable view of human nature also has darker implications. 
For instance, such a view implies that humans could be conditioned to accept any 
form of social organization, good or bad: malleable humans could accept slavery, say, 
as readily as equality. Indeed, given the ‘right’ social environment, humans could 
presumably be conditioned to mutely accept inequality or injustice; in which case, an 
environmentally-determined society could be as unjust or unequal and as unalterable 
as any biologically-determined alternative. 
These issues can be illustrated with a poignant vignette from George Orwell’s 
The Road to Wigan Pier. In this extract from his Depression-era social commentary, 
Orwell describes catching a glimpse through his train window of a young working 
class woman trying to unblock a drain at the back of a “row of little grey slum 
houses” in an industrial town in northern England: 
 
I had time to see everything about her – her sacking apron, her clumsy clogs, 
her arms reddened by the cold. She looked up as the train passed, and I was 
almost near enough to catch her eye. She had a round pale face, the usual 
exhausted face of the slum girl who is twenty-five and looks forty, thanks to 
miscarriages and drudgery; and it wore, for the second in which I saw it, the 
most desolate, the most hopeless expression I have ever seen. It struck me then 
that we are mistaken when we say “it isn’t the same for them as it would be 
for us” and that people bred in slums can imagine nothing but the slums. For 
what I saw in her face was not the ignorant suffering of an animal. She knew 
well enough what was happening to her – understood as well as I did how 
dreadful a destiny it was to be kneeling there in the bitter cold, on the slimy 
stones of a slum backyard, poking a stick up a foul drain-pipe.
29
 
 
Although The Road to Wigan Pier provides one of the most moving 
denouncements of poverty that I have read, the most relevant point here is the claim 
that ‘it isn’t the same for them as it would be for us’ – a view of human nature that 
Orwell forcefully rejects. In this extract, Orwell is attacking the callous indifference 
of the rich; those who believe that, because the poor are born and bred in poverty, 
they cannot really ‘suffer’ from it in the same way that those born in more privileged 
circumstances would. Ironically – or, rather, tragically – this is also a conclusion that 
would arise from the (leftist) notion of a malleable human nature, one conditioned by 
social environment. That is, if human thought and behaviour is entirely the product of 
social and cultural experience, then Orwell may simply be wrong: those bred in slums 
may indeed be incapable of imagining anything but the slums; moreover, they would 
not necessarily ‘suffer’ in the same way as other human beings who had been brought 
up in a different environment. 
To relate this to Darwinian perspectives on human behaviour: one of the 
central claims of modern ETOHN, and, in particular, of evolutionary psychology, is 
that there is a universal human nature and that important aspects of emotion or 
behaviour will be shared by all human beings. From the ETOHN perspective, all 
normal humans will experience suffering in a similar way – thus, given such a view, 
we could not simply brush aside demands to ameliorate human suffering with the 
claim that ‘it’s not the same for them as it is for us’. According to the social 
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conditioning position, by contrast, such a dismissive attitude to ‘suffering’ could in 
fact be possible. 
Furthermore, the idea that social environment is the sole determinant of human 
nature overlaps with the relativist beliefs examined in Chapter 3. In its extreme forms, 
epistemic relativism suggests that human beliefs and behaviour would vary 
indefinitely between people, and peoples, as the result of differences in sex, social 
class, culture, and the like – in which case, it really would be different for them than it 
is for us. Importantly, while epistemic relativism is often thought of by its adherents 
as politically liberating (as a means, say, to challenge the prejudice and vested self-
interest of those in power), it also has more sinister implications: for example, that 
humans could be habituated to accept oppression or even conditioned to ignore or 
dismiss the suffering of others. By contrast, if humans share similar natures and 
similar capacities for suffering or for empathy, as ETOHN presuppose, then any 
justification for inequality premised on the (relativist) argument that ‘it’s not the same 
for them’ is open to challenge. 
Political philosopher Norman Geras, in his Marx and Human Nature, makes a 
related (though non-Darwinian) point about the dangers of the left denying the 
possibility of a fixed human nature. Geras begins by examining why many egalitarians 
might wish to reject the existence of human nature. He suggests that this is, in large 
part, a reaction to common right-wing or conservative arguments in defence of the 
status quo; the claim that existing social institutions simply reflect permanent or 
ineradicable aspects of unchanging (and unchangeable) human nature.  Geras 
acknowledges “the frequency of this kind of suggestion: in reference to selfishness, 
greed, love of power, cruelty; to private property, social and sexual inequality, 
nationalism, violence and war, as well as any number of other things”.30 
However, Geras goes on to suggest that it is an unfortunate over-reaction by 
the left to dismiss the idea of human nature in this way. (Singer, of course, argues the 
same point about the left’s rejection of ETOHN: that they mistakenly accept the 
right’s interpretation of the political implications of an evolved human nature). 
Moreover, Geras argues that it is counterproductive for the left to deny the existence 
of certain constant features of human nature:  
 
Where it concerns basic human needs, whether for adequate nourishment and 
other physical provision, for love, respect and friendship, or for freedom and 
breadth of intellectual and physical self-expression; where it concerns the 
identification of suffering and oppression associated with their non-fulfilment, 
and the attempt to remove such institutions as may be responsible for 
frustrating them – this is surely a central part of any socialist politics worth the 
name: the fight against what is inimical to human happiness. Could it be 
reactionary, in today’s world, to protest and act against hunger? Or against 
torture? And could not one – I do not say the only – motivation for doing so be 
a conception, an elementary conception, of the vital needs of any healthy 
human being, in virtue of human nature?
31
 
 
According to Geras, the socialist belief in a radically different social order is 
itself dependent on human beings, as a species, having the inherent capacity to 
develop the qualities necessary to sustain such a society – that is, characteristics such 
as “civic intelligence, interest, responsibility; mutual sympathy or respect, a deep 
feeling of human equality, the ability to use and enjoy a very extensive individual 
freedom; and so on”.32 
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This raises a significant objection to the concept of an infinitely malleable 
human nature: why would any social order be better (or worse) that any other if the 
human mind were simply a ‘blank slate’ upon which culture alone leaves its imprint? 
For example, on what grounds might egalitarians argue that their concept of society 
was more just than any other, equally possible social order? In Geras’ view, unless a 
desire for equality, or at least freedom from oppression, is intrinsic to human nature, 
there appears little basis to the socialist opposition to inequality. Far from being a 
reactionary belief, therefore, the notion of a substantive human nature is actually 
necessary to the left’s egalitarian aspirations.33  
Irrespective of which view of human nature turns out to be correct, the point is 
that widespread assumptions about the egregious implications of an evolved human 
nature, or of the progressive implications of a socially conditioned one, may not 
themselves be accurate.  Even from a non-Darwinian perspective, the idea of an 
infinitely malleable human, as Geras points out, may be detrimental to the leftist 
cause itself. Thus, the ‘best case’ scenario for the left is not necessarily of a non-
existent human nature, but rather of a nature that would both allow and flourish within 
the sort of more equal society aspired to by egalitarians. 
 
≈ 
As both Singer and Geras argue, it is a mistake for the left to reject the notion of 
‘human nature’ simply on the basis of its assumed political consequences. The Mead-
esque view of human nature, for example, in which even such basic emotions as love, 
fear and anger are the result of social conditions, could initially appear attractive to 
egalitarians. On closer inspection, however, such a view could be equally appealing to 
would-be tyrants; given a malleable human nature, and the right social environment, a 
totalitarian dictatorship is as feasible as a socialist utopia. 
To Geras, the crucial argument is not whether there is a human nature, but 
whether the likes of greed, violence and so on are its attributes: “The question 
whether certain, named characteristics are permanent and natural is neither to say nor 
imply that there are no permanent or natural human characteristics.”34 Furthermore, 
according to Geras, those egalitarians who deny the existence of human nature may 
inadvertently reach a conclusion similar to that of many elitist, conservative or anti-
democratic thinkers: that “the generality of humankind will be stupid or ignorant 
rather than intelligent, apathetic rather than interested, in awe of leaders and not 
capable of general responsibility; and too selfish, greedy and competitive to sustain 
any wide sense of human solidarity or community; afraid of too much freedom and 
unable to use it”.35 
Unfortunately, Geras is perhaps guilty here of defining what human nature 
should be rather than awaiting a scientific account of what it is. According to Geras, 
for example, the very idea of socialism or egalitarianism is infeasible unless, at a 
minimum, there exists a human nature capable of sustaining such a society. However, 
such an argument goes both ways: given the long historical record of human 
inequality, human nature also appears capable of sustaining vastly unequal societies. 
It is possible (indeed, likely from a Darwinian perspective) that human nature does 
have some of the attributes that Geras wishes to reject: humans are often greedy, 
violent, apathetic and in awe of their leaders, and there may well be (indeed, there 
are) Darwinian explanations for these aspects of our nature. In other words, in 
opening the door to the idea of a substantive human nature, Geras appears to be 
picking and choosing which attributes will and will not be admitted.  
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Geras’ argument appears to over-emphasise the positive aspects of human 
nature – intelligence, cooperation, altruism, empathy, and so on – at the expense of 
the negative. From Singer’s evolutionary-informed perspective, this too would be a 
mistake: that is, while it may indeed be a common ploy by reactionaries to highlight 
the more deplorable aspects of human behaviour, many undesirable traits may 
nevertheless be a real feature of our nature. For Singer, the point is not simply to 
exchange the left’s tradition view of human malleability for a sanitised version of 
human nature, but for the left to adopt a realistic account of human nature, warts and 
all.  
The anarcho-communist Petr Kropotkin (a near-contemporary of both Darwin 
and Marx), articulated a similar argument to Singer’s. Kropotkin’s most famous work, 
his evolutionary theory of Mutual Aid, was motivated in large part by a desire to 
counter (what Kropotkin believed to be) a dangerous misrepresentation of Darwin’s 
concept of natural selection: that is, the over-emphasis on the ‘struggle for existence’ 
presented by many of Kropotkin’s fellow Darwinists. Taking particular exception to 
Thomas Huxley’s influential Darwinian belief that primitive human life “was a 
continuous free fight … [in which] the Hobbesian war of each against all was the 
normal state of existence”, Kropotkin argued:  
 
[I]t may be remarked at once that Huxley’s view of nature had as little claim 
to be taken as a scientific deduction as the opposite view of Rousseau, who 
saw nothing in nature but love, peace, and harmony destroyed by man. 
…Rousseau had committed the error of excluding the beak-and-claw fight 
from his thoughts; and Huxley committed the opposite error ….36  
 
Kropotkin, like Singer a century later, insisted that social theorists take the 
actual facts of human nature into account in their political planning; that is, those 
facets of our nature, both good and bad, that could be revealed through Darwinian 
analysis. Unlike many other leftists before and since, Kropotkin resisted the 
‘Hobbesian’ interpretation of Darwinism without blindly accepting a non-Darwinian 
‘Rousseauian’ alternative. Instead, Mutual Aid emphasises the social or cooperative 
aspects of our behaviour as a means to mitigate the deleterious effects of other less 
desirable, but no less existent, facets of evolved human nature. In presenting this 
argument, Kropotkin anticipates Singer’s own Darwinian left ambition: the desire to 
build a more cooperative society, informed by a realistic appreciation of human 
evolution. 
According to Matt Ridley, Kroptotkin’s Mutual Aid poses questions that still 
reverberate through economics, politics and biology: “If life is a competitive struggle, 
why is there so much cooperation about? And why, in particular, are people such 
eager cooperators?”37 Ironically, these are the very issues so often raised by the left in 
opposition to Darwinian theory; equally ironically, and as Kropotkin was well aware, 
these questions cannot be answered except through a deeper understanding of our 
evolutionary history. Human beings are evolved animals, and to understand why we 
are such ‘eager cooperators’ we must first understand how we have become such 
creatures.  
Although Kropotkin’s own Darwinian theory of sociality is flawed from the 
perspective of modern gene-centred evolution – as Singer points out, Kropotkin 
erroneously assumed “that individuals behave altruistically for the sake of a larger 
group”38 – he was correct in his fear that an over-emphasis on competition and 
struggle would turn many leftists against evolutionary theory. Being thus blind to the 
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fact that human sociality is as much (if not more) an evolved feature of human nature 
as competition, leftists have tended to throw the social baby out with the competitive 
bathwater.
39
  
To return to the initial question: are leftist political values solely dependent on 
a malleable human nature? As this has already been addressed above – e.g., Geras’ 
argument that human beings, at the very least, must have the capacity for pro-social 
behaviour – this can now be changed to the related question: is a Darwinian 
perspective on human nature compatible with the leftist desire to create a more 
egalitarian society? At this point, I will simply answer this with a qualified ‘yes’. 
Human beings have evolved as a social species and everyday observation 
demonstrates our capacity for cooperative and altruistic behaviour, at least in some 
circumstances. The sort of evolutionary-informed approach to politics advocated by 
Singer, therefore, does not preclude the possibility of a more egalitarian society than 
currently exists; the question, rather, is of how much more? This is the subject of the 
next chapter, where I address the next level of ‘apparent ‘worst case scenarios’ for the 
left – that evolved human nature may impose constraints on what is and is not 
politically possible.    
If little else, it is premature of the left to assume that a Darwinian account of 
human nature is inimical to its egalitarian aspirations. Indeed, it is potentially more 
damaging to the leftist cause to continue to ignore biological human nature than it is 
to accept the fact that we are evolved animals. Singer argues, for example, that human 
beings have an evolved tendency to form social hierarchies; if so, this has an obvious 
bearing on the likely success of leftist attempts to create a less hierarchical society. In 
the concluding sections of this chapter, therefore, the question of social hierarchy will 
be used as a case study of this aspect of Singer’s Darwinian left argument – that, by 
maintaining its ‘Level 1’ belief in a malleable human nature, the left may fail to 
achieve many of its political goals.  
 
≈ 
 
Singer begins A Darwinian Left by contrasting the views about political authority of 
two of the 19th century’s great revolutionary figures, Karl Marx and the anarchist 
Mikhail Bakunin. Conservative political scientist Larry Arnhart uses the same 
example (more succinctly) in his Darwinian Conservatism:   
 
(Arnhart) Against Marx, the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin warned that Marx’s 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ would actually become a new ‘despotism of a 
governing minority’. ‘He who doubts this,’ Bakunin insisted, ‘simply doesn’t 
know human nature’. Marx responded by ridiculing Bakunin’s ‘hallucinations 
about domination’.40 
 
(Singer) The most tragic irony of the history of the past century is that the 
record of governments that have claimed to be Marxists shows that Marx got it 
wrong, and Bakunin’s ‘nightmares about authority’ were grimly prophetic.41 
 
Marx’s mistake, Singer argues, was his concept of human nature as solely the 
result of individuals’ social environment or the product of “the ensemble of the social 
relations”.42 Of course, as indicated above, this view – and its corollary, that if you 
can change society, you can change human nature – was not unique to Marx; the 
notion of human perfectability stretches from Plato through Marx and Margaret Mead 
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and on to the present. Nevertheless, Singer focuses his analysis mainly on Marx 
because the claims of Marxism “and of broadly marxist (with a small ‘m’) thinking … 
[still] affects much of the thought of the entire left”.43 
Given a Darwinian perspective on human behaviour, Singer sides with 
Bakunin. After noting the ‘nightmares’ of Stalin’s Russia, Mao’s China and Pol Pot’s 
Kampuchea, he argues: “To be blind to the facts of human nature is to risk disaster.”44 
Singer illustrates this argument with the near-universal existence in human societies 
of systems of rank: “To say that human beings under a wide range of conditions have 
a tendency to form hierarchies is not to say that it is right for our society to remain 
hierarchical; but it is to issue a warning that we should not expect to abolish hierarchy 
by eliminating the particular hierarchy we have in our society.”45 
For example, according to Singer, one of the ultimate reasons that hierarchies 
based on wealth, military power or Party membership quickly replaced the hereditary 
aristocracies in post-Revolution America, France and Russia was because of our 
inherent hierarchical nature. These evolved tendencies, he goes on to claim, manifest 
themselves “in all sorts of petty ways in corporations and bureaucracies”.46 (Personal 
observation of the behaviour of many academics would confirm that they, too, are 
human – at least in this respect.)  
Mindful of the fact/value distinction, Singer is quick to qualify his 
evolutionary-informed argument. While the evolved human tendency to form 
hierarchies could, for instance, help us “to understand the rapid departure from 
equality in the Soviet Union”, this does not therefore demonstrate either the 
desirability or the inevitability of social hierarchy. Rather, Singer simply emphasises 
“that getting rid of [hierarchy] is not going to be nearly as easy as revolutionaries 
usually imagine”.47  
Singer offers no suggestions for how the left might work to overcome the non-
egalitarian consequences of the human tendency to form social hierarchies. He merely 
comments: “These are the facts that the left needs to grapple with. To do so, the left 
has to accept and understand our nature as evolved beings.”48 This appears to be 
simple pragmatic advice for the left – that is, to take into account those aspects of our 
nature that may hinder our egalitarian aspirations without making the moralistic 
mistake of rejecting empirical evidence that we do have such tendencies. Moreover, 
by maintaining the distinction between facts and values, egalitarians could challenge 
the erroneous normative arguments that inequalities resulting from social hierarchies 
are ‘natural’ or justified.49  
Of course, as a professional academic philosopher, Peter Singer could be 
accused of being simply an armchair theorist about human nature. Thus, it is worth 
noting how Singer’s leftist political beliefs mirror those of anthropologist Christopher 
Boehm, whose egalitarian arguments are grounded in first-hand experience of human 
tribal societies and research into primate political behaviour.  
The final section of this chapter, centred on Boehm’s more detailed Darwinian 
analysis of human hierarchical tendencies, will act as a concluding corrective to the 
left’s Level 1 assumption that Darwinian approaches to human nature can only have 
egregious political implications. 
 
≈ 
 
Boehm’s evolutionarily-informed analysis of pre-historic human society initially 
appears to confirm a Rousseauean view of an ‘innocent’ human state of nature: 
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[B]efore twelve thousand years ago, humans basically were egalitarian … 
They lived in what might be called societies of equals, with minimal political 
centralisation and no social classes. Everyone participated in group decisions, 
and outside the family there were no dominators.
50
 
 
Boehm suggests that this egalitarian existence subsequently diminished as 
human societies became larger and more complex: “For more than five millennia 
now, the human trend has been toward hierarchy rather than equality”.51 This 
anthropological account, therefore, appears compatible with both Rousseau’s belief in 
the corrupting influence of society and with traditional Marxist interpretations of 
progressive stages of human social development, beginning with an egalitarian 
‘primitive communist’ stage of human history. 
Nevertheless, according to Boehm, it is a mistake to assume from this that 
human social organisation is ‘naturally’ egalitarian or, given the apparent flexibility 
of human social arrangements, that underlying human nature is completely malleable, 
or that social factors alone determine whether societies are more or less equal. Boehm 
instead argues that humans actually have an evolved tendency to form unequal social 
ranking systems: “Our political nature favors the formation of orthodox hierarchies – 
hierarchies like those of chimpanzees or gorillas, or humans living in chiefdoms or 
states”52 and that “[b]asic aspects of our political nature (notably the tendency to form 
hierarchies) were formed far back in primate evolution”.53 
Yet, despite these evolved predispositions, what distinguishes us from our 
hierarchical or ‘despotic’ primate cousins, Boehm suggests, is that prehistoric humans 
developed social mechanisms (e.g., collective monitoring of others’ behaviour) to 
prevent would-be dominants from wielding over-much coercive social power. He 
describes this as a ‘reverse hierarchy’, in which subordinates could limit the despotic 
tendencies of politically ambitious individuals. In Boehm’s analysis, reverse 
hierarchies – and thus relative social equality – were a feature of much of our species’ 
existence, at least while human groups were small, and subordinates could 
individually or collectively enforce egalitarian behaviour. Unfortunately from an 
egalitarian perspective, with the later rise of larger and more complex chiefdoms, 
kingdoms and empires (and their eponymous rulers), human hierarchical tendencies 
again came to the fore, with subordinates less able to limit the coercive power of 
dominants.  
Significantly, and despite the seeming retention of ‘despotic’ tendencies from 
our primate past, Boehm speculates that the egalitarian cultural environment that 
arose in prehistoric human societies allowed for the natural selection of a more 
altruistic human psychology: “our species (and our species alone) was given a unique 
chance to develop altruistic traits – precisely because social dominance hierarchies 
were definitely reversed for a long period of evolutionary time”.54 
In short, Boehm believes that humans have competing evolved hierarchical 
tendencies: a desire to dominate, and a desire not to be dominated. In his scheme, 
both tendencies are ultimately based on reproductive pay-offs – for example, being 
able to dominate allows greater access to sexual partners and more resources for 
offspring; being dominated, meanwhile, means less access to sexual partners and 
fewer resources for offspring.  
According to Boehm, by curtailing particular individuals’ ability to dominate, 
our Palaeolithic ancestors found the means to collectively satisfy the evolved desire 
not to be dominated. In more complex later societies, those in which certain 
individuals were once again able to dominate others, the subordinated population 
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have periodically resisted this domination through peasants’ revolts, slave rebellions 
and the like. (Indeed, modern political debates about the role of the state could be 
analysed in these terms: that the more egalitarian welfare state, in which 
‘subordinates’ gain greater access to social ‘resources’, and the less egalitarian market 
economy, in which ‘dominants’ control more of the wealth, are both possible 
manifestations of these evolved human tendencies.)  
Boehm relates his evolutionary argument to more recent political ideas. For 
example, he contrasts the idealistic philosophy of the likes of Rousseau with the 
practical political acumen of hunter-gatherers, who, as “utter realists about human 
nature”, intuitively comprehend “the need for force in the hands of the rank and file as 
means of controlling the self-aggrandizing tendencies of their own leading citizens”.55 
He further compares this intuitive realism with the sincere but naïve beliefs of Marx 
and Engels, whose ‘Rousseauian’ view of human nature led them to erroneously 
conclude that human society would naturally become egalitarian and cooperative as 
soon as the exploitative capitalism system had been overthrown:  
 
In their anthropological naiveté, visionary communists everywhere failed to 
see that human hierarchical tendencies are simply too strong to allow 
dominant competition to evaporate and the state to wither away on its own. 
The image was compelling, and it captured the hearts of resentful underdogs 
everywhere. But the social engineering was inept: the blueprint was not laid 
out with an accurate view of human political nature.”56 
 
Boehm’s thesis, therefore, is not that human nature renders egalitarian social 
organisation impossible; indeed, he argues that humanity’s tens of thousands of years 
of egalitarian existence created the very conditions within which human cooperative 
and altruistic traits were able to evolve. Rather, his point is that, given the right 
political dynamic, human beings can indeed create cooperative egalitarian societies; 
given different circumstances, however, we can as readily form competitive, unequal 
or despotic social systems.  
Thus, while new (and improved) political ‘blueprints’ and social experiments 
are possible, Boehm cautions that they must be based on a realistic appreciation of 
what humans are like: “In designing future political systems, we must take into 
careful account the flexible specificity of human political nature and the constraints it 
places on our behaviour.”57 Boehm’s (field-based) political philosophising, therefore, 
mirrors much of Singer’s (armchair) variety.  
 
≈ 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the left’s commitment to the idea of a malleable 
human nature, and the corresponding belief that human malleability is a necessary 
prerequisite for desirable social and political change. I have argued that the traditional 
leftist stance on human nature is ideological not empirical (especially in its opposition 
to contradictory evidence) and that, moreover, the notion of an infinitely malleable 
human nature may be less politically liberating than is often assumed. Indeed, the 
leftist desire for a more equal and more cooperative society itself appears dependent 
on the inherent sociality of a universal human nature. 
I have emphasised the argument – articulated by the likes of Singer, Kropotkin 
and Boehm – that all aspects of our nature be taken into account in our designs for a 
better future society, and that, even if there are fixed, non-egalitarian aspects to our 
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nature, this does not necessarily preclude the creation of a much more equal society 
than any currently in existence. 
An obvious (and obviously more sensible) position for political theorists to 
adopt is that nature and nurture, biology and culture, both play some role in 
determining or influencing human behaviour. But this just moves the argument up a 
level: Do our genes, for example, “shout commands to us about our behavior”, or 
merely “whisper suggestions”? (as ecologist Paul Ehrlich suggests).58  This is the 
subject matter of the next chapter: the Level 2 ‘worst case scenario’ for the left – the 
idea that human evolution has resulted in a universal (and universally fixed) human 
nature. 
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We must, however, acknowledge … that man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for 
the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living 
creature, with his god-like intellect … – with all these exalted powers – Man still bears in his bodily frame 
the indelible stamp of his lowly origin. 
Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 
 
Chapter 7: The Psychic Unity of Humankind 
 
At first glance, the left’s traditional belief that humans have largely broken free from 
the constraints of their biological heritage could seem reasonable. After all, humans 
did not need to evolve woolly coats to live in colder environments or bigger teeth and 
sharper claws to hunt the new animal species that they encountered as they spread 
across the globe. Rather, humans used culture to overcome the numerous 
environmental problems that they faced – for example, making new clothes or shelters 
for different climates, or developing new tools or techniques to exploit novel food 
sources.  
Similarly, it does not initially appear unreasonable to suggest that the 
influence of biology has declined as humans have become increasingly dependent on 
culture. Given this, the notion that Darwinian evolution stopped (or at least 
increasingly tailed off) at ‘the dawn of human history’ appears plausible. 
In this chapter, I turn to the Level 2 ‘worst case scenario’ for the left – the 
claim that human beings have a universal and fixed human nature – and I examine 
why the left have (or may appear to have) genuine reasons to be concerned about a 
Darwinian approach to human politics. This marks a change of focus; for whereas this 
thesis has thus far argued that the left is largely misguided in its rejection of modern 
ETOHN, here I will play devil’s advocate and highlight various difficulties with 
Singer’s concept of a Darwinian left.  
I begin with a general discussion of why the left might reasonably dismiss the 
applicability of evolutionary ideas to political theory, and then provide a brief 
evolutionary-informed response, illustrated by reference to concepts within the major 
sub-disciple of ETOHN, evolutionary psychology. I then turn to a troubling 
contradiction in A Darwinian Left: the manner in which, after initially suggesting 
evolutionary theory as a source of inspiration for the left, Singer concedes that his 
argument ultimately provides a ‘deflated’ vision for the left. 
I contrast two broad historical visions of human nature and the possibility of 
social change: the ‘tragic’ view that social reform is constrained by a fixed human 
nature and the ‘utopian’ view that social transformation is possible due to the 
malleability of human nature. Aspects of Singer’s argument appear to place him on 
the ‘tragic’ or conservative side of this debate, and again I illustrate this with 
reference to concepts from evolutionary psychology. I then briefly examine 
alternative evolutionary theories of human nature (which take human culture more 
closely into account). Finally, I highlight Singer’s emphasis on the human capacity 
for reason as a possible means to overcome the constraints of our evolutionary 
heritage – an emphasis that places Singer firmly back within the utopian current of 
political thinking. 
 
≈ 
 
There are obvious and understandable reasons to dismiss the relevance of human 
evolution to modern social behaviour. Everyday observation indicates (or appears to 
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indicate) a divide between the biological and the cultural aspects of human activity, 
with the latter being more distinctly human. Our biology, for instance, seems to 
determine only the basic elements of human life, such as our general anatomy and 
physiology, or to govern primitive ‘instinctive’ behaviours, such as the “animal 
functions – eating, drinking, procreating” to which humans are largely reduced, 
according to Marx
1
, by the alienation of capitalist social organisation. By contrast, 
most aspects of uniquely human life, language, say, or technology or religious belief, 
are clearly acquired and passed on via social or cultural processes rather than being 
inherited through biological means.  
The left could readily accept that Darwinian biological evolution moulded our 
pre-human ancestors, and yet argue that the cultural environment of modern humans, 
from our culturally-constructed cradles to our socially-sanctioned graves, now buffers 
us from the rigorous selective pressures that were so important in the earlier stages of 
our species’ pre-history. From such a perspective, the dawn of (non-Darwinian) 
history most likely began once humans had evolved the suite of capabilities – e.g., 
language and social intelligence, and hands capable of manipulating objects and 
constructing tools – that allowed cultural processes to increasingly usurp biological 
ones, and for cultural evolution to supersede biological evolution.
2
 
Furthermore, the human ability to reason provides yet more distance between 
us and our biology. We are an intelligent species, able to reflect upon our actions and 
behaviour, and hence have the capacity to reason ourselves beyond the promptings of 
our biological past. More especially, the ‘blueprint’ for human life is not contained 
simply in our genes; in a manner unparalleled elsewhere in nature, human beings can 
store information externally to their bodies and brains – in oral traditions, say, or 
(more recently) in written or electronic form. Our species is thus unique in its capacity 
to access the accumulated knowledge of the past, and in its ability to add to and refine 
this information, and to pass it on to future generations. ‘Humanness’ is not simply 
(or even mainly) contained in our genes; it is inherited and passed on through our 
culture. 
In short, the leftist emphasis on human culture, and its dismissal of human 
biology, is not obviously wrong-headed. Such a stance appears to accord with 
observations of human behaviour, and with a broad outline of human history and 
prehistory: after all, it was clearly human cultural practices and not human biology 
that allowed our species to spread across, and eventually to dominate, this planet. In 
addition, great changes in political and social beliefs and behaviour have occurred 
over timescales that preclude biological explanations (e.g., compare modern British 
society to that of Darwin’s day, and his society to that of feudal England only 
centuries earlier).  
Thus, given that cultural practices cleared played a major role in creating the 
vast inequalities evident in the modern human world, it would appear plausible that, 
as egalitarians, we can and should change these practices. With regard to the central 
plea in Singer’s A Darwinian Left, egalitarians could indeed take seriously the notion 
that we are evolved animals without necessarily accepting that this is particularly 
relevant to our attempts to create a more equal world. 
 
≈ 
 
How might an evolutionary-informed egalitarian (i.e., a member of Singer’s posited 
Darwinian left) respond to this seemingly commonsensical view of the limited 
significance of human biology in comparison to human culture?  
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For a start, the fact that human beings are utterly dependent on culture does 
not, in itself, imply that all biological influences on our behaviour have disappeared. 
The mutually exclusive dichotomy between culture and biology is a false one. 
Unfortunately, and as indicated in previous chapters, despite lip-service 
acknowledgement that genes and environment must both play a role in human 
development, this either/or dichotomy is a recurring theme of leftist discourse: that 
the only alternative to an exclusively environmentally-determined human nature is an 
exclusively biologically-determined one. And because the latter view of human nature 
denies the possibility of desirable social change, the former appears the only option 
for anyone who genuinely wishes to improve the world. 
Of course, according to Peter Singer, the left could accept the fact that our 
evolved biology may still influence our behaviour without directly compromising its 
political values – for instance, the fact that humans may have an evolved tendency to 
form social hierarchies need not curtail our demands for a more equal society; rather, 
we simply use our evolutionary understanding of these tendencies to design political 
policies that mitigate their non-egalitarian consequences.  
Importantly, even if we accept the precedence of culture over biology, evolved 
tendencies towards forming hierarchies could coexist with complex cultural 
behaviour. That is, while the traditional left simply assumes that culture has wiped the 
human slate clean of biological influences, this obscures the strong possibility that 
culturally-mediated behaviour builds upon, rather than displaces, more ancient 
biologically-mediated behaviour.
3
 
According to Singer, the tendency to form social hierarchies is simply one of a 
number of human traits that are near-ubiquitous in human societies. Although Singer 
himself talks only in general terms of ‘Darwinian’ (i.e., evolved) influences on our 
behaviour, his beliefs about fixed human nature equate to the idea of the ‘psychic 
unity of humankind’ – the argument that many psychological traits are universal or 
species-typical for all human beings.  
Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, for instance, 
point to the fact that “[o]ur ancestors spent well over 99% of our species evolutionary 
history living in hunter-gatherer societies”, and that all modern humans are the 
descendants of creatures who faced and overcame similar problems of survival and 
reproduction.   
 
Generation after generation, for 10 million years, natural selection slowly 
sculpted the human brain, favouring circuitry that was good at solving day-to-
day problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors – problems like finding mates, 
hunting animals, gathering plant foods, choosing a good habitat and so on. 
Those whose circuits were better designed for these problems left more 
children and we are descended from them.
4
 
 
In the standard evolutionary psychology scheme, the more recent 
abandonment of hunter-gatherer lifestyles by some populations was too recent to 
effect much further evolutionary change; therefore, the modern cultural differences 
we witness between different peoples are largely superficial. As popular science 
writer Matt Ridley argues: “Such evolutionary novelties as agriculture, metal and 
writing arrived less than three hundred generations ago, far too recently to have left 
much of an imprint on [the human] mind. There is, therefore, such a thing as a 
universal human nature, common to all people.”5  
The point here is not to unreservedly accept evolutionary psychology’s 
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account of humankind’s psychic unity, but rather to indicate, first, that it is certainly 
plausible that humans share certain evolved psychological traits in common, and, 
second, that such traits may continue to exist despite the increasing complexity of the 
human cultural environment. And this leads on to another important claim of modern 
ETOHN: that the seemingly obvious dependence of human beings on culture and 
reason has perhaps blinded us to the existence of deeper and more fixed tendencies 
and behaviours. According to anthropologist Donald Brown, for instance, his 
discipline’s practitioners, through holding “a near monopoly on studying humanity as 
a whole”, have had a major influence on our beliefs about human behaviour – but, he 
argues, anthropologists have prejudiced these beliefs by “dwel[ling] on the 
differences between peoples while saying too little about the similarities (similarities 
that they rely upon at every turn in order to do their work)”.6  
In contrast to what he believes is anthropology’s traditional over-emphasis on 
difference, Brown describes a ‘Universal People’, which (he claims) represents a 
broad evolutionary-informed picture of what all people, all societies, and all cultures 
have in common. Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker describes Brown’s 
argument thus:  
 
Hundreds of traits, from fear of snakes to logical operators, from romantic 
love to humorous insults, from poetry to food taboos, from exchange of goods 
to mourning the dead, can be found in every society ever documented. … 
[T]he sheer richness and detail in the rendering of the Universal People comes 
as a shock to any intuition that the mind is a blank slate or that cultures can 
vary without limit ….7  
 
Again, the point is not to unconditionally endorse this evolutionary view of 
what all human beings share in common. It is merely to highlight a major problem 
with the standard leftist view of a malleable human nature – namely, the need for 
those holding such a view to explain why universal human commonalities exist. Why, 
if the human mind truly is infinitely malleable, has the behaviour of humans within 
separate societies not diverged to the point that these commonalities have been 
extinguished? 
From a political perspective, the universalist view of human nature would not 
initially appear an obvious cause of alarm for the left. After all, if all humans share a 
common suite of mental traits, then the obvious differences in, say, cultural or 
technological complexity that convinced earlier theorists of the superiority of 
‘civilised’ peoples over ‘savages’ are not due to innate cognitive differences. Rather, 
given that all humans share a similar underlying psychology, we must look to 
environmental causes for the differences between human populations and for the 
obvious inequalities that exist between peoples.
8
 
This, in turn, appears to bolster the argument in A Darwinian Left that 
egalitarians should not be concerned about the possibility of a universal human 
nature, but rather about the consequences of failing to appreciate this fact. Viewed in 
this way, Singer’s argument would appear to contain nothing but helpful advice for 
the left: that if egalitarians accepted a realistic account of human nature, and of the 
possibility of lingering biological influences on our behaviour, they could devise 
more workable, and less naïve, solutions to social problems. This could be seen as a 
form of consilience – bringing together the left’s traditional emphasis on the cultural 
determinants of behaviour with the evidence emerging from modern evolutionary 
science that some aspects of our behaviour have deep biological roots.
9
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Why, then, would such a sensible seeming approach be described as the Level 
2 ‘worst case’ scenario for the left? In order to answer this question, I will first 
examine some of the (inconsistent) arguments that Singer presents in A Darwinian 
Left. 
 
≈ 
 
Singer begins A Darwinian Left with a bang and ends with a whimper. After insisting, 
in his introduction, that Darwinism could provide a source of new ideas and new 
approaches to revitalise the left, he concedes, in his conclusion, that his is a “sharply 
deflated vision”10 of what an evolutionary-informed left can realistically hope to 
achieve. Although he goes on to tentatively suggest that the human capacity for 
reason may provide “a prospect of restoring more far reaching ambitions of 
change”11, this could provide little to motivate the ‘genuine left’ – that is, those who, 
in Singer’s own definition, do not just accept the unequal world as it is but who want 
to do something to change it.  
The seeds of this uninspiring conclusion are evident, in retrospect, in Singer’s 
initial discussion of why the left is in need of new ideas. According to Singer, the 
modern left has been deprived of its former political power and influence not only by 
the failure of communism, but also by the way in which mainstream leftist parties 
have embraced capitalism and have turned away from the traditional socialist 
objective of industrial nationalisation, and from the left’s customary reliance on the 
trade union movement. Although Singer admits to having no answers to these issues, 
his argument nevertheless implies that the mainstream left has lost many of its leftist 
credentials – e.g., the more radical goal of transforming society – in its adoption of 
capitalist principles.  
Sociologist Erik Wright makes a similar point when he comments: “There was 
a time, not so long ago, when both critics and defenders of capitalism believed that 
‘another world was possible’. It was generally called ‘socialism’.” 12 Thus, 
irrespective of the vehement disagreement over the normative aspects of socialism, 
both sides at least accepted that some form of socialist alternative to capitalism was at 
least a possibility. Wright concludes, however: “Most people in the world today, 
especially in its economically developed regions, no longer believe in this possibility. 
Capitalism seems to them part of the natural order of things”.13  
The key point here is that the mainstream left has apparently become less ‘left’ 
by becoming more realistic – and part of this process has involved abandoning much 
of its former utopianism. But this is where Singer’s own Darwinian left also 
eventually leads; to the argument that the left should give up grandiose schemes for 
radical political change, and simply work on what may ‘realistically be achieved’.  
In other words, Singer appears caught in his own argument. The left’s urgent 
need for new ideas and new approaches, he suggests, is the result of its mainstream 
political parties giving up on large-scale social transformation, with what remains of 
the left’s radicalism remaining wedded to an unrealistic (and potentially disastrous) 
concept of a malleable human nature. Unfortunately, Singer’s proffered solution, a 
coolly realistic Darwinian left, itself ends up rejecting the possibility of radical social 
change (at least in the foreseeable future).  
Far from being genuinely ‘leftist’, therefore, Singer’s subdued vision of the 
left would actually seem a form of political realism: the idea that politics is or should 
be simply ‘the art of the possible’. For example, from the realistic Darwinian left 
perspective, political decision-making would be based on a clearer understanding of 
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what can be achieved, rather than idealistic adherence to what ought to be achieved – 
a point that Singer emphasises in his summary dismissal of the absolutist moral 
theories that “tell us that justice must be done even if the heavens fall”14. From the 
realistic Darwinian left point of view, normative prescriptions of what we should do 
are tempered by what we are able to do – that while is does not imply ought, ought 
does imply can.  
 This realism reflects an inherent qualification to Singer’s Darwinian 
argument: that an evolutionary-informed approach to human behaviour can not only 
help in identifying the means to achieve our political objectives, but also in “assessing 
the possible costs and benefits of doing so”.15 And this raises an immediate (and, for 
the left, worrying) question: what if the costs of achieving a particular social goal – 
equality, say – exceed the benefits? For example, a truly egalitarian society might 
only be achievable through suppressing other important aspects of human nature, such 
as human individuality or the desire for recognition that motivates much of our 
behaviour. But what if the facts of human nature ultimately indicate that some (or 
perhaps many) of our political beliefs are unachievable – that, in practice, we cannot 
do what, according to egalitarians, we ought to do?  
Singer himself offers little guidance. After emphasising that Darwinian 
thinking may provide relevant information for our ethical decision-making, he simply 
comments: “consequentialists like myself will always welcome information about the 
likely outcomes of what we are proposing to do.”16 Following this consequentialist 
logic, if a particular proposal is doomed to fail, given the facts of our nature, then 
there is no point in adopting it. Thus, it would appear that even if such an approach 
required the left to abandon certain of its cherished political objectives, this would be 
acceptable to a consequentialist like Singer – from his perspective, the costs of the left 
maintaining its utopianism outweigh the benefits.  
In A Darwinian Left, therefore, Singer appears to provide an inconsistent 
argument. On the one hand, he argues that the left is desperately in need of new ideas, 
new approaches and new inspiration because its mainstream elements have lost their 
radicalism (while its radical elements remain unrealistically utopian). On the other 
hand, his ‘realistic’ Darwinian alternative itself questions the possibility of radical 
social transformation. Arguably, Singer offers less of a leftist take on politics and 
more of a moderate or ‘soft’ conservative one.  
Here, I will further examine this seeming ironic contradiction in Singer’s 
Darwinian left: that it appears to have more in common with traditional conservative 
beliefs about the possibility of social change than with traditional leftist ones. My 
purpose is to present a negative picture of Singer’s Darwinian left – i.e., one that 
highlights why the traditional left might reject his argument – before examining more 
positive aspects of his overall thesis. 
 
≈ 
 
The two visions of human nature discussed by Singer (i.e., malleable versus fixed) are 
themselves reflective of two broad currents of post-Enlightenment thought concerning 
political change.
17
 In the first current, traceable to the likes of Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
an unconstrained, malleable or ‘utopian’ vision of human nature places few obstacles 
in the path of rationally-directed social change: in order to bring about a better 
society, we simply identify, through reason, the social obstructions to such a 
harmonious future, and then we remove them. According to journalist David Brooks, 
for instance, this is the vision that inspired the American Revolutionaries and, to a 
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much greater extent, their French counterparts to “sweep away the old precedents and 
write new constitutions based on reason”.18  
Those (leftists) who accept this unconstrained vision of human nature, 
therefore, emphasise the power of reason in resolving existing social problems and in 
rationally planning a better future society. According to conservative political 
scientist Larry Arnhart, “those with a utopian vision of life believe that since the 
moral and intellectual limits of human beings are rooted in social customs and 
institutions that are changeable, the best social order would arise from rationally 
planned reforms in those customs and institutions that would perfect human nature”.19 
Erik Wright makes a similar point about the traditional leftist belief that we can 
transform society so as to promote human well-being and happiness: 
 
[R]adicals of diverse stripes have argued that social arrangements inherited 
from the past are not immutable facts of nature, but transformable human 
creations. Social institutions can be designed in ways that eliminate forms of 
oppression that thwart human aspirations towards living fulfilling and 
meaningful lives. The central task of emancipatory politics is to create such 
institutions. 
20
 
 
Wright goes on to indicate, however, that the ‘conservative critique’ of this 
sort of radical social transformation is not that the emancipatory goal is morally 
indefensible, “but that the uncontrollable, and usually negative, unintended 
consequences of these efforts at massive social change inevitably swamp the intended 
consequences”.21 
Ironically, this conservative critique appears the very one that Singer makes 
against the left in his own alternative ‘leftist’ manifesto. In other words, Singer 
appears to be siding with the conservative opposition to emancipatory politics – for 
example, by arguing that, however desirable the leftist vision of a cooperative and 
peaceable society may be in theory, the left’s radical attempts to achieve such a 
society have proved disastrous due to its failure to take fixed human nature into 
account.  
Indeed, in contrast to the left’s traditional utopianism, Singer’s ‘coolly 
realistic’ Darwinian left emphasis the political and social constraints imposed by 
human nature. For example, in asking how reformers can learn from Darwin, Singer 
uses the analogy of carving a desired shape from wood. Wood carvers will not simply 
follow a pre-prepared design, he argues: “Instead they will examine the material with 
which they are to work, and modify their design in order to suit its grain.”22 Political 
philosophers and reformers, he goes on to suggest, should adopt a similar approach: 
rather than working out an abstract plan for an ideal society and attempting to apply it 
without regard for the people who will inhabit this pre-conceived world, “those 
seeking to reshape society must understand the tendencies inherent in human beings, 
and modify their abstract ideals in order to suit them”.23 
Given the sort of uncharitable interpretation likely from the left, Singer could 
here appear to be sanctioning the second of the broad currents of political thought 
about social change – the ‘tragic’ or ‘constrained’ vision of what is possible. 
According to Steven Pinker, those who accept this ‘Tragic Vision’ emphasise the 
inherently limited wisdom and virtue of actual human beings: 
 
In the Tragic Vision, moreover, human nature has not changed. Traditions 
such as religion, the family, social customs, sexual mores, and political 
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institutions are a distillation of time-tested techniques that let us work around 
the shortcomings of human nature. They are as applicable to humans today as 
they were when they were developed, even if no-one today can explain their 
rationale.”24 
 
It is understandable why leftists would resist any such argument as inherently 
reactionary. Yet, as regards Singer’s own view of human nature (or of ‘tendencies 
inherent in human beings’), the following all appear on his list of near universal 
human traits: xenophobia, racism, hierarchy, status seeking, war, male domination 
and female subjugation.
25
 The point here is that, even if we reject the standard charge 
that Darwinism equates to determinism – that, say, racism or war or female 
oppression are inevitable outcomes of human nature – Singer’s deflated (or tragic) 
vision certainly implies that we may be limited in our capacity to alter these aspects of 
our nature.  
Indeed, if we follow Singer’s wood-carving argument, we may even need to 
modify our abstract and idealistic opposition to undesirable behaviours like 
xenophobia or war to take account of the inherent tendencies of human beings. This 
politically troubling conclusion can be emphasised by briefly comparing Singer’s 
broad claims about evolved tendencies or predispositions with the most high-profile 
Darwinian account of how the human mind operates, that presented by evolutionary 
psychology.  
Again, my aim here is to play devil’s advocate and to indicate why many 
leftists might misinterpret Singer’s position on Darwinism (and, indeed, why leftist 
critics such as Stephen Jay Gould have so readily convinced many people of 
evolutionary psychology’s pernicious right-wing agenda of biological determinism, 
elitism, sexism and racism
26). Singer’s own ‘wood grain’ analogy is not deterministic 
– rather, he is simply arguing that evolved constraints be taken into account – 
nevertheless, as I demonstrate below, for those predisposed to be suspicious of 
Darwinian thinking, it would be easy to gain a much more negative impression.  
  
≈ 
 
Evolutionary psychology is premised on a domain-specific or modular conception of 
human mental behaviour – the idea, according to biologists Kevin Laland and Gillian 
Brown, that “minds are composed of a large number of psychological mechanisms 
dedicated to finding quick and efficient solutions to particular problems that were of 
significance to our ancestors”.27 These psychological mechanisms (or mental modules 
or organs) are believed to operate in specific ‘domains’; that is, they are seen as 
discrete cognitive processes dedicated to tasks such as parenting, choosing mates, 
accruing resources, avoiding disease, or identifying predators.
28
  
Human language is the paradigm example of a domain-specific cognitive 
module. According to Steven Pinker:  
 
Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child 
spontaneously, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is 
qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general 
abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some 
cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a 
mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module.
29
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Pinker suggests that we think about language as an ‘instinct’ – “the idea that 
people know how to talk in more or less the same way that spiders know how to spin 
webs”.30 And other mental organs or modules posited by evolutionary psychologists 
include those underlying face recognition, navigation, and the neural circuits that tell 
us, instinctively, that faeces are not good to eat.
31
  
This becomes politically problematic when we turn to some of the supposedly 
universal features of human nature highlighted by Singer: xenophobia, racism, social 
hierarchy, sexual jealousy, and male domination and status-seeking. While Singer 
does not describe these features in terms of mental modules, unless they are solely 
culturally derived (in which case they would not be aspects of a universal human 
nature), they must somehow be psychologically ‘fixed’ in the human mind. 
Presumably, therefore, this is what Singer means when he talks about evolved 
tendencies or dispositions – that there is some specific neural circuitry that underlies, 
say, the evolved human predisposition to react jealously to sexual infidelity, or the 
male tendency to seek status. 
But, on analogy with Pinker’s conception of language, to what extent are 
Singer’s universal behaviours instinctive – that is, psychological 
tendencies/dispositions that ‘develop spontaneously’, are ‘deployed without 
awareness’, or are ‘distinct from our general abilities to behave intelligently’? We 
could, for instance, use Singer’s Darwinian reasoning to come up with some troubling 
conclusions about xenophobia or racism. It is certainly plausible that our minds have 
been designed by natural selection to respond negatively to strangers – after all, 
strangers may carry diseases to which our group has not developed immunity, or may 
otherwise pose a threat to our lives. Thus, again plausibly, we may have adaptive 
mental circuits that trigger xenophobic reactions when exposed to unfamiliar humans 
or their unfamiliar behaviours. But, if so, to what extent can we control such evolved 
reactions? For example, we cannot help but react negatively to the smell of decaying 
food (the result, according to evolutionary reasoning, of a cognitive adaptation to 
prevent us eating the pathogens that such food contains). Could apparently universal 
xenophobic tendencies be of a similar nature? 
Matt Ridley, for example, believes that racial persecution is an unfortunate but 
ingrained facet of human nature (the human nature that, as indicated above, Ridley 
believes is universal or common to all people). He argues that, while we can limit the 
effects of racist behaviour through legislation, “even after a thousand years of strictly 
enforced laws against racism, we will not one day be able to declare the problem of 
racism solved and abolish the laws safe in the knowledge that racial prejudice is a 
thing of the past”.32 Racist tendencies, it would seem, are simply an unfortunate 
example of the way in which we humans, according to Ridley, “stick to the same 
monotonously human pattern of organising our affairs”.33 Singer’s xenophobia, 
hierarchy, status seeking, war, male domination and female subjugation would also 
appear to be tragically and inevitably human – and, from a traditional leftist 
perspective, Singer’s deflated vision of the left seems to reflect the broader ‘tragic’ 
belief that there is little we can do to change these undesirable aspects of human 
social behaviour.  
For example, in warning that any well-intentioned but utopian social policy 
may have unintended consequences that are worse than the problems it is meant to 
resolve, Steven Pinker expounds the ‘tragic’ belief that: 
 
We are fortunate to live in a society that more or less works, and our first 
priority should be not to screw it up, because human nature always leaves us 
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teetering on the brink of barbarism. … It also follows that we should not aim 
to solve social problems like crime or poverty, because in a world of 
competing individuals one person’s gain may be another person’s loss. The 
best we can do is trade off one cost against another.
34
 
 
As described by Pinker, this tragic view of society – that it more or less works, 
so interfering with it (such as attempting to solve poverty) is not necessarily a 
desirable or viable option – appears to give strong grounds to a long-standing 
criticism of Darwinian accounts of human behaviour: the conclusion that current 
social arrangements are in some sense optimal.
35
 Taken on face value, this appears to 
imply that the inegalitarian status quo, while imperfect, provides the only viable 
means for stable social interaction. 
One final (negative) point can be made about Singer’s ‘realistic’ approach to 
leftist politics, the important practical question: when does political realism become 
political defeatism? That is, the danger that such thinking may encourage the belief 
that little can be done to solve certain, seemingly intractable, social problems. An 
analogy here is the way in which certain health inequalities can come to be regarded 
as ‘normal’ for some disadvantaged groups – as, for instance, with diabetes amongst 
Maori New Zealanders.
36
 When such issues become normalised – for example, with 
the attitude that, in this case, diabetes is just ‘a Maori disease’ – then political will to 
tackle these seemingly inevitable or ineluctable problems may be reduced. 
The broader political aspects of this issue are emphasised by Erik Wright in 
Envisioning Real Utopias: “Self-fulfilling prophesises are powerful forces in history, 
and while it may be naively optimistic to say ‘where there is a will there is a way,’ it 
is certainly true that without a ‘will’ many ‘ways’ become impossible.”37 One obvious 
danger (or ‘cost’) of the left adopting Singer’s realistic Darwinian approach, 
therefore, is that it may lose the will to find a way around the obstacles that an 
accurate evolutionary account of human nature may reveal. Indeed, Singer’s 
Darwinian left would seem to confirm the left’s long-standing belief that evolutionary 
perspectives on human nature are inherently conservative.  
How, then, can we resurrect Singer’s Darwinian left as a genuinely leftist 
approach to politics? In the next section I briefly discuss whether Singer’s broad 
notion of evolved predispositions or tendencies does indeed bring with it the idea of 
strict constraints on what is politically possible. I then turn to Singer’s concept of 
‘Darwinian thinking’ – that is, whether or not his general evolutionary argument 
could or should be linked to a particular branch of modern ETOHN (for example, as 
above, with evolutionary psychology). Here, I examine alternative approaches to 
human evolution, and argue that Singer himself is perhaps being overly pessimistic 
about what Darwinian thinking implies about the possibility of desirable social 
change. In particular, I suggest that evolutionary psychology, despite being the most 
high-profile of modern ETOHN, may not provide an appropriate basis for Singer’s 
Darwinian politics. 
 
≈ 
 
One problem with Singer’s discussion appears to be ill-defined concepts such as 
evolved ‘predispositions’ or ‘tendencies’. What do these actually mean? If we equate 
Singer’s vague ‘tendencies’ and ‘predispositions’ with evolutionary psychology’s 
domain-specific or modular conception of the brain, then his account of evolved 
human behaviour appears worryingly deterministic. For example, as argued above, 
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human beings are biologically ‘predisposed’ to find the smell of faeces or rotting meat 
unpleasant. But this sort of predisposition is of a different order from, say, our 
apparent evolved tendency (to quote Singer) ‘to join in group acts of violence against 
people who are not members of our own group’. In other words, while our ‘yuk 
reactions’ are automatic, and non-consciously controlled, our violent behaviour is to a 
large extent ‘strategic’ (i.e., motivated and consciously directed to achieve particular 
goals); describing the latter as an evolved predisposition, however, implies it is more 
like the former – that is, ‘beyond our control’.38  
Nevertheless, this terminological imprecision is less important to Singer’s 
broad political argument, and it is perhaps inappropriate to link Singer’s Darwinian 
perspective to the more clearly defined focus of the likes of evolutionary psychology 
– especially as much of the success of evolutionary psychology has been in 
identifying possible evolved predispositions for certain specific behaviours in certain 
specific circumstances (e.g., reaction to threats). The extent to which evolutionary 
psychology’s ‘modules’ are generalisable to wider human behaviour, in which the 
environmental inputs are much more complex, is still open to question.
39
  
To put this another way, there is an obvious spectrum of ‘tendencies’ from the 
more fixed and more automatic behaviours (which are thus more amenable to 
evolutionary psychological investigation) and the more complex but more general 
tendencies of interest to social and political theorists. Singer is not, therefore, 
necessarily misguided in talking in general terms about evolved tendencies or 
predispositions, nor is it fair (as in the negative interpretation above) to equate these 
broad concepts only with the more basic ‘instinctive’ behaviours. 
Another crucial issue is the apparent ‘weight’ that different approaches to 
human nature put on either biology or environment – or on either side of the 
nature/nurture dichotomy. Certainly, as the name itself implies, the constrained vision 
of human nature suggests that there are limits upon what is socially (i.e., 
environmentally) possible. Arguably, Singer’s broad concept of ‘Darwinian thinking’ 
is premised on an overly constrained reading of evolutionary theory, and this perhaps 
explains his pessimistic conclusion about the implications of a Darwinian approach to 
political change. This becomes apparent if we examine how evolutionary psychology 
(which, along with its precursor, sociobiology, has been most influential on wider 
perceptions of ETOHN) addresses gene/environment interaction. 
As Cosmides & Tooby explain in their primer on the basic tenets of 
evolutionary psychology: “Genes allow the environment to influence the development 
of phenotypes. Indeed, the developmental mechanisms of many organisms were 
designed by natural selection to produce different phenotypes in different 
environments”.40 They illustrate this relationship between genes and environment by 
asking the reader to imagine planting an arrowleaf plant seed (representing the 
genotype) in water (representing one environment) and another arrowleaf 
seed/genotype in a different environment, dry land. The environmental differences, 
they argue, will result in different phenotypes: in this case, the arrowleaf seed that 
germinates in water will develop wide leaves, while the one on land will develop 
narrow leaves. 
 
But this doesn’t mean that just any aspect of the environment can affect the 
leaf width of an arrowleaf plant. Reading poetry to it doesn’t affect its leaf 
width. By the same token, it doesn’t mean you can get the leaves to grow into 
just any shape: short of a pair of scissors, it is probably very difficult to get the 
leaves to grow into the shape of the Starship Enterprise.
41
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Of most relevance here is the idea that while organisms display some 
developmental plasticity, the genes still set constraints. In the arrowleaf plant example 
(which, it should be noted, is used in Cosmides’ and Tooby’s discussion of human 
evolutionary psychology), the environmental influence on the genotype allows for 
broader or narrower leaves, but not spaceship shaped ones. At the same time, the 
genotype does not determine the development of the phenotype irrespective of 
environment (as an obvious example, there has to be sufficient nutrition).  
By analogy with the arrowleaf, human genotypes would also produce different 
phenotypes in different environments – but only within limits. If we follow Cosmides’ 
and Tooby’s argument, then short of the political equivalent of a pair of scissors, 
humans should not be expected to lose their xenophobic predispositions or their 
competitive tendencies in, say, a cooperative or a cosmopolitan cultural environment. 
(Recall Ridley’s point about racist tendencies being likely to persist, despite long-
term legislative change.) 
This is in line with Singer’s more general political argument – the idea that 
evolved tendencies may still lurk beneath the surface of the human psyche. For 
example, human competitive tendencies re-emerged in the supposedly cooperative 
communist states, and, as periodic outbursts of ethnic hatred and violence indicate, 
xenophobia seems ever-present in human societies; as Singer argues, “racist 
demagogues hold their torches over highly flammable material”– and this is the case 
even amongst people, as in the Balkans, who live together peaceably for decades.
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Singer’s broad notion of ‘Darwinian thinking’, therefore, seems to reflect that of 
evolutionary psychology, and especially its concept of a relatively fixed (or domain-
specific) human nature that, despite differences between cultural environments, 
constrains our behaviour in universally predictable ways. 
Crucially however, and unlike the environment in which, say, an arrowleaf 
plant develops, human phenotypes are the joint product of genes and a rich socio-
cultural environment, one that includes attitudes, beliefs, customs, historical 
awareness and the human ability to reflect upon and to reason about their behaviour. 
At least as presented above, Cosmides & Tooby’s discussion of the relationship 
between our biology and our environment appears to undervalue the depth and 
complexity of human cultural surroundings, and of the influences that this may have 
on human development and observed human behaviour. Indeed, according to Laland 
& Brown, a major criticism of evolutionary psychology, even from other 
evolutionists, is “that it underestimates the critical role of cultural transmission 
processes in shaping human knowledge and behaviour”.43  
For example, one obvious difference between humans and arrowleaf plants (or 
most other species) is that we can, to a greater or lesser extent, change our 
environment. Therefore, if human behaviour (as part of our ‘phenotype’) is the result 
of interaction between genes and environment, and if we have the capacity to 
manipulate this environment, this suggests that we may also have some capacity to 
modify our behavioural development. In other words, there is (potentially) a feedback 
relationship between human environments and human behaviour - that is, changes to 
the environment can affect human behaviour, and this changed behaviour can create a 
changed environment, which in turn would affect human behaviour, and so on. Add to 
this the human capacity to make rational changes to the environment and we have a 
far less pessimistic view of the potential for desirable political change than Singer’s 
‘deflated’ vision would imply.  
In the following section, therefore, I will briefly examine an alternative 
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perspective on human evolution, one that raises the possibility of a more flexible or 
malleable human nature. In particular, I will look at the implications of the human 
capacity to change its environment, and assess whether this may provide a more 
appropriate model for Singer’s Darwinian left. 
 
≈ 
 
Philosopher of biology Kim Sterelny portrays humankind as a ‘self-made species’, 
able to ‘engineer’ its ecological, social and cognitive environments in a way that is 
unique in the natural world. Importantly, in contrast to the evolutionary psychology 
view of relatively fixed human behaviours, Sterelny argues that human beings are 
developmentally and behaviourally plastic. In outlining this argument, Sterelny, like 
Singer, emphasises the fact that we are evolved animals, but with a significant caveat: 
 
In assessing evolutionary theories of human nature, we are right to be wary of 
theories that invoke discontinuities between humans and the rest of nature. 
Such theories have often been born out of special pleading; out of mindsets 
that have been reluctant to see us as part of nature. Nevertheless, this reaction 
can go too far. We are indeed part of nature, and are the products of 
mechanisms that made other species too. Nonetheless, we are very unusual 
primates indeed. This too must be acknowledged and explained.
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For a start, human beings are a uniquely social and cooperative species (a fact 
that can be explained in evolutionary terms), and this in turn creates the uniquely 
complex social environment in which humans develop. In addition, according to 
Sterleny, human beings are outstanding ‘ecological engineers’ – through their social 
and cultural practices (e.g., learnt behaviours such as tool-making), humans can 
create environments that buffer them from the effects of the wider physical world.
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In Sterelny’s scheme, moreover, human ecological engineering (or niche 
construction) has cumulative or ‘downstream’ effects: the more humans change their 
environment, the more they are able to make further changes to their environment, 
with later changes building upon or being ‘scaffolded’ by earlier ones. And an 
important, and unique, aspect of human niche construction is that our species not only 
inherits genes from its ancestors, but also their knowledge and understanding. Thus, 
whereas the rest of the living world has only a genetic inheritance system, humans 
have a ‘dual inheritance’ system of genes and culture. 
As a result of human sociality and the human capacity to engineer or construct 
a cultural buffer against a diverse range of physical environments (and to pass on this 
capacity non-biologically), our species has been able to colonise the planet, from icy 
tundra to scorching desert to steamy jungle. But this ability to adapt to different 
environments over the course of human history, in Sterelny’s view, relies upon a 
unique level of malleability: “Hominid environments became more variable at a 
single time, and changed faster over time, for some of these changes were self-
induced. These changes select for both behavioural and developmental plasticity.”46 
In other words, in order to cope with novel physical environments, and with changing 
cultural environments, human behaviour became increasingly malleable. 
This argument that the human mind became more plastic over evolutionary 
time, therefore, contrasts with the standard evolutionary psychology view that our 
modern skulls house a stone age brain – that the human mind is not designed for the 
modern world, but rather to solve problems that our ancestors faced over millions of 
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years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers.
47
 Evolutionary psychology’s ‘modular mind’, 
in other words, implies a relatively fixed human nature. In Sterelny’s alternative 
evolutionary account, the human mind actually became less fixed and more malleable 
precisely because human environments became less predictable as a consequence of 
humans themselves rapidly altering them. This possibility is also raised by Laland & 
Brown: 
 
For humans, our capacity to create solutions continuously to self-imposed 
problems reflects the fact that we are very adaptable species. Moreover, to a 
degree that surpasses other species, human mental processes must contend 
with a constantly changing information environment of their own creation …. 
The flexible nature of our learning and culture allows us to survive and 
flourish in a broad range of settings. This adaptability means that, rather than 
being adapted to a particular environment, humans adapted to a broad range of 
environments that they and their ancestors were involved in constructing.
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This implied criticism of evolutionary psychology also reflects that of other 
evolutionary theorists – for example, Bolhuis et al. conclude a recent review of the 
tenets of evolutionary psychology with the comment: “The key concepts of EP 
[evolutionary psychology] have led to a series of widely held assumptions (e.g., that 
human behaviour is unlikely to be adaptive in modern environments, that cognition is 
domain-specific, that there is a universal human nature), which with the benefit of 
hindsight we now know to be questionable.”49 
Importantly, this is not to claim that evolutionary psychology’s approach to 
human nature is therefore wrong; rather, it is to emphasis that it is only one such 
evolutionary approach. For instance, as regards evolutionary psychology’s modular 
concept of the brain, Laland & Brown note that ‘domain-general’ and ‘domain-
specific’ accounts of cognitive processes represent poles of a continuum, and that 
“Domain-general processes are no more incompatible with evolutionary theory that 
domain-specific processes”.50 In other words, some human behaviours may be 
determined by the more fixed processes emphasised by evolutionary psychology, 
while other behaviours, as the result of our dual inheritance system, say, may be far 
more malleable.  
How, then, is this relevant to Singer’s general concept of ‘Darwinian 
thinking’, and to the broader application of such thinking to human social and 
political behaviour? 
 
≈ 
 
As more and more is revealed about human biological evolution, so too is more and 
more revealed about what we don’t know, and of what else needs to be taken into 
account in any accurate picture of human nature. For example, given an appropriate 
political interpretation, Kim Sterelny’s view of human behavioural and developmental 
plasticity seems to provide an evolutionary argument that, especially with its 
emphasis on the cultural determinants of human behaviour, is more in line with the 
standard leftist view of human malleability. Add to this the human ability to make 
rationally-directed changes to the social environment, and it would seem premature to 
make conclusive claims about how the ‘constraints’ of human nature could determine 
what is or is not politically possible.  
Nevertheless, we can only begin to explore these possibilities by taking human 
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cognitive and behavioural evolution seriously. It might turn out that some of our 
social behaviour is firmly leashed to our evolved biological nature, and it may turn 
out that other behaviours are only loosely tethered. Importantly, this means we cannot 
simply assume, as utopians do, that anything is possible, nor, as conservatives do, that 
everything is constrained.  
Admitting that ETOHN are still very much in their infancy, and that many of 
their findings are as yet provisional or speculative is not to accept that we must 
postpone applying ‘Darwinian reasoning’ (in the very general sense employed by 
Singer) to political theory. Indeed, the fact that we still do not know the extent of 
evolved constraints on our behaviour is a source of some optimism for the future – 
and this is where Singer tentatively suggests “a prospect of restoring more far-
reaching ambitions for change”.51 Here, too, Singer implicitly draws his ‘deflated’ 
vision of the left back into the utopian current of political thought. 
In his concluding comments to A Darwinian Left, Singer points out that “We 
are the first generation to understand not only that we have evolved but also the 
mechanisms by which we have evolved and how this evolutionary heritage influences 
our behaviour. … For the first time since life emerged from the primeval soup, there 
are beings who understand how they have come to be what they are.”52 In his closing 
sentence, Singer suggests that this knowledge and understanding “may turn out to be 
a prerequisite for a new kind of freedom”.53 
Singer’s focus here in on our (evolved) ability to rationally reflect on our 
circumstances and the possibility that our capacity to reason might, over time, allow 
us to escape the constraints imposed by our biological heritage. Could we, for 
example, use our ability to reason not only to identify the socially imposed obstacles 
to creating a better society, but also the ‘biologically’ imposed ones? And could we 
then employ reason to not only overcome these obstacles but also provide lasting 
solutions to them? 
In his Darwinian Conservatism, political scientist Larry Arnhart argues that 
evolved human predispositions set the limits to possible changes within human 
culture. Interestingly, Arnhart also provides an important addition to the usual concept 
of nature versus nurture, arguing that “instead of seeing an antithetical dichotomy of 
nature versus convention, we should see a three level nested hierarchy in which 
custom presupposes nature, and reason presupposes both nature and custom”.54 In 
Arnhart’s opinion, the left’s rational attempts to change society go ‘against the flow’ 
of nature determining culture, and both determining reason: “if it is not to be an 
exercise in utopian fantasy, deliberate choice will always be constrained by human 
nature and human culture”.55 
But is it indeed the case that human reason ‘will always be constrained’ by 
nature and tradition? As Sterelny indicates, humans can, through technological 
innovation or conscious decision-making, manipulate and change their environments 
(including their cultural traditions) – and they can also, to a greater or lesser extent, 
control the environments in which other humans (i.e., infants) will subsequently 
develop. In other words, human reason is not obviously at the whim of nature and 
culture; we can reverse the flow (at least to some degree) and consciously change our 
environment. Anthropologist Christopher Boehm, for instance, argues that “through 
morality, humans can radically manipulate their behaviour”.56  
Indeed, Arnhart himself accepts that human reason does offer some limited 
latitude for change – for instance, that “mature adults can deliberately reflect on their 
individual habits and social customs so that they might reform some of these habits 
and customs, but without expecting a radical reconstruction that would sweep away 
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all that has gone before”.57 But, from an egalitarian perspective, the question then 
becomes how much can we ‘reform’ our customs: a great deal of desirable egalitarian 
change, for example, could be effected without ‘sweeping away all that has gone 
before’. And the consequences of such change could also be cumulative – for 
example, a more tolerant society allowing for more tolerant attitudes which, in turn, 
creates a more tolerant society, and so on.  
The broad notion of cumulative social change is evident, for example, in 
Steven Pinker’s recent Better Angels of Our Nature (2011). Here, Pinker argues that, 
over the long run of human history, our societies have become increasingly less 
violent – that, for example, the casual everyday violence accepted by Europeans only 
a few centuries ago (witch burnings, public executions, floggings and gratuitous 
animal cruelty) would now be unthinkable for modern Europeans. Pinker provides 
several explanations for this apparent decline in violence, including the effects of 
enlightened (i.e., rationally-directed) social and political change, with the dramatic 
abandonment of the millennia-old institution of slavery in the 19
th
 century being a 
particular striking example.  
The relevant point here is that while modern Europeans are unlikely to be 
‘biologically’ much different from their forebears a few hundred years ago, at least as 
regards violence, they are behaviourally very different. In terms of the genetic and 
environmental influences on phenotypes, therefore, a less-violent environment 
presumably selects for (or at least allows) less-violent phenotypes, which in turn 
would create a less-violent environment. An interesting question then arises: what are 
the limits to this process? To someone in 1800, much less 1600, many of the changes 
in modern human social behaviour would have been unthinkable; might, though, the 
currently ‘unthinkable’ possibility of a truly peaceable society actually be realisable in 
the future? If this is indeed the case, then the socialist notion of changing the 
environment to change human nature may not be as unrealistic as those holding the 
‘tragic’ vision suppose. 
In Envisioning Real Utopias, Erik Wright suggests: “Nurturing clear-sighted 
understandings of what it will take to create social institutions free of oppression is 
part of creating a political will for radical social changes to reduce oppression.”58 
This, I believe, can be applied to Singer’s concept of a Darwinian left. Keeping its 
egalitarian aspirations clearly in view, the left must develop a clear-sighted 
understanding of the social and the ‘biological’ obstacles to a more equal society. 
This will prevent the left from forming impossibly utopian beliefs about radical social 
change, but it will also avert the tragic conclusion that today’s society is the best that 
can be achieved. Singer’s Darwinian left is not a ‘worst case’ scenario for the left: 
that honour would go to a left that continues to assume that human biology is 
irrelevant to our aspirations for emancipatory social change. 
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Old biases from many sources burrowed in and nestled at the heart of evolutionary theory, the most 
coherent and all-encompassing theory that scientists have ever had to explain the living world. … 
Women were assumed to be ‘naturally’ what patriarchal cultures would socialize them to be: modest, 
compliant, non-competitive, and sexually reserved. 
Sarah Hrdy Mother Nature 
 
 
Chapter 8: The Descent of Man and the Ascent of Woman 
 
In January 2005, at a conference on diversity at universities and research institutions, 
Harvard University President Lawrence Summers gave a speech addressing gender 
imbalances in science and engineering. Summers suggested three possible (though not 
mutually exclusive) explanations for the underrepresentation of women at the top 
levels of these fields, that: (1) women suffer disproportionately more than men from 
the demands of professional employment versus the demands of family and 
childrearing; (2) women differ from men in the relevant cognitive abilities, at least at 
the high end of the aptitude scale; and, (3) women are more likely to be discriminated 
against or otherwise discouraged from entering these professions than men.
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In Summers’ opinion, “the largest phenomenon, by far” in accounting for 
these observed gender imbalances was “the general clash between people’s legitimate 
family desires and employers’ current desire for high power and high intensity”2 
(essentially, that by being more likely to prioritise family and children, high-flying 
female scientists were disadvantaged in the job market compared to their more work-
obsessed male colleagues).
 
 
In addition, Summers suggested that “in the special case of science and 
engineering, there are issues of intrinsic aptitude, and particularly of the variability of 
aptitude [between men and women] … reinforced by what are in fact lesser factors 
involving socialization and continuing discrimination”.3 In other words, according to 
Summers, the underrepresentation of women in the highest positions of science could 
also be because some men have more inherent ability in this field, and this factor 
possibly outweighs the undoubted impact of discrimination against women. 
The massive furore that Summers’ speech precipitated is summed up by 
psychologist Roy Baumeister: “After initially saying, it’s possible that maybe there 
aren’t as many women physics professors at Harvard because there aren’t as many 
women as men with that high innate ability, just one possible explanation among 
others, [Summers] had to apologize, retract, promise huge sums of money, and not 
long afterward he resigned.”4 
 
≈ 
 
The possibility of evolved (intrinsic, inherent or innate) differences between men and 
women – at the psychological and behavioural level, in addition to obvious physical 
dissimilarities – is this thesis’ Level 3 worst case scenario for the left. According to 
philosopher Raymond Belliotti, the question “are gender and reproductive roles 
natural or are they socially constructed?” is one “of the major sexual issues about 
which philosophers puzzle”.5 Yet while philosophers (or social scientists generally) 
can indeed ‘puzzle about’ the underlying causes of gender roles, philosophical 
reasoning per se cannot answer this question. As elsewhere in this thesis, therefore, 
my concern is with the implications of evolved sex differences if they do indeed exist, 
or ‘what follows if’ observed inequalities in social outcomes between men and 
women do in fact have some evolutionary basis. 
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As the Summers’ controversy indicates, this is very much a live topic in 
academic and public discourse. It is also a wide-ranging issue, with a long (and 
controversial) history. In this chapter, therefore, and in order to keep the discussion 
within manageable boundaries, I will largely confine myself to evolutionary based 
responses to Summers’ argument – in particular, the commentaries provided by 
evolutionary psychologists Steven Pinker and Roy Baumeister – and to the related 
Darwinian account of human sexual behaviour raised by behavioural ecologist Sarah 
Hrdy. 
Importantly, from the empirical perspective provided by evolutionary biology, 
it does appear plausible that some psychological and behavioural differences between 
men and women are likely to exist. At the very least, given that the existence of 
behavioural differences between the sexes is well documented in non-human animals, 
including our closest primate relatives, the onus appears to be on those who believe 
that human beings are an exception to the rule elsewhere in nature to explain how and 
why this is the case. 
As indicated in previous chapters, an emphasis on the ‘social construction’ of 
gender is very much a feature of leftist (and feminist) thought, with the rejection of 
biological approaches to sex differences based on the belief that such accounts are 
socially or politically deleterious. In this chapter, I wish to explore a number of ways 
in which applying Darwinian reasoning to sex differences and to sexual inequality 
may not necessarily be as egregious as leftists often assume.  
I will begin with an approach to evolved sex differences likely to elicit 
opposition from egalitarians: the conservative Darwinian argument presented by 
political scientist Larry Arnhart. I next examine Peter Singer’s own Darwinian 
perspective on sex difference – one that, initially, seems to endorse the sort of 
conservative views articulated by the likes of Arnhart. I briefly examine possible 
feminist responses to evolutionary accounts of gender inequality, before arguing that 
the standard leftist assumptions about socially constructed gender roles are 
implausible. 
I then assess various evolutionary arguments about likely psychological 
differences between men and women, and suggest that, even if such differences do 
exist, these need not derail our ambitions for a more sexually equal society. My 
overall conclusion is that awareness of the possible evolved basis of male and female 
behaviour may provide information about how to redress the undesirable 
consequences of this behaviour. Here, I also emphasise how a refusal to accept the 
possibility of sex differences may itself prove detrimental to the left’s feminist 
egalitarian cause. 
 
≈ 
 
Conservative political scientist Larry Arnhart identifies the standard leftist position on 
sex differences: “Liberals and socialists tend to agree with the gender feminist 
assumption that the behavioural differences between men and women are mostly 
social constructions rather than natural propensities, and as social constructions, they 
can be changed by social policy to promote an ideal of sexual equality in which sex 
differences would disappear.”6  
Given these assumptions, the leftist reaction to Lawrence Summers is 
understandable: by suggesting that observed sexual inequality may be due, in part, to 
cognitive differences between the sexes themselves, the Summers perspective casts 
doubt on the viability of leftist attempts at societal change. For instance, if men really 
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are intrinsically better at jobs in high-status professions like science, there appears 
little that can be done to bring about true gender equality in this area. And if gender 
imbalances in science and technology are the result of innate sex differences, then, 
presumably, so too might similar imbalances in wider society – for instance, the 
disproportionate number of men in all positions of high-status and authority.  
Arnhart himself goes on to present an alternative to the left’s ‘social 
constructionist’ view of gender inequality: the conservative belief “that many of the 
traditional differences between men and women manifest differences in their 
biological nature that cannot be radically changed, and that the attempt of social 
policy to bring about an androgynous society must bring emotional harm and social 
disorder”.7 
Peter Singer’s Darwinian left initially appears to accept both Summers’ 
explanations for gender inequality and Arnhart’s conservative perspective on sex 
differences. For example, Singer points to the universality of sex roles in human 
social groups, in which women “almost always have the major role in caring for 
young children”, while men “have a disproportionate role in the political leadership of 
the group”.8 He also argues that “biological differences between men and women” 
may partially explain “the fact that there are fewer women chief executives of major 
corporations than men”.9 
How, then, does Singer justify these claims? 
In A Darwinian Left, Singer argues that Darwinian thinking suggests that 
leftists too readily assume that all human beings are the same in all important 
respects. He applies this argument to human sex relations: “While Darwinian thought 
has no impact on the priority we give equality as a moral or political idea, it gives us 
grounds for believing that since men and women play different roles in reproduction, 
they may also differ in their inclinations or temperaments, in ways that best promote 
the reproductive prospects of each sex.”10 
Singer extends this evolutionary logic to explain certain obvious social 
inequalities between women and men. He begins by arguing that, because there is a 
physical limit to the number of children women can have, they are likely to be choosy 
about the men they take as mates.
11
 Men’s reproductive potential, by contrast, is 
limited only by the number of fertile females they can have sex with. Crucially, if 
high status increases the opportunities for men to have sex, then men will likely be 
more motivated to seek status than women.
12
 
Further, in an argument echoing the one that caused Lawrence Summers so 
much grief, Singer questions the standard leftist belief that the massive over-
representation of men in high status positions is solely the result of discrimination 
against women. He suggests this may instead be because “men [are] more willing to 
subordinate their personal lives and other interests to their career goals”, and that 
psychological differences between men and women “may be a factor in [men’s] 
greater readiness to sacrifice everything for the sake of getting to the top”.13 For 
Singer, this is merely an example of the various ways that Darwinian thinking 
connects with ethics and politics, and he does not examine further the political 
implications of these apparent evolved sex differences. 
What, though, might egalitarians make of the way in which ‘Darwinian 
thinking’ apparently connects with this particular ethical and political issue? Feminist 
Anne Fausto-Sterling indicates a number of questionable conclusions that people 
might draw from this sort of Darwinian reasoning: for example, that affirmative 
action to allow more women access to leadership roles “can only result in the hiring 
or promoting of inferior candidates”, or that, however much women may desire to 
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shatter the glass ceiling, such an aspiration is unachievable “because, biologically, 
they have less of men’s innate ambition and willingness to take the risks necessary for 
success”. Fausto-Sterling acerbically concludes: “Discrimination against equally 
qualified applicants, it seems, no longer happens”.14 
Thus, while the thrust of Singers’ (and Summers’) argument is that 
discrimination alone may not account for sex inequalities, there is undeniable truth to 
the claim that women do face numerous pernicious forms of discrimination, and that 
this is an important factor in present-day gender imbalances.
15
 
As a single (and singularly apt) example of prejudicial assumptions about 
female psychology, consider the following by philosopher John Wilson in Equality (a 
1960s book in the series, ‘Philosophy at Work’, aimed at applying philosophical 
concepts to ‘real-world’ issues):   
 
[A]n egalitarian might wish to argue that since women as well as men are 
rational (or are equal in being rational), therefore to treat them unequally … is 
wrong. But if we take ‘being rational’ to mean that women actually abide by 
the rules of a certain game – that they use logic rather than intuition, avoid ad 
hominem arguments, remain calm and unemotional during discussion, and so 
forth – then perhaps women are not equally rational.16 
 
Given that we are only a few decades away from the ‘real world’ where 
egalitarian political philosophers like Wilson held the (apparently unremarkable) view 
that women are limited in their ability to be rational, it is not difficult to understand 
the critical reaction to Lawrence Summers’ more recent comments. Any number of 
further examples might be provided to show the prevalence of sexist and 
discriminatory attitudes, and how these feed back into prejudicial social behaviour 
and practices. Thus, even if we were to grant some basis in scientific fact to Singer’s 
evolutionary-informed argument, how do we disentangle the social causes of sexual 
inequality (including discriminatory beliefs) from possible ‘biological’ ones?  
A danger in popularising or promoting images of ‘coy’ and unambitious 
women, say, or domineering and career-focused men – especially when given the 
veneer of scientific respectability – is potentially to make them self-fulfilling. If so, 
Singer’s evolutionary interpretation of sex relations may, ironically, reinforce the very 
inequality that a Darwinian egalitarian would wish to eliminate.
17
 
How then might an evolutionary-informed left proceed? Essentially, by 
maintaining the fact/value distinction (e.g., Singer’s point that ‘Darwinian thought has 
no impact on the priority we give equality as a moral or political idea’). For example, 
Darwinian thinking suggests that men are likely to be more aggressive and more 
politically dominant than women
18
 – indeed, in summarising anthropological findings 
about sexual inequality, Stephen Sanderson points out that “we find a widespread, 
indeed a universal, pattern in which the institutional sectors of human societies are 
sexually asymmetrical; males monopolize political leadership; males monopolize 
warfare; and males monopolize a society’s high-status positions”.19 Yet, the fact that 
males universally monopolise power does not mean that this is the best or even the 
only possible social arrangement; indeed, as I argue below, the (evolved) male desire 
for power perhaps provides grounds for denying men that power. 
Nevertheless, here the left appears in danger of accepting the ‘moralistic 
fallacy’ – of rejecting the possibility of evolved differences because this appears to 
contradict egalitarian beliefs about what should be the case. In the following section, 
therefore, I will examine why the left might find some of evolutionary claims about 
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sex differences unpalatable, but why these claims cannot simply be waved away.  
 
≈ 
 
In many (especially academic) leftist circles even raising the possibility of sex 
differences violates a strong taboo. As Steven Pinker points out: “At some point in the 
history of the modern women’s movement, the belief that men and women are 
psychologically indistinguishable became sacred. The reasons are understandable: 
Women really had been held back by bogus claims of essential differences.”20 If men 
and women really are psychologically near-identical, then existing inequalities (at 
least those not dependent on males’ greater size or strength) can only be the result of 
the differential socialisation of males and females; thus, the solution to these 
inequalities lies in changing the relevant social practices.  
Nevertheless, this well-intentioned belief, and especially its emphasis on 
socialisation, stretches credulity. For example, as Sanderson argues, if male 
domination of political leadership and high-status positions, and female orientation 
towards child nurturing were solely the result of arbitrary socialisation processes, 
“then what we should find in the full range of the world’s societies is essentially this: 
About a third should be led by men, another third by women, and the remaining third 
by both men and women; about a third of the world’s societies should make women 
the primary care providers, another third should give men this role, and the final third 
should assign this responsibility to both men and women equally; and so forth and so 
on”.21 
Sanderson goes on to emphasise that “this is not even remotely what we find”. 
Thus, given that a more likely explanation for the universality of sexual inequalities is 
some underlying element of universal human nature (i.e., one that leads human 
societies to consistently come up with similar patterns of social organisation), the 
onus is very much on those who oppose this view to come up with a better 
explanation, one that would also account for why humans would thus be unique 
amongst sexually-reproducing animal species. 
Stephen Jay Gould, for instance, while remaining a fierce critic of many 
aspects of ETOHN, nevertheless acknowledges the likelihood of broad and general 
cognitive differences between males and females.
22
 His point, though, is that this still 
cannot explain the huge range of supposed sex differences proposed by (‘pop’) 
evolutionary psychology. Gould’s point is well taken. At the same time, however, 
given that we are descended from creatures whose sexual nature has a lineage of 
hundreds of millions of years, it does not appear unreasonable to accept that our 
evolutionary history may have more of a bearing on male/female differences than the 
left has traditionally believed. 
The most relevant question here is whether the implications of evolved 
psychological differences between men and women are as detrimental to the leftist 
cause as is often believed (by both the left and the right). In the following (albeit 
selective) analysis of why such a conclusion is perhaps unwarranted, I will simply 
adopt the working hypothesis that there are likely to be differences between the sexes, 
even if, as Gould’s suggests, these differences may only be minor. 
Importantly, even broadly general differences between the sexes may have 
significant consequences. Roy Baumeister, for example, argues that many of the 
differences in social outcomes between men and women, such as inequalities in 
salary, may have less to do with differences in ability and more to do with differences 
in motivation. Echoing Singer’s point that men appear more willing than women to 
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subordinate their personal lives to their career goals, Baumeister suggests that one of 
the causes of the gender wage gap may be that men are simply prepared to work much 
longer hours. According to Baumeister, for example, most workaholics are male, with 
one study suggesting that “over 80% of the people who work 50-hour weeks are 
men”.23  
Of course, an obvious alternative to the claim that differences in (evolved) 
psychology results in more male workaholics is that men are not socially restricted in 
the same way that women are, and that if these social restrictions were removed, more 
women would work longer hours too. Again, this argument is well taken – but it 
raises an issue that is pertinent to many environmentally-based objections to 
male/female differences: what is the ultimate cause of the social behaviours we see 
today? That is, even if gender roles are kept in place by social attitudes and practices, 
why did these particular differences arise in the first place?  
In attempting to explain the universality of gender divisions, Stephen 
Sanderson argues that in all human societies throughout history tasks requiring long 
periods away from home base have been assigned to men. Women, by contrast, tend 
to be assigned tasks that keep them close to the home base – a finding “that is 
explicable in terms of women’s responsibilities for infant and child care, especially 
nursing of infants”.24 This does not entail that this particular division of labour is, 
from a modern liberal perspective, fair or just (or even unchangeable), but simply that 
it is an optimal behavioural strategy given the type of animal we are. In Sanderson’s 
view, “the sexual assignment of work roles seems to be carried out in such a way as to 
promote the well-being of infants and children and thus the inclusive fitness of their 
parents.” 25 Ancestral males could afford to be absent for longer because they were 
less important to the day-to-day well-being of infants, especially pre-weaned ones. 
That such a pattern continues today, therefore, is possibly a reflection of these more 
deeply rooted behaviours.  
Thus, morally unfair patterns of behaviour may have their ultimate cause in 
the amoral imperatives of human evolutionary history. The point is that explaining 
these behaviours in biological terms is not therefore to condone them. Similarly, the 
fact that inequalities are often sanctioned or reinforced by social beliefs and practices 
does not therefore deny the possibility of an evolutionary origin for these inequalities 
(or indeed for the social beliefs that sustain them).   
With regard to Baumeister’s arguments about male/female differences in 
motivation, the important point is that such motivational differences may have a basis 
in evolved human psychology even if social attitudes and practices reinforce the 
relevant behaviours. Furthermore, according to Baumeister, while average cognitive 
differences between men and women are usually extremely small, nevertheless “when 
you look at what men and women want, what they like, there are genuine 
differences”. As an example, Baumeister points to the human sex drive: 
 
Men and women may have about equal ‘ability’ in sex, whatever that means, 
but there are big differences as to motivation: which gender thinks about sex 
all the time, wants it more often, wants more different partners, risks more for 
sex, masturbates more, leaps at every opportunity, and so on. Our survey of 
published research found that pretty much every measure and every study 
showed higher sex drive in men. It’s official: men are hornier than women. 
This is a difference in motivation.
26
  
  
According to Baumeister, a gender contrast also occurs with musical ability: 
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women appear just as talented as men in performing music, he argues, but not in 
creating it – and the evident dearth of female composers cannot easily be put down to 
discrimination or discouragement. In Baumeister’s view, even though women have 
similar musical talents to men they simply appear less motivated to create music.
27
 If 
Baumeister is correct, therefore, some of the obvious gender divisions may not in fact 
be the result of major differences in ability or in psychology.  
With regard to separate gender roles in parenting, for instance, relatively 
minor sex differences in ‘emotional propensities’ may have major social 
consequences. According to Sarah Hrdy, given the right circumstances, most male 
primates can be induced to display nurturing behaviour. Why, therefore, is it “almost 
always females who end up holding the baby?” – or, in a modern human context: 
“Why, even among bottle-fed babies with both parents working outside the home, 
does the traditional division of labor between father and maternal caretaker so often 
emerge?”28 
Gender ideology (i.e., that premised on socialization) provides no real answer, 
Hrdy argues, because cultural socialization cannot explain sex roles in non-human 
mammals: “There must be evolved emotional differences between males and females, 
differences that go beyond the two major physical differences, birth and lactation.”29 
These initial psychological differences, Hrdy goes on to suggest, could be relatively 
slight compared with the magnitude of the resultant social differences between men 
and women. For example, while both male and female parents recognize the cry of a 
distressed infant, it is more salient for the mother than the father. Of course, the 
mother’s greater responsiveness to signs of infant distress might be learned. “More 
probably”, Hrdy suggests, “her lower threshold for responding to infant signals is 
innate”.30 
According to Hrdy, the stereotypical social division between stay-at-home-
mums and go-out-to-work-dads arises, not because fathers cannot be caregivers, but 
because parents unwittingly follow the line of least resistance: “a seemingly 
insignificant difference in thresholds for responding to infant cues gradually, 
insidiously, step by step, without invoking a single other cause, produces a marked 
division of labor by sex”.31 This social disparity, in other words, is bought about by 
evolved predispositions and social expectations: 
 
Where natural inclinations lead depends on how much effort is expended 
bending them back. Among humans, conscious effort can minimize 
preexisting differences. More often, small initial differences in responsiveness 
are exaggerated by life experiences and then blown out of all proportion by 
cultural customs and norms.”32 
 
As with Baumeister’s argument about motivation, therefore, relatively minor 
psychological differences between the sexes may underpin major social differences 
between the genders – in employment terms, for example, males’ greater ‘motivation’ 
for work can result in higher earnings, while females’ greater ‘motivation’ for family 
can result in poorly paid part-time jobs that fit around the needs of children.  
None of this is to deny that social attitudes and practices allow men to escape 
many of the responsibilities of parenting, to the disadvantage of women. But 
regardless of whether work/family disparities are the result of differences in 
socialization or of differences in evolved psychology (or, as more likely, a 
combination of both), the political question remains the same: what is to be done 
about the resulting social inequalities? From an egalitarian perspective, the cause of 
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gender inequalities does not negate the moral imperative to do something about it. 
Indeed, if understanding the possible evolutionary roots of such inequality helps us 
discover solutions to it, Darwinian thinking would not, as many leftists seem to 
believe, turn out to be incompatible with feminist ideals.  
However, before suggesting possible ways in which such thinking might be 
used to address gender inequalities, I will first examine a number of other relevant 
arguments about male/female differences – most especially the fact that, while men 
and women do not differ greatly on average, men show much greater variability than 
women. I will argue that this greater variability, itself explicable in evolutionary 
terms, could be the cause of much observed gender inequality – and that by 
acknowledging this fact, gender egalitarians may be better informed about ways to 
proceed. 
 
≈ 
 
In Lawrence Summers’ controversial speech on the possible causes of gender 
imbalances in science, his suggestions about sex differences in cognitive abilities 
were interpreted as a claim that men in general were more intelligent than women. In 
actual fact, according to Baumeister, the average IQ of males and females is pretty 
much the same.
33
 
However, Summers did not actually claim that the average intelligence of 
males was greater than females; rather he suggested that men showed more variation 
in intelligence than women, and that there may, therefore, be more men at the high 
end of the range of relevant cognitive abilities than women. Such variation between 
the sexes does indeed seem to be the case. According to Steven Pinker: 
 
In many traits, men show greater variance than women, and are 
disproportionately found at both the low and high ends of the distribution. 
Boys are more likely to be learning disabled or retarded but also more likely to 
reach the top percentiles in assessments of mathematical ability, even though 
boys and girls are similar in the bulk of the bell curve.
34
 
 
Given this greater variance in intelligence, therefore, men and women could 
well be equally intelligent on average, and yet there still be more men with high-end 
(and with low-end) mathematical or scientific abilities.  
Why then was Summers pilloried for making a claim based on factual 
evidence – evidence, moreover, that does not initially seem politically problematic? 
According to both Pinker and Baumeister, Summers had broken the strict academic 
taboo that gender imbalances must be regarded solely as the result of discriminatory 
social practices.
35
 
The greater male variance in intelligence, Baumeister argues, is part of the 
general pattern that men tend more to extremes than women – even with height, for 
instance, there are more really tall and really short men than women. And just as there 
are more men at the top of the social hierarchy, so too are there more at the bottom, 
“the criminals, the junkies, the losers”.36 
And the evolutionary explanation for the greater variance of traits amongst 
men is the same as that highlighted by Singer: the basic biological fact that males can, 
potentially, have far more offspring than females. As Pinker explains:  
 
[N]atural selection favors a slightly more conservative and reliable baby-
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building process for females and a slightly more ambitious and error-prone 
process for males. That is because the advantage of an exceptional daughter 
(who still can have only as many children as a female can bear and nurse in a 
lifetime) would be canceled out by her unexceptional sisters, whereas an 
exceptional son who might sire several dozen grandchildren can more than 
make up for his dull childless brothers.
37
 
 
(Importantly, this is not a normative argument: that is, the claim that women 
are possibly ‘slightly more conservative’ and men ‘slightly more ambitious’ is not a 
value judgment.) 
  Baumeister expands on this Darwinian explanation for sex differences with 
what he describes as “the single most underappreciated fact about gender”: that, 
according to DNA analysis, modern humans are descended from twice as many 
women as men.
38
 This finding, Baumeister estimates, equates to about 80 percent of 
human women successfully reproducing over the course of our species’ history, but 
only about 40 percent of men.  
Baumeister goes on to argue that this major difference in reproductive success 
very likely contributed to some significant personality differences between the sexes: 
 
Most men who ever lived did not have descendants who are alive today. Their 
lines were dead ends. Hence it was necessary to take chances, try new things, 
be creative, explore other possibilities. … Women did best by minimizing 
risks, whereas the successful men were the ones who took chances. Ambition 
and competitive striving probably mattered more to male success (measured in 
offspring) than female. Creativity was probably more necessary, to help the 
individual man stand out in some way. Even the sex drive difference was 
relevant: For many men, there would be few chances to reproduce and so they 
had to be ready for every sexual opportunity. … In terms of the biological 
competition to produce offspring, then, men outnumbered women both among 
the losers and among the biggest winners.
39
 
 
Again, this is not a normative argument. The fact that personality differences 
likely exist between men and women – indeed, that it would be biologically bizarre if 
they did not – says nothing about whether particular traits or tendencies are ‘good’ or 
‘bad’, just whether they were more or less successful in the biased lottery of sex over 
the long course of human history. Under natural selection’s remorseless gaze, the 
difference between ‘mediocrity’ and ‘great achievement’ is simply number of 
offspring: as Baumeister argues, “only a few men can achieve greatness, but for the 
few men who do, the gains have been real. And we are descended from those great 
men much more than from other men”.40 (The estimated 16 million male descendants 
of Genghis Khan alive today graphically demonstrates Baumeister’s point.41)  
Nor is this a deterministic argument – that, say, women will play it safe in all 
circumstances, or that men will take risks or try to dominate no matter what. For both 
men and women, social dominance is worth striving for if it can usefully be directed 
at promoting the interests of offspring or kin. At the same time, conservative 
behaviour may be appropriate for men in many situations, for example when they are 
older and established, and therefore have more to lose. The Darwinian argument 
simply predicts that, other things being equal, men and women are likely to behave in 
ways that better ensure their reproductive prospects; it therefore predicts, for instance, 
that a psychological focus on accruing status or dominance is more likely for men 
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than for women.  
The above discussion indicates reasons to question the standard leftist view 
that socialisation alone explains gender imbalances. There are, in fact, good grounds 
to assume that sex differences do exist. Of course, this does not prove the matter 
either way. Here, lacking the expertise to decide the issue – and holding out the 
possibility that further evolutionary research might show that humans are an 
exception to what would otherwise be predicted – I will instead examine ‘what 
follows if’ observed gender inequalities do have some basis in males’ and females’ 
evolved psychology, and whether Darwinian thinking could provide useful 
information for those wanting to tackle the resultant social disparities. 
 
≈ 
 
The first political point to make is that the probable existence of broad psychological 
differences between men and women does not undermine arguments for reducing 
gender inequality. An obvious example here is the egalitarian demand for greater 
provision of maternity leave and childcare. To the extent that parenting 
responsibilities fall more on women (for whatever reason), and to the extent that this 
results in social and economic disadvantage, this provides an argument for some form 
of equitable recompense. This is a standard egalitarian argument – but such an 
argument still stands (indeed, could perhaps be strengthened) even if some evolved 
sex differences underlie the inequality. In other words, the causes of inequality, 
whether cultural or ‘biological’ or both, do not impact upon the moral or political 
argument; the facts do not determine our values. 
The second political point is that difference does not equate to deficiency. For 
example, as philosopher Jean Grimshaw indicates in her discussion of ‘The idea of a 
female ethic’, some feminists accept that “there are in fact common or typical 
differences in the ways in which women and men think about or reason about moral 
issues”. 
 
This view is, of course, not new. It has normally been expressed, however, in 
terms of a deficiency on the part of women; women are incapable of reason, of 
acting on principles; they are emotional, intuitive, too personal and, so forth. 
Perhaps, however, we might recognise difference without ascribing deficiency; 
and maybe a consideration of female moral reasoning can highlight the 
problems in the male forms of reasoning which have been seen as the norm.
42
 
 
(While Grimshaw focuses on moral reasoning, this argument still stands with 
possible broad differences in male and female psychology, such as those highlighted 
by Baumeister and Hrdy above.) 
This might serve to ease egalitarian concerns about the political implications 
of evolved sex differences, should they actually exist. According to Grimshaw, for 
instance, many feminists themselves believe that women are ‘naturally’ more 
cooperative and gentle, and less aggressive, than men.
43
 Yet, while here this may be 
based more on wishful speculation than empirical research, how could this posited 
difference be taken as a deficiency? Were this belief true, it suggests that women are 
less likely to initiate conflict, or that they may be better able to resolve it if it occurs – 
in which case, this female difference is more a strength than a weakness. Furthermore, 
given that the political processes that lead to war have traditionally been dominated 
by more aggressive, less cooperative men, one potential means to avoid conflict could 
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be to give more political power to women. 
Could explicitly Darwinian thinking also lead to similar conclusions – that is, 
could hitherto speculative beliefs about women’s more peaceable nature, and the 
possible political consequences of this, be more fully grounded in an evolutionary 
appreciation of human nature? In The Better Angels of Our Nature, an analysis of the 
apparent decline in violence in modern human societies, Steven Pinker briefly 
addresses this issue. After providing evolutionary explanations for gender gaps in 
“overconfidence, personal violence, and group-against-group hostility”, Pinker 
ponders three related questions: would the world be more peaceable if women were in 
charge; has it become more peaceful as women have gained more social sway; and, 
will it become even more peaceful if women acquire increasing political influence? 
“The answer to all three,” Pinker suggests, “is a qualified yes”.44 
The qualification is necessary, Pinker argues, because the relevant aspects of 
men’s and women’s psychology are not that different – while actual combat, for 
example, has been overwhelmingly a male activity throughout history, women have 
often supported, assisted in, or even led armies or nations to war (Boadicea, Elizabeth 
I and Margaret Thatcher are three examples from Britain alone of women leaders who 
were not averse to war). 
Nevertheless, given that women are slightly less likely than men to support 
violent or forceful actions, Pinker argues that, over the course of history, “women 
have been, and will be, a pacifying force”. Furthermore, according to Pinker, a clear 
correlation exists between a society’s recognition of women’s rights and its attitudes 
to war: 
 
Several ethnographic surveys of traditional cultures have found that the better 
a society treats its women, the less it embraces war. … We don’t know what 
causes what, but biology and history suggest that all else being equal, a world 
in which women have more influence will be a world with fewer wars.
45
 
 
Here, Darwinian thinking can (to co-opt Grimshaw’s point) highlight the 
problems in the male forms of reasoning which have been seen as the norm. For 
instance, by paying attention to likely evolved sex differences in attitudes to violence 
or war, and how this might affect how the world is, we can focus on reasons why it is 
not as it ought to be. If war is more likely when ‘male-like’ reasoning is the social 
norm, and our normative beliefs oppose war, then we have a reason to promote more 
‘female-like’ reasoning. 
Indeed, as Pinker points out, the history of anti-war sentiment demonstrates 
that “women have taken the leadership in pacifist and humanitarian movements out of 
all proportion to their influence in other political institutions of the time”; 
furthermore, the recent decades in which women’s interests have been increasingly 
acknowledged “are also the decades in which wars between developed states became 
increasingly unthinkable”.46  
If Pinker is correct, then these historical trends are explicable in Darwinian 
terms: for example, that because men have a greater evolved incentive to compete for 
sexual access to females (e.g., through displays of dominance), while women have a 
greater incentive to minimise risks to their children (e.g., the dangers that might arise 
through war), any increase in female influence on society could be expected to lead to 
a decrease in the level of violence.  
Science writer Matt Ridley reaches a similar conclusion about the role of 
women in the socially competitive environment of politics or business. Echoing 
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Baumeister’s argument that men and women are likely to differ more in motivation 
than general ability, Ridley suggests that women have little incentive to compete for 
political power because, unlike men, this would not further enhance their reproductive 
success. Importantly, however, while “evolutionary thinking predicts that women will 
not often seek to climb political ladders … it says nothing about how good they will 
be if they do”.47 
According to Ridley, the available evidence about women’s success as 
political leaders (e.g., as Queens or as Prime Ministers) suggests that they do a 
slightly better job than men, and that this is perhaps due to certain features of female 
psychology, such as greater intuition and character judgement, or lack of self-
worship. To Ridley, moreover, this could justify affirmative action to place more 
women in positions of power: “Since the bane of all organisations, whether they are 
companies, charities or governments, is that they reward cunning ambition rather than 
ability (the people who are good at getting to the top are not necessarily the people 
who are best at doing the job), and since men are more endowed with such ambition 
than women, it is absolutely right that promotion should be biased in favour of 
women.”48  
To relate this more closely to Singer’s Darwinian left argument: the facts of 
our nature (or of differences in male and female nature) do not determine our values. 
We are no more justified in using the (possible) fact that violence/competition is a 
more male-like tendency as the basis for our political policies than we are in using the 
(possible) fact that reduced aggression/competiveness is a more female-like tendency. 
However, if our political goal is for a less aggressive or less competitive society then 
we can use these facts in pursuit of this goal (e.g., by further empowering women).  
Similarly, broad psychological sex differences as regards family and work 
commitments do not in themselves justify particular social arrangements; men can 
make good caregivers just as much as women can make good wage slaves. Yet, if we 
deem current gender roles to be undesirable, then an understanding of the sex 
differences that lead to this inequality could help us work out the best ways of 
bringing about a more desirable state of affairs. 
At the same time, there is an obvious danger to ill-considered reasoning about 
male and female cognitive differences: as Grimshaw emphasises, the view that 
women ‘reason differently’ (or, in Darwinian terms, that they may have different 
psychological inclinations) “runs the risk of recapitulating old and oppressive 
dichotomies”.49 For example: 
 
Women themselves have constantly tended to be devalued or inferiorized 
(frequently at the same time as being idealized). But this devaluation has not 
simply been of women themselves – their nature, abilities and characteristics. 
The ‘spheres’ of activities with which they have particularly been associated 
have also been devalued. … Thus home, family, the domestic virtues, and 
women’s role in the physical and emotional care of others … are commonly 
seen as a mere ‘backdrop’ to the more ‘important’ spheres of male activity, to 
which no self-respecting man could allow himself to be restricted; and as 
generating values which must always take second place if they conflict with 
values or priorities from elsewhere.
50
 
 
In the case of Larry Arnhart’s conservative belief that Darwinism sanctions a 
‘natural’ role for men and women (i.e., the traditional view of ‘men at work, women 
at home’), the leftist fear that Darwinian reasoning is simply an attempt to further 
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devalue women and women’s behaviour does not appear unfounded. Nevertheless, 
Arnhart’s argument fallaciously transgresses the fact/value distinction, and the real 
point is that accepting differences in men’s and women’s nature, abilities and 
characteristics, or in their predispositions towards certain activities, need not bring 
with it value (or ‘devalue’) judgements – difference, as Grimshaw makes clear, does 
not imply deficiency.  
From a Darwinian perspective, there are obvious reasons why women’s 
psychological predispositions may be more attuned to home, family or care-giving 
than men’s, and why men’s evolved psychology may be more focused on 
(competitive) work environments. This being the case, one important question is 
whether a Darwinian perspective on this issue could help overcome (rather than 
reinforce) the tendency to disregard women’s spheres of activity. 
For example, as Lawrence Summers argues, the demands of employers rather 
than the employment itself is perhaps the biggest factor in under-representation of 
women in certain roles: one solution, therefore, is to change working conditions so 
that women may be more willing to enter those professions currently dominated by 
men. Here, an evolutionary perspective may inform us about the sort of working 
conditions that may be more conducive, on average, to women, and of what other 
possible aspects of male and female psychology may need to be taken into account to 
bring about desired egalitarian outcomes. 
If men and women do, in general, have differing inclinations and tendencies, 
and if women are therefore more likely to opt for occupations that earn less money, 
then they risk being unfairly penalised (e.g., wage-wise) for attempting to satisfy their 
job preferences. If this is indeed the case, then we have additional grounds to demand 
more equitable pay levels, or to argue that market force wage competition may not be 
appropriate to certain occupations, such as the ‘caring’ roles traditionally filled by 
women. Thus, even if our argument is informed by Darwinian thinking, raising the 
pay and status of women (and of women’s roles) can still remain the political goal.  
At the same time, however, if broad sex differences do exist but we ignore 
them and attempt to channel people into jobs that they would not otherwise tend to 
choose, then we risk encouraging people into roles where they may be unhappy or 
unfulfilled. Of course, to those sceptical of Darwinian reasoning, this last point might 
appear on a slippery slope to the argument that certain roles are ‘natural’ and 
therefore inevitable for women – that women will, on average, always be the nurses 
and never the doctors. This is not what I am suggesting. Rather, I am arguing that 
accepting the possibility of evolved sex differences may help illuminate why men and 
women tend to prefer particular jobs, or why we might unconsciously assign greater 
importance to some roles than to others.  
It could be the case that women, in general, tend towards the caring 
professions because of their evolved psychology; if so, this does not mean we cannot, 
if we so desire, raise the wages and status of such jobs. At the same time, women may 
be deterred from certain professions by factors extraneous to the actual job itself, such 
as family-unfriendly hours or lack of childcare; yet, here again, there are social and 
legislative changes that can be effected to make such professions more accessible for 
women.  
Similarly, paying attention to possible evolved differences between the sexes 
could help reveal certain biases in our perceptions of the social world. For example, 
the discipline of animal behaviour was revolutionised by the input of increasing 
numbers of women (such as Sarah Hrdy) who drew attention to socially-significant 
female behaviours – behaviours, moreover, that had hitherto been overlooked by male 
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observers. Perhaps the same is true of how we normally look upon human behaviour: 
that highly visible male activities (especially aggressive competition) draws our 
attention away from socially-significant female behaviours, and that this causes us to 
‘inferiorize’ the latter.51 
Of course, those most likely to analyse female behaviour in human societies, 
such as academic social scientists, are also those least likely to accommodate 
evolutionary theory in their analysis. This attitude is unfortunate because Darwinian 
reasoning can, in fact, further illuminate the old and oppressive dichotomies that have 
always devalued women and women’s roles. Far from justifying the persistent belief 
that women’s roles form a mere backdrop to more important male activities, 
Darwinian reasoning can help foreground the former instead of the latter.  
As concrete example of the potential value of a Darwinian perspective on old 
arguments about sex and politics, and to draw the various strands of my argument 
together, I will here turn to that most controversial social issue – the debate around 
abortion and women’s reproductive rights. 
 
≈ 
 
In Sarah Hrdy’s opinion, the abortion debate “is ultimately about what it means to be 
a mother”.52 Surprisingly, despite childbirth and motherhood being an obvious sphere 
of women’s activity, arguments about reproduction and abortion are dominated by 
men. Or is this surprising? In commenting on one especially heated debate about 
abortion in the US Congress, and on the emotional fervour of one anti-abortion male 
senator in particular, Hrdy comments: “Like all humans, and indeed as is typical of 
the entire Primate order, the senator exhibited an intense, even obsessive, interest in 
the reproductive condition of other group members. Like all high-status primates 
before him, he was intent on controlling when, where, and how females belonging to 
his group reproduced.”53  
Further, after highlighting the significant fact that Congress never argues 
about intervening in the bodily functions of men, Hrdy goes on to claim: “Passionate 
debates about abortion derive from motivations to control female reproduction that 
are far older than any particular system of government, older than patriarchy, older 
even than recorded history. Male fascination with the reproductive affairs of female 
group members predates our species.”54 
With regard to the value of ETOHN to political arguments for sex equality, 
therefore, the abortion issue illustrates an extreme example of the evolved male desire 
to control women – and this, in turn, could provide an extra dimension to standard 
gender feminist ideas about patriarchal society; that is, that the cultural processes 
(e.g., patriarchy) that result in the oppression of women are themselves based on pre-
human psychological predispositions. Could we therefore use this sort of evolutionary 
insight as an additional means to challenge or combat male social hegemony?  
Hrdy herself points to the dangers in ignoring the deep psychological basis of 
the male desire to control females. Young women in developed countries, Hrdy 
suggests, naively take for granted the freedoms that they currently enjoy (freedoms 
that are, in fact, historically unique): 
 
They view the antiabortion movement in the United States, along with the 
emergence of powerful political lobbies seeking to substitute ‘abstinence only’ 
for practical knowledge about human sexuality and reproduction, as too 
irrational to take seriously. … They see no connection between innate male 
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desires to control women in earlier times and the attitudes toward women and 
family that inspire all-male audiences of ‘Promise Keepers,’ or that motivate 
elected officials to debate endlessly over whether and when a woman gives 
birth.
55
  
 
In Hrdy’s view, few in the West could take seriously the possibility that that 
“old tensions between maternal and paternal interests” could re-emerge, and even 
reverse the more recent revolution in the treatment of women. She herself is less 
sanguine: “If age-old pressures are allowed to erode hard-won laws and protections, it 
is far from certain that the unique experiment we have embarked upon can persist.”56 
Surely, therefore, an evolutionary-informed understanding of the male desire 
to control women is highly relevant to egalitarian aspirations for a more sexually 
equal society (irrespective of where one stands on a particular emotive issue such as 
abortion). Such an understanding is not antithetical to the desire to end female 
oppression: indeed, the on-going rejection of ETOHN by many feminists – in this 
case, for example, ignoring evidence that patriarchal behaviour has deep evolutionary 
roots – could itself pose a threat to our hopes for further gender equality, especially if 
it causes us to misunderstand or to underestimate the motivations of those who want 
to turn back the clock and put women back in what they perceive is their ‘natural’ 
place.    
Furthermore, this evolutionary perspective on specific aspects of male and 
female behaviour appears entirely consistent with the wider egalitarian argument 
articulated by the likes of Grimshaw – for example, that taking the experiences and 
perspectives of women seriously could provide a basis to critique the current male-
dominated public sphere. Grimshaw points out that human social life would be very 
different if women had the same sort of political power that men enjoy, or if men had 
the same sort of responsibility for children as women have. She goes on to suggest, 
“there is every reason, too, to suppose that in a world in which the activities and 
concerns of women which have traditionally been regarded as primarily female were 
given equal value and status, moral and social priorities would be very different from 
those of the world in which we now live.”57 
The role of women in bringing about a decrease in violence in developed 
societies appears to support Grimshaw’s argument; in this case, the evidence suggests 
that more equal consideration of women’s concerns and activities does indeed lead to 
a change in moral and social priorities. And while the recent transformation in 
attitudes to women’s rights has not been informed by ETOHN, a Darwinian 
perspective is not – or not necessarily – incompatible with further egalitarian reform. 
Darwinian thinking, therefore, can potentially provide a deliberate and scientifically 
credible source of critique of the male-dominated social world. Indeed, as the 
preceding discussion of women’s reproductive rights illustrates, failure to take 
seriously the possible evolved basis of certain male ‘concerns’ may undermine the 
hard won egalitarian reforms already achieved. 
 
≈ 
 
A Darwinian perspective on our social behaviour can provide insights into why we 
might have the preferences that we do, or why we are so readily socialized to behave 
in particular ways, or why society has come to be organized in the manner that it is. 
The greater tolerance of long working hours by males, for example, may be a 
reflection of behaviour that, in the past, better ensured male reproductive prospects 
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(e.g., in provisioning female partners and offspring with resources). And as human 
societies grew larger and more complex, this pattern of behaviour may have provided 
the initial impetus for the gender dichotomy that we see today – of men working 
longer hours (and getting more pay) than women.  
Yet while any such evolutionary account could simply provide an explanation 
for observed behaviour, from the point of view of a Darwinian left it could also 
provide a means to critique that behaviour – for example, to ask whether, in a modern 
society, this is a desirable way to behave. Furthermore, as argued at length above, an 
evolutionary understanding of our behaviour can also inform us about possible ways 
to change it (and its social outcomes) if that is what we desire. As philosopher Griet 
Vandermassen argues in respect of likely evolved differences between men and 
women: “If we are not prepared to look reality in the face, we will be unable to 
respond to it adequately.”58 
The question addressed in the next three chapters is whether a similar 
perspective can also be applied to the possibility of evolved genetic differences 
between human racial populations. 
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It is true that the only certain race is the human race. Perhaps, however, the time has come to explore 
how biological variation and social construction are related. Dealing with difference may be easier said 
than done. But denial no longer appears to be an option. 
                                                               Marek Kohn, The Race Gallery  
 
 
Chapter 9: Of Definitions and Diversity  
 
In 1840, under the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Maori people of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand formally acquired the rights of British subjects. That same 
year, historian Thomas Macaulay depicted a possible future for the Empire that Maori 
had signed up to, famously envisaging a time “when some traveller from New 
Zealand shall, in the midst of a vast solitude, take his stand on a broken arch of 
London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul’s.”1 This vision of native New 
Zealanders risen above the declining British could hardly have contrasted more with 
that of Charles Darwin, who, only a few decades later, forecast eventual extinction for 
Maori in the struggle for existence with Europeans: “The [Maori] New Zealander 
seems conscious of this … for he compares his future fate with that of the native rat 
now almost exterminated by the European rat.”2 
While history has proved Darwin’s gloomy prediction false, it is nevertheless 
the case that the life outcomes of many modern Maori in New Zealand, like those of 
most indigenes elsewhere, are much poorer than those of more recently arrived 
peoples. And indigenous peoples are not alone in suffering from the vicissitudes of 
history; other peoples who had fallen, or were soon to fall, under colonial rule in 
Darwin’s day still lag far behind their former European overseers in prosperity and 
power, despite subsequently regaining independence. 
As biogeographer Jared Diamond acknowledges: “It is perfectly obvious to 
everyone, whether an overt racist or not, that different peoples have fared differently 
in history.”3 But why is this the case? Why has the course of human history been so 
very different for different peoples?  In his Pulitzer Prize winning Guns, Germs and 
Steel, Diamond attempts to answer these questions: “Why did wealth and power 
become distributed as they are now, rather than some other way? For instance, why 
weren’t Native Americans, Africans, and Aboriginal Australians the ones who 
decimated, subjugated, or exterminated Europeans and Asians?”4 (Or, contra 
Macaulay, why were the British able to visit ruin upon the Maori rather than the other 
way round?) 
The most common explanation for a world divided between haves and have-
nots, according to Diamond, “involves implicitly or explicitly assuming biological 
differences among peoples”.5 And while such views (most especially the idea of 
cognitive differences between races) are repudiated in public in Western countries 
today, biological explanations for inter-group inequalities are still widely held in 
private.
6
 
Yet, despite it being impolite to say so in public (at least in the West), 
Diamond accepts that “[i]t seems logical to suppose that history’s pattern reflects 
innate differences among the people themselves”: 
 
We see in our daily lives that some of the conquered peoples continue to form 
an underclass, centuries after the conquests or slave imports took place. We’re 
told that this too is to be attributed not to any biological shortcomings but to 
social disadvantages and limited opportunities. Nevertheless, we have to 
wonder. We keep seeing all those glaring, persistent differences in peoples’ 
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status. We’re assured that the seemingly transparent biological explanation for 
the world’s inequalities … is wrong, but we’re not told what the correct 
explanation is.
7
  
 
In Diamond’s opinion, unless there is “some convincing, detailed, agreed-
upon explanation for the broad pattern of history, most people will continue to suspect 
the racist biological explanation is correct after all”.8  
 
≈ 
 
Although Diamond is careful not to couch it in these terms, his discussion of the 
glaring social disparities between different peoples equates to racial inequalities. And 
the question of ‘race’ is the elephant in the room for Peter Singer’s Darwinian 
approach to social inequality.  
If the left is to take seriously Singer’s claim that “we bear the evidence of our 
[evolutionary] inheritance, not only in our anatomy and our DNA, but in our 
behaviour too”9, it must also entertain the possibility of evolved differences between 
human populations. After all, some divergent evolution between long-separated 
human lineages appears to follow directly from Darwin’s basic concept of ‘descent 
with modification’.  
Indeed, for the likes of sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, this is more than just a 
possibility: “Given that humankind is a biological species, it should come as no shock 
to find that populations are to some extent genetically diverse in the physical and 
mental properties underlying social behaviour.”10 
Yet for many liberal thinkers, the very idea of evolved differences between 
peoples is potentially (if not actually) racist. As Diamond argues, for instance, it 
simply lends credence to the belief that obvious inequalities between different peoples 
(or races) are explicable in biological terms; that disparities in wealth or well-being, 
say, are a consequence of biological differences between peoples themselves. This 
liberal attitude is not surprising: after all, the most appalling application of biological 
thinking to human societies was the racial ideology of Hitler’s National Socialists.  
Moreover, reference to human biology in analysis of inter-group inequality 
may appear to blame the victims rather than the perpetrators of colonial subjugation 
and post-colonial marginalization. Again, this attitude is not without good cause. Ill-
considered theorizing about ‘deep’ differences between groups identified on the basis 
of ‘race’ may indeed cause genuine social harm, particularly if it promotes the 
political belief that little can be done to change or to ameliorate glaring and persistent 
inequalities. As philosopher Philip Kitcher rightly points out: “Throughout history, 
allegations of deep differences in temperament and capacity [between races] … have 
done incalculable harm.”11 The possibility of there being meaningful differences 
between racial populations, beyond superficial features such as skin colour, is 
therefore strongly resisted by many egalitarian social theorists. 
Singer himself largely side-steps this incendiary subject, beyond briefly noting 
the human tendency towards in-group/out-group violence and the relative ease with 
which racial hatred can be stoked. Nevertheless, some of Singer’s analysis of apparent 
biological differences between men and women can readily (and worryingly) be 
applied to possible evolved differences between racial groups.  
For example, because Darwinian thinking, according to Singer, tells us “that 
we are too ready to assume that all human beings are the same in all important 
respects”,12 we may be wrong to “[a]ssume that all inequalities are due to 
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discrimination, prejudice, [or] oppression”.13 In Singer’s view, certain gender 
inequalities, such as the obvious dearth of women in positions of authority, could 
ultimately be due to biological differences between the sexes. The relevant point here, 
though, is that women are not the only group under-represented in high status roles; 
so too are many racial or ethnic minorities. (Similarly, many racial or ethnic 
minorities are over-represented in low status roles, or at the wrong end of social 
statistics for crime, health, education and the like.) Could Singer’s Darwinian 
thinking, therefore, lead to the analogous conclusion that this too is the result, not 
simply of discrimination, but of biological differences between members of different 
races? 
This chapter examines this deepest, and most controversial, level of worst case 
scenarios for the left: the possibility that divergent human evolution may be a factor 
in modern ‘racial’ inequality. And because this is such an explosive topic, 
I will immediately lay out my position. From a Darwinian perspective, human 
populations may differ to a greater extent than most egalitarians might hope. My 
position is not that there necessarily are substantive racial differences, but that we 
cannot simply deny this possibility because it conflicts with our political beliefs or 
hopes. Even if it turns out that racial populations do differ more than commonly 
assumed, this does not impact on our egalitarian ideals: the desire for equality does 
not depend on all people being the same in all important respects.  
Due to the controversial nature of this topic, however, I will develop my 
argument over three chapters. This chapter will address many of the background 
issues to an evolutionary view of racial diversity – for example, how terms such as 
‘race’ or ‘racism’ are defined, and how the biological aspects of race are treated in 
academic contexts. One problem I identify in this chapter is how the term ‘race’ is 
defined and used. Many widely held conceptions of race are premised on a belief in 
the superficiality of racial difference. I examine two such conceptions – that race is 
solely a social construct and that race is simply ‘skin deep’ – and suggest that both 
fail to adequately account for possible divergent human evolution.  
Next, I examine various evolutionary arguments about race; those that defend 
the ‘skin deep’ position on racial diversity and those that, by contrast, imply that more 
substantive racial differences may have arisen over the course of human evolution.  
I further argue that the reluctance to accept the possibility of biological aspects 
of race is, in large part, ideologically motivated – part of a well-intentioned attempt to 
curtail possible racist misinterpretations of human diversity. I end the chapter by 
suggesting that the left’s present taboo on discussing this topic is counter-productive, 
and that egalitarians may effect more beneficial social change for marginalized groups 
through an open and honest approach to human evolution. In the next two chapters I 
then apply a Darwinian left perspective more closely to the question of racial 
inequality. My ultimate aim is to assess if and how how such a perspective might be 
politically and socially beneficial. 
To ground this chapter’s discussion in the real world, and to provide a case 
study relevant to later discussion, I will begin with an example of different peoples 
who have fared differently over the course of history, those with which this chapter 
began – Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand. In focusing on the health disparities 
between these different ‘racial’ groups, I will argue that confusion and uncertainty 
about possible biological/genetic aspects of group membership is detrimental to 
egalitarian attempts to improve people’s lives. 
 
≈ 
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The most obvious social inequality in New Zealand is that between Maori and non-
Maori. Mortality statistics provide grim and unequivocal witness to this fact: the 
average life expectancy of Maori, for instance, is nearly a decade less than that of 
non-Maori, while, in relative terms, the overall Maori mortality rate is twice that of 
the non-Maori population.
14
  
To get an idea of the extent of health disparities between different groups in 
New Zealand, consider the following from the chapter on ‘Mortality’ in Hauora: 
Maori Standards of Health IV: 
 
Cardiovascular disease death rates were 2.3 times higher for Maori than non-
Maori during 2000-2004. Cancer mortality rates were 77% higher and 
accidental deaths 94% more common. Deaths due to respiratory disease were 
2.6 times more frequent among Maori. The type 2 diabetes mortality rate was 
seven times the non-Maori rate. The age-sex-standardised rate of suicide was 
49% higher among Maori.
15
 
 
As can be seen in these appalling statistics, there is a vital need to identify and 
understand Maori health issues.
16
 In addition to the medical data, therefore, Hauora 
also examines the social, economic, environmental and political factors that influence 
health outcomes: income, employment, housing, education, social exclusion, and the 
deleterious effects of racial discrimination. These factors, moreover, are inter-related 
and often self-reinforcing: for example, institutionalised racism leading to poorer 
health provision and thus to poorer health, which then leads to reduced income and 
employment prospects, which exacerbates health problems, and so on. By tackling 
health disparities, therefore, many of the other negative social indicators are also 
likely to improve. 
Maori and non-Maori in New Zealand are obvious examples of Jared 
Diamond’s point that different peoples have fared differently over the course of 
history. But what exactly is meant by the term ‘people’ or ‘peoples’ – as, for example, 
when members of New Zealand’s Maori Party talk about ‘our people’? And how do 
‘peoples’ differ from folk concepts of ‘races’? On this particular issue – Hauora’s use 
and definition of the term race – there appears to be considerable confusion. Given 
that this is a publication specifically focusing on an identifiable racial population, it is 
therefore important to examine how this term is used.  
According to Hauora’s subsection on ‘Colonisation and health inequalities’, 
for instance, the concept of ‘race’ was central to colonial New Zealand’s “racist 
ideology” of white superiority, in which different peoples were placed in a simplistic 
biological hierarchy from less advanced to more advanced races – intellectually, 
socially, culturally and spiritually.  
 
This idea of a hierarchy of different ‘races’ has long been discredited, yet the 
term ‘race’ still has popular usage even today, with expressions like ‘raced-
based funding’. This return to discredited terminology suggests the 
foundations of white superiority are still alive and well in our country today.
17
  
 
Interestingly, this ‘discredited terminology’ is openly used by Maori health 
advocate Gwen Tepania-Palmer in Hauora’s own foreword: “There is no question 
that we [Maori] … are still confronting obstacles. Tobacco, alcohol and other drugs 
continue to impede the full development potential of our race.”18 Here, ‘race’ is used, 
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not as a sop to white superiority, but simply as a referent for the ‘group’, ‘population’ 
or ‘people’ identified as Maori. While this indicates that the term does not necessarily 
carry racist overtones, it is nevertheless often avoided because of its past associations 
with racist beliefs. Indeed, aside from its foreword, Hauora itself adopts expressions 
such as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic inequalities’ as alternatives to ‘race’ or ‘racial 
inequality’.  
As a biological concept (akin to ‘variety’ or ‘sub-species’), ‘race’ is no longer 
deemed appropriate when discussing human social groups, and synonyms such as 
‘people’, ‘population’ or ‘(ethnic) group’ are therefore are often used as a means to 
avoid any biological associations. At the same time, when race is deliberately used in 
contemporary discussion (for example, in reference to racism or racial 
discrimination), the term most often refers, not to human biology, but to the socio-
cultural determinants of group membership. For example, in discussing racial 
discrimination, Hauora notes “‘Race’ is not used as a biological construct reflecting 
innate differences but [as] a social construct that captures the impact of racism.”19  
In academia especially, a social constructivist perspective on race (that 
concepts of race, including racist beliefs, arise from prevailing social attitudes rather 
than from ‘biological’ differences between peoples) is widely held.20 If this is applied 
to a real world case, however, such as the health disparities affecting Maori, the result 
is inconsistency and confusion.  
‘Being Maori’, for example, is not just a social construct: ancestry is an 
integral part of Maori identity – the very idea of Maori as tangata whenua (‘People of 
the Land’) is premised on cultural and spiritual heritage and ancestral descent. In the 
case of Maori, therefore, as with other indigenous peoples, terminological 
equivocation (‘race’ versus ‘people’ or ‘ethnic group’, say), or the notion of race as 
solely a social construct, obscures the fact that group membership is also based on 
genealogy (and thus, that it has a ‘biological’ component). At the same time, 
biological/genetic factors, in addition to social issues such as poverty or 
discrimination, are themselves implicated in the obvious health disparities between 
different racial groups.
21
 
For example, consider Tepania-Palmer’s claim above that tobacco, alcohol 
and other drugs continue to impede the full potential of Maori (or of the Maori 
‘race’). A seemingly straightforward question here is whether there may be a genetic 
basis to the apparent difference in addictive behaviour between Maori and non-Maori, 
in addition to socio-cultural influences on tobacco, alcohol and drug use: that is, could 
a better understanding of the genetic aspects of addiction, and of how this impacts on 
Maori in particular, assist in addressing the wider health and social problems that this 
addiction causes?  
Thus, while social factors undoubtedly play a major role in health inequalities, 
we cannot simply ignore the possible role of genes in the disparate outcomes for 
different racial groups. This may seem an obvious point to make. Unfortunately, 
because of the confusion and uncertainty about exactly what is meant by ‘race’ (or by 
its more politically palatable synonyms), it is far from straightforward how we may 
best accommodate social and biological perspectives on group differences, especially 
given the appalling political history of the latter. 
Hauora’s discussion of Maori health disparities, therefore, illustrates the real 
world relevance of these issues. But before assessing the political implications of 
possible evolved differences between human populations or ‘races’, I need to be clear 
about how the term ‘race’ is used or defined in wider social science discourse. I have 
already touched upon the social constructivist analysis of race and indicated how this 
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fails to adequately account for the genealogical aspects of indigenous peoples’ 
identity (as well as for the obvious physical differences between racial populations in 
general).  
In the next section, therefore, I examine a more nuanced and detailed 
definition of race, one that exemplifies a standard social science belief that race is 
only ‘skin deep’ (in the analysis below, this is referred to as the ‘ordinary concept of 
race’). I will argue that, while this definition can usefully be applied to many widely 
held social beliefs about race, including racist behaviour, it fails to adequately 
accommodate evolutionary perspectives on the issue.  
I then turn to a number of arguments about the ‘biological reality’ of race, and 
indicate some of the deficiencies in accounts that, like the ‘skin deep’ or ordinary 
concept, emphasise the superficiality of biological differences between peoples. My 
aim is to demonstrate that, while the possibility of substantive racial differences may 
be unpalatable to many egalitarians, an evolutionary perspective on this issue cannot 
simply be dismissed or defined away. 
Importantly, and to reiterate a point made earlier, I do not here endorse a 
substantive account of evolved racial differences. Rather, I indicate that this is an 
open question. My point is, however, that by refusing to accept this possibility (and 
by defending the ‘skin deep’ position with inadequate or implausible arguments) 
egalitarians undermine their own credibility. 
 
≈ 
 
According to philosopher Michael Hardimon, the ‘ordinary concept of race’ has a 
logical core consisting of three basic theses – that of a group of human beings whose 
members (1) “are distinguished from other groups of humans beings by visible 
physical features of the relevant kind” (i.e., differences in skin colour or body shape); 
(2) “are linked by common ancestry”; and, (3) “originate from a distinctive 
geographic position”. As represented by this logical core, therefore, “race is a matter 
of skin color, shape, ancestry, and aboriginal habitat – and nothing more”.22 This then 
is the view of race as little more than ‘skin deep’. 
Hardimon argues that any such ordinary concept of race (which captures a 
real, though superficial, feature of empirical reality) provides an indispensible tool in 
the struggle against racism. That is, without a concept of race, we cannot analyse, and 
therefore address, racial discrimination. He emphasises this point to counter the 
eliminativist philosophical argument “that the concept of race ought to be ‘eliminated’ 
(withdrawn from use in theory and talk) on the grounds that it provides justification 
and support for racism”.23 
In Hardimon’s view, racism does not arise directly from the ordinary concept 
of race, but rather from the ‘racialist development’ of this concept – that is, from 
additional suppositions, such as the belief that the physical features of a racial group 
correlate with particular behavioural or cognitive traits, or that members of a 
particular race share ‘essential’ characteristics peculiar to that group alone. For 
example, the racialist development (or ‘racialism’) leads to the view that “[t]o be of a 
particular race is to have a particular set of moral, intellectual, and cultural aptitudes 
and tendencies. The racialist conception represents the visible physical features of 
race as reliable markers of important human differences”.24 
Hardimon argues that, by keeping the logical core of the ordinary concept of 
race distinct from the racialist development, we can perhaps retain the concept of race 
without sustaining racist thinking. Nevertheless, Hardimon also cautions that “it is 
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unrealistic to suppose that the word ‘race’ can ever be wholly liberated from its 
racialist overtones and connotations”.25  
This point is well taken. The hesitancy or reluctance to use the ‘discredited 
terminology’ of race evidenced by the likes of Diamond or by the contributors to 
Hauora is not without good cause. The very notion of race, as Hardimon earlier 
makes clear, means that “racism does have a toehold in reality. Human beings do 
differ in shape and color in ways that that are connected to ancestry and aboriginal 
habitat”.26 At the same time, however, without such a concept, it becomes difficult to 
even discuss racism and thereby effectively tackle it.
27
  
In relation to the earlier discussion of health disparities, therefore, Hardimon’s 
definition of the ordinary concept of race can usefully be applied to the social aspects 
of inter-group (or racial) inequality. For example, in analysing the inequality that 
arises from social factors – poverty, unemployment, lack of health provision, social 
exclusion, and so on – the ordinary concept of race can be used to ask why it is that 
distinct groups of people who differ in nothing but physical appearance, ancestry and 
origin can end up better or worse off relative to each other.
28
  
Moreover, Hardimon’s core definition of race reflects an apparent ‘consensus 
opinion’ amongst anthropologists and social theorists that, beyond noticeable physical 
characteristics, races are not biologically real.
29
 According to philosopher Ian 
Hacking, for example: “Superficial differences in races do exist in nature, and these 
are readily recognised. … Sensible naturalists stop there. The belief that racial 
differences are anything more than superficial is a repugnant error.”30 In a similar 
vein, Philip Kitcher notes: 
 
There are simple and powerful arguments against the biological reality of race. 
Although the phenotypic characteristics, the manifest features that have been 
traditionally been used to divide our species into races, are salient for us, they 
are superficial, indicating nothing about important differences in 
psychological traits or genetic conditions that constitute some racial essence.
31
  
 
And herein lies the problem if we apply a Darwinian perspective to the idea 
that human groups differ from each other merely in physical appearance, ancestry and 
aboriginal origin. That is, if the salient phenotypic characteristics of ‘race’ are 
themselves the result of biological evolution – as, for example, Hardimon suggests in 
claiming that “[a] racial group’s visible physical features are the product of its 
ancestors’ adaptation to the climate of its aboriginal habitat”32 – how has further 
evolutionary genetic divergence between groups (i.e., biological differences that are 
not merely ‘skin deep’) been prevented over the course of evolutionary time?  
In other words, there is a prima facie case for a more substantive view of 
evolved racial differences. For example, it is at least plausible that the different rates 
of disease among different human groups is to some extent based on deeper genetic 
differences – genetic differences that are themselves the result of divergent biological 
adaptation to different ancestral environments. (A textbook case is that of malarial 
resistance and sickle cell anaemia in certain West African populations.)  
Furthermore, it also appears plausible that non-adaptive or stochastic 
biological changes, such as genetic drift (in which particular genetic combinations 
may disappear from or become fixed within a population by chance) or founder 
effects (the loss of genetic variation that occurs when a population is ‘founded’ by a 
small number of individuals), could readily have occurred in some populations but not 
others during the course of human dispersal across the globe. It would therefore be 
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odd – i.e., in need of explanation – if these processes, which are well-documented in 
other widely dispersed species, did not occur within our particular species.
33
  
Human beings, moreover, are also able to consciously select ‘desirable’ traits 
in their sexual partners. As science journalist Nicholas Wade notes: “sexual selection, 
the partly capricious taste of men and women for partners of a certain type, as well as 
competition between men, may have been a strong selective force, and one that acted 
somewhat independently in each human population”.34 Thus, different physical and 
behavioural or cognitive characteristics and abilities may have been preferred in 
different human populations, potentially leading to further physical and psychological 
divergence between populations – especially as sexual selection provides a strong 
feedback mechanism that can bring about relatively rapid change.
35
 Sexual selection, 
natural selection and genetic drift are all mechanisms that could have propelled 
different human lineages on different biological trajectories. 
The type of detailed philosophical definition provided by the likes of 
Hardimon, therefore, fails to adequately explain why ‘biological’ processes have 
resulted in different physical characteristics but nothing else. In short: while it is 
perhaps repugnant (or at least deeply worrying to egalitarians) to believe that racial 
differences are anything more than superficial, a scientifically credible explanation is 
needed to explain why deeper biological divergence between human populations has 
not occurred.  
How, then, do social theorists such as Hardimon (or Kitcher or Hacking) 
explain away the possibility that racial differences might be more than skin deep, or 
the idea that human races might be biologically ‘real’? As will become apparent in the 
next section, many of those theorists wishing to deny the possibility of deeper 
biological differences between races present this in terms of essentialist beliefs. This, 
though, is a straw man argument: modern biological perspectives on racial diversity 
do not imply the existence of essential differences between peoples. Furthermore, 
many of the beliefs about the implications of substantive racial differences appear 
exaggerated. I argue that maintaining these implausible concepts of race is itself 
detrimental to the cause of greater racial equality. 
 
≈ 
 
As an example of an essentialist concept of race, consider the Concise Oxford 
Dictionary’s definition of racism: 
 
the belief that all members of each race possess characteristics or abilities 
specific to that race, esp. so as to distinguish it as inferior or superior to 
another race or races; prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed 
against someone of a different race based on such a belief. 
 
Here, racism is premised on a view of race in which particular 
characteristics are taken to be specific or essential to that race. Philip Kitcher, 
above, similarly alludes to an essentialist concept of race when he refers to 
“psychological traits or genetic conditions that constitute some racial essence”. 
In the same way, the racialist development of the ordinary concept of race, 
according to Hardimon, is also based on this sort of essentialist belief. Thus, in 
distinguishing between the ordinary concept of race (which is non-essential) and 
its essentialist racialist development, Hardimon argues:   
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[The ordinary concept’s] logical core does not hold that human beings are 
divided ‘by nature’ into a hierarchy of races. Nor does it hold that each race is 
characterised by a fixed set of fundamental, ‘heritable’, moral, intellectual, 
and cultural characteristics common and peculiar to it. Nor again does it hold 
that each race has an essence that explains why it has the visible physical 
features that it does, or why the two are correlated. It does not hold that each 
member of a race necessarily shares the ‘essential’ characteristics of his or her 
race. It does not – and this point should be underscored – require any intrinsic 
connection between skin color and humanly important traits such as 
intelligence or moral character.
36
  
 
It is important to emphasise the distinction that Hardimon draws here. On 
the one hand, there is the non-essential view of race as colour, shape, ancestry and 
aboriginal origin, and nothing else. On the other hand, there is the essentialist 
racialist view of a ‘natural’ “hierarchy of races”; of “fixed, fundamental and 
heritable” characteristics, that are “common and peculiar” to a particular race; of 
an essence shared by all members of that race; and, of an “intrinsic connection” 
between skin colour and intellectual or moral traits. 
Here, Hardimon quite justifiably rejects the widely held but erroneous 
belief that evolutionary biology supports the notion of racial essences. As he later 
argues: “There is no room in modern biology (in the modern conception of 
species) that species have distinct essences which distinguish them from other 
species. A fortiori there is no room in biology for essences at the infraspecific 
level” (i.e., at the level of ‘race’).37 Philosophers Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan 
Kaplan make the same point, that modern biology does not support an essentialist 
conception of ‘race’.38 
But then again, modern biological concepts such as species, sub-species, 
varieties and races are themselves non-essentialist – and as Pigliucci & Kaplan 
point out: “While it is valuable for biologists to note that the essentialist 
conception of human races has no support in biology … they should not fall into 
the trap of claiming that there is no systematic variation within human populations 
of interest to biology.”39 
In other words, human racial populations could vary meaningfully – say, at 
the genetic level – without such variation being a question of essences, or without 
implying that certain traits are “common and peculiar” to specific races and to 
those races alone. Hardimon therefore is correct that modern biology does not 
support an essentialist view of race; nevertheless, Hardimon (and many other 
theorists) is not correct to imply that the superficiality of race necessarily follows 
from a non-essentialist definition. There is not simply a mutually exclusive choice 
between a non-essential concept of race and an essentialist (racialist) concept. A 
non-essential but biologically real concept of race is also a possibility.  
The ‘non-essentialness’ of biological concepts of race is highlighted, for 
instance, in Pigliucci’s & Kaplan’s discussion of the way that particular traits may 
vary gradually across a species’ geographical range (or cline). Such clinal 
variation means that any given individual could display characteristics common to 
a number of different populations, and that distinguishing clear boundaries 
between groups is impossible. This is also the case with our globally dispersed 
species, H. sapiens. Nonetheless, despite the ‘fuzzy’ way in which populations 
merge into each other, widely separated populations (or racial groups) could still 
be meaningfully identified.
40
 Indeed, in Pigliucci & Kaplan’s view, many of the 
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arguments against biologically meaningful human races fail because they rely on 
concepts that are not actually presented by modern biological theory.
41
 
Philosopher Neven Sesardic makes a similar point about how those 
wishing to deny the biological reality of race often posit an inappropriate target for 
their arguments. For instance, Sesardic highlights one ‘straw-man’ position often 
articulated by those wishing to deny biological aspects of race: the belief, 
supposedly held by ‘racialists’, that criminality and skin colour are causally 
linked. He quotes Philip Kitcher’s argument against this belief, in which Kitcher 
suggests: “young men with dark skin are not more likely to commit crime because 
of the darkness of the skin or because the alleles that code for proteins that 
increase melanin concentrations in the skin have some psychological side effect, 
but because they are poor, undereducated, given fewer opportunities, and so on”. 
According to Sesardic, Kitcher is here presenting the “wildly implausible” 
hypothesis that criminal behaviour is caused by dark skin or increased melanin 
concentration – a hypothesis that is therefore easy to refute. “Needless to say,” 
Sesardic argues, “no scholar has ever defended such a silly explanation.”42 
(Michael Hardimon similarly implies that racialism entails this sort of 
‘wildly implausible’ belief: for instance,as quoted above,  when emphasizing that 
his non-essentialist ordinary concept of race “does not – and this point should be 
underscored – require any intrinsic connection between skin color and humanly 
important traits such as intelligence or moral character”.) 
Given the manner in which ‘skin deep’ concepts of race are defended by 
such inadequate arguments, Sesardic concludes his critical analysis of modern 
theories of race with the call to “abandon the mantra about the biological 
meaninglessness of race. Instead of wasting our time on ‘refuting’ straw-man 
positions dredged from a distant past or from fiction, we should deal with the 
strongest contemporary attempts to rehabilitate race that are scientifically 
respectable and genetically informed”.43 
Indeed, such is the inadequacy of standard arguments about the 
superficiality of race that Jared Diamond (one of the fiercest critics of any 
suggestion of ‘biological’ difference between racial groups) himself inadvertently 
endorses the strong possibility of evolved cognitive and behavioral differences 
between different peoples. 
For example, in Guns, Germs and Steel, Diamond argues that in densely 
populated European societies the major cause of mortality for millennia was endemic 
disease; thus, selective pressure would have focused forcefully on disease resistance. 
At the same time, however, evolutionary pressure on cognitive abilities would have 
been reduced as these societies’ sedentary lifestyles and greater political 
centralization reduced the impact of natural environmental hazards. In other words, 
according to Diamond, the social and environmental conditions in post-agricultural 
Europe would have selected strongly for disease resistance but not for intelligence. 
By contrast, in sparsely populated traditional societies elsewhere in the world, 
with mortality determined mainly by chronic tribal warfare, food procurement 
problems, accidents, and the like, selective pressure for greater intelligence would 
have remained constant. Overturning widespread beliefs about race and intelligence, 
therefore, Diamond concludes that “modern ‘Stone Age’ peoples [such as Australian 
Aborigines and New Guineans] are on the average probably more intelligent, not less 
intelligent, than industrialised peoples”.44  
Here, Diamond explicitly accepts that differences in the natural and 
cultural environments of different ‘racial’ groups (i.e., those of different ancestry 
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and aboriginal habitat) could have resulted in cognitive and behavioral differences 
that are more than skin deep. By doing so, however, Diamond merely presents a 
mirror image explanation for supposed racial differences in intelligence to those 
proffered by controversial ‘racial scientists’ such as Philippe Rushton and Richard 
Lynn,
45
 who both argue that the uniquely harsh environmental conditions in 
Eurasia selected for greater intelligence in those human populations that 
successfully expanded into that region. In Rushton’s and Lynn’s view, this helps 
explain the higher recorded IQ of modern Europeans and Asians relative to other 
racial groups.
46
 The point is, though, if Diamond’s arguments about selective 
pressures on intelligence deserve our consideration, why not those of Rushton or 
Lynn? 
Why, then, is there such confusion and contradiction here? How can there 
be, as Philip Kitcher indicates, “a widespread consensus amongst anthropologists 
that races are not ‘biologically real’”47 when such ‘reality’ seems so plausible 
from a Darwinian perspective? Indeed, the possibility of evolved racial differences 
is so plausible that an acclaimed scientist like Jared Diamond can inadvertently 
(but blatantly) contradict himself by decrying as racist any biological explanation 
for group differences, while at the same time endorsing such an explanation.  
There appears a clear political motive for Diamond’s inconsistency. On the 
one hand he wishes to counter widespread but ‘loathsome’ racist explanations for 
obvious group differences (such as those between European and Aboriginal 
Australians). On the other hand, he also wants to provide a positive evolutionary 
perspective on historically oppressed peoples – for example, by arguing that 
Australian Aborigines are very likely more intelligent than the later arriving 
Europeans, whose subsequent success was based on technological not cognitive 
advantage.  
But if Diamond’s thesis is potentially influenced by political 
considerations, could this also be the case elsewhere?
48
 In other words, could the 
apparent consensus on the superficiality of race be as much politically as 
scientifically motivated? 
This is a conclusion reached by several commentators on the race debate.
49
 
Anthropologist George Gill, for example, argues that those theorists who deny the 
existence of biological races are largely motivated by socio-political 
considerations rather than scientific ones:   
 
Their motivation (a positive one) is that they have come to believe that the 
race concept is socially dangerous. In other words, they have convinced 
themselves that race promotes racism. Therefore, they have pushed the 
politically correct agenda that human races are not biologically real, no 
matter what the evidence.
50
  
 
Indeed, according to Gill, while a majority of biological anthropologists 
accept the reality of the race, no introductory text to physical anthropology 
presents this perspective as a possibility. “In a case as flagrant as this,” Gill argues, 
“we are not dealing with science but rather with blatant, politically motivated 
censorship”.51 
Similarly, Pigliucci & Kaplan begin their discussion of race and human 
biology by noting: “It has become commonplace to claim that, insofar as ‘race’ is 
a biological concept, there are no human races. This claim, while widely defended, 
is misguided.”52 Pigliucci & Kaplan end their analysis by cautioning that “the 
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ambiguity surrounding definitions of ‘race’ and the politically charged atmosphere 
surrounding race in humans has hampered research into these areas, a situation 
from which neither biology nor social policy surely benefit”.53  
Philosopher Neven Sesardic is less circumspect. After noting the 
complaints of “many serious and responsible scientists” (such as Gill) that 
scientific opinions are misrepresented due to political correctness, Sesardic warns: 
“Given this smoke and mirror situation in the debate about such a politicized issue 
as race, where emotions run high and where huge dangers of a wrong step are 
obvious to everyone, do not take at face value what scientists merely say about 
these topics.”54 
Of course, even if standard arguments about the non-biological nature of 
race are based on a fallacious view of the alternative, this does not mean that 
human races are therefore biologically real. However, it does beg the question of 
why our species does not display the sort of ‘racial’ variation evident in other 
animal species.  
How, though, can non-scientists (e.g., political or social theorists) proceed 
if this is indeed the case – that is, if we cannot be certain of the ‘scientific’ or 
empirical facts underpinning the debate about race? One of the avenues open for 
the non-scientist has already been explored: assessing whether particular 
arguments about race are coherent or logically consistent. In the case of Michael 
Hardimon or Philip Kitcher, the arguments against the biological reality of race 
appear flawed, based on an implausible account of what a concept of biologically 
real races would imply. Jared Diamond, meanwhile, maintains a blatantly 
contradictory stance, one that appears motivated by (the well-intentioned) political 
desire to counter widely held racist beliefs. 
Another option open to the non-scientist is to explore ‘what follows if’ we 
adopt a particular position on race (e.g., what follows if we accept that races are to 
some extent ‘biologically real’?). Michael Hardimon, for instance, expresses a 
widely held view about the implications of a non-superficial concept of race when 
he argues that any such ‘racialism’ could provide a “rationale for racism, slavery, 
colonization, or genocide”. 
 
It [‘racialism’] motivates the step from (a) representing another group as 
racially different to (b) taking these differences to be humanly important, 
to (c) regarding the other group as inferior, and (d) making it the object of 
hatred and contempt, to (e) imposing upon it involuntary servitude or (f) 
colonial rule, or (g) attempting the liquidation of all its members – a 
sequence of steps historically all too familiar.”55  
 
Other theorists express similar opinions about what follows if racial 
differences turn out to be more than skin deep. Sociologist Ullica Segerstale, for 
example, records how one of the prominent early critics of E.O. Wilson’s socio-
biology, physicist Bob Lange, responded when asked what he would do if 
incontrovertible facts about racial differences really were to emerge. According to 
Segerstrale, “Lange … quite spontaneously answered my question as follows: 
‘Then I would evidently have to become a racist, because I would have to believe 
in the facts!’ But he went on to cheerfully add that, so far, there were no such 
facts!”56  
Yet is this indeed the case? Does racialism – or the belief that race may be 
something more than skin colour, shape, ancestry and aboriginal habitat – really 
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motivate the steps leading to racism and, ultimately, to genocide? And would 
incontrovertible evidence of racial difference really mean that we would inevitably 
become racists? An initial counter-question, one based on the fact/value 
distinction, would be: why should it? That is, as with the other aspects of human 
biological evolution addressed in this thesis, a Darwinian perspective on human 
populations can only provide factual information – in this case, for example, about 
the likely existence of evolved variation between groups. It tells us what the world 
is like, not how the world should be. 
Any facts about possible differences between human groups do not in 
themselves entail value judgments; in particular, the possibility of evolved 
differences does not directly motivate affective racist responses, such as 
antagonism or discrimination. Subjective racist beliefs do not arise from objective 
facts about human races; indeed, they are based on erroneous beliefs about 
essential and unchangeable differences between racial groups – beliefs that are 
themselves denied by modern biology. 
The apparent ideological motivation for dismissing biological aspects of race, 
while well-intentioned, is potentially counterproductive: for instance, if our anti-racist 
beliefs are tied to empirical claims about the nature of human biology, and these 
empirical claims are open to question, this could play into the hands of racist 
ideologues. Efforts to combat racism should not be determined by the facts of human 
biology, whatever they turn out to be.  
 
≈ 
 
Having criticized various philosophical arguments that reject the possibility of 
non-superficial racial differences, I now turn to modern evolutionary defences of 
the ‘consensus opinion’ that race is only skin deep. I argue that such biological 
views, like their philosophical counterparts, are open to question.  
Many modern ETOHN appear to implicitly or explicitly accept the widely 
held social science view that racial differences are superficial.
57
 For instance, 
Chris Stringer, one of the original proponents of the prevailing ‘Out of Africa’ 
theory of human origins, argues that racial differences are trivial, and that the 
timescale since our species’ exodus from Africa “is so brief that only slight 
differences, if any, in intellect and innate behaviour are likely to have evolved 
between modern human populations”.58  
This claim – that modern humans have not had enough ‘evolutionary time’ 
to diverge markedly from our common ancestral stock – is one of three common 
theoretical justifications for disregarding the biological significance of race. 
Another, first pointed out by biologist Richard Lewontin in the early 1970s, is that 
there is greater genetic diversity between individual members of the same race 
than between individual members of different races, and that the idea of 
genetically distinct races is thus meaningless.
59
 Similarly, as popular evolutionary 
writer Matt Ridley argues, “genetic differences between the average members of 
different races are actually tiny and mostly confined to a few genes that affect skin 
colour, physiognomy and physique”.60 
The third claim, advanced by evolutionary psychologists such as Leda 
Cosmides and John Tooby, is that because all human groups, despite differences 
in physical environment, have faced similar cognitive challenges throughout the 
vast majority of our species’ existence (e.g., selecting mates, acquiring status, 
forming coalitions and the like), significant psychological differences between 
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races are unlikely to have arisen.
61
 Evolutionary psychology, therefore, assumes 
the ‘psychic unity of humankind’. 
Thus, despite widespread disagreement elsewhere (e.g., over the 
applicability of evolutionary reasoning to human psychology, or about evolved 
differences between the sexes), many evolutionists share the opinion expressed by 
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould: “There’s been no biological change in humans 
in 40,000 or 50,000 years. Everything we call culture and civilization we’ve built 
with the same body and brain.”62 Jared Diamond’s acclaimed Guns, Germs and 
Steel thesis, for instance, is based firmly on this belief, with Diamond tracing the 
unequal course of human history to the cultural changes between otherwise near-
identical human populations subsequent to the advent of agriculture.  
But as argued earlier, such a stance appears as much politically motivated as 
biologically justified – as, for example, with Diamond’s contradictory arguments 
about the likelihood of ‘biological’ differences between long-separated human 
groups. Indeed, Diamond’s plausible-seeming evolutionary argument for differences 
in intelligence between members of hunter-gatherer groups in Australasia and 
members of long-settled agricultural societies in Eurasia indicates only one of a 
number of theoretical flaws in the standard arguments that human beings have 
remained fairly much the same over the course of our species’ existence, despite the 
separation of populations for tens of millennia.  
For instance, we could similarly question the claim that the evolutionary 
timescale since our African exodus is too short to have resulted in meaningful 
evolutionary divergence between different populations. Genetic changes in response 
to farming, or to the prevalence of malaria and other diseases, all occurred in some 
human populations, but not others, within the last several millennia alone (with most 
being a result of changing cultural practices).
63
 Lactose tolerance – the ability to 
digest milk in adulthood – is a straightforward example of such recent genetic 
divergence. This ability, the result of a minor change in a single gene, arose perhaps 
5,000 years ago in cattle-rearing societies in Europe (and later, and independently, in 
Africa), and allowed these peoples access to a rich energy source, animal milk, that 
elsewhere makes the majority of human adults ill. 
Moreover, the evolutionary history of lactose tolerance (to give one clear 
example) provides a challenge to several other common assumptions about human 
biological evolution; for instance, that such evolution largely ceased once complex 
cultural behaviour had arisen, or that limited genetic variation between human 
populations means that minor genetic differences are unimportant. Lactose tolerance, 
by contrast, is (in evolutionary terms) recent; it arose because of, not despite, cultural 
practices; and it is a slight genetic variation that carries great potential significance – 
that is, lactose tolerant peoples can exploit an energy resource unavailable to non-
lactose tolerant peoples, even if the latter adopt similar cultural practices.
64
 Analogous 
conclusions could be drawn from the evolutionary history of genetic changes in 
response to malaria and other diseases. 
Such reasoning also raises questions about the standard argument that there is 
more genetic variation within a race than there is between one race and another. What 
does this actually mean? Chris Stringer, for instance, points out that members of 
widely separated human populations (say, Eskimos and Australian Aborigines) are 
more genetically alike than are members of separate gorillas populations in the same 
African forest.
65
 Our other primate relatives, the chimpanzees and the orang-utans, 
display similarly wide genetic diversity, despite close geographic proximity; human 
beings, therefore, are the odd primate out in being widely dispersed yet genetically 
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highly homogenous. Stringer uses this genetic fact as an argument for the 
superficiality of human racial differences. 
Yet degree of genetic heterogeneity or homogeneity is not necessary the 
significant issue – rather, it is the effect that the genetic differences have at the 
phenotypic level that is important. After all, despite a high degree of genetic 
difference, gorillas sharing the same forest are still phenotypically very similar.
66
 
Conversely, while there may indeed be only slight genetic differences between 
Eskimos and Aborigines, say, these relatively minor differences may be of great 
consequence in the different physical and social environments in which these people 
live. As philosophers Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan point out in their 
discussion of the relative lack of genetic variation in Homo sapiens (and the political 
arguments that are based on this fact): “The question is not whether there are 
significant levels of between-population variation overall, but whether there is 
variation in genes associated with significant adaptive differences between 
populations”.67  
Obviously, deciding the exact details and consequences of any such genetic 
variation is a task for evolutionary biologists, not social theorists (although see 
Sesardic, 2010 for a detailed statistical critique of Lewontin’s argument about intra- 
and inter-group genetic differences). The point, though, is that the standard 
evolutionary dismissal of the significance of human biological diversity, like the 
related social science rejection of the idea of non-superficial human differences, is in 
many respects inconsistent or unconvincing, and it is at least theoretically plausible 
that humans do in fact differ more than usually believed.  
This is the very conclusion reached by evolutionists Gregory Cochrane and 
Henry Harpending in The 10,000 Year Explosion: How civilisation accelerated 
human evolution. As their book title suggests, Cochrane & Harpending reject the 
‘conventional wisdom’ that human evolution somehow stopped after our species 
dispersed from Africa, and they instead argue that it has actually accelerated, 
especially in the last 10,000 or so years (i.e., as a consequence of the advent of 
agriculture). The type of hard evidence they provide to support this argument is that 
discussed above – i.e., the genetic changes, such as lactose tolerance and disease 
resistance, that are known to have arisen recently as the result of cultural processes in 
some populations but not others.  
Moreover, Cochrane & Harpending argue that the different cultural 
environments of different human groups would also have brought about changes in 
cognitive and behavioural traits. For example, they suggest that the different pressures 
of life in more densely populated agricultural societies, compared to traditional 
hunter-gatherer societies, would have selected for more docile or submissive human 
psychologies, analogous to the process by which previously wild animal species were 
domesticated. In other words, agriculturalists were perhaps ‘tamed’ by the selective 
pressures of their new cultural environment – or, as Cochrane & Harpending more 
evocatively describe it: “If your ancestors were farmers for a long time, you’re 
descended from people who decided it was better to live on their knees than to die on 
their feet.”68 
Cochrane & Harpending’s speculation here appears no less plausible (or 
implausible) than that proffered by Jared Diamond on the adaptive pressures for 
greater intelligence in hunter-gatherer societies versus disease resistance in 
agriculturalist ones. Yet there appears little to prevent this reasoning being applied to 
the ultimate historical causes of social differences between populations today – that is, 
to provide evolutionary biological explanations for some of the obvious social 
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inequalities in the modern world. Indeed, this is the very direction that Cochrane & 
Harpending head when they suggest that, because the evolutionary response to 
agriculture “affected the distribution of cognitive and personality traits”, these 
changes likely “played a crucial role in the development of civilization and the birth 
of the scientific and industrial revolutions”.69 
Cochrane & Harpending do not shy away from an obvious implication of 
this line of argument: that by overlooking possible evolved psychological 
differences between peoples, current social policies aimed at reducing inter-group 
disparities may be less efficacious than often hoped: “If the root causes of [social] 
differences are biological changes affecting cognitive and personality traits, 
changes that are the product of natural selection acting over millennia, 
conventional solutions to the problem of slow modernization among peoples with 
shallow experience of farming are highly problematic”.70 
This kind of Darwinian reasoning, therefore, leads to a conclusion directly 
counter to the widely held egalitarian belief that racial inequalities are solely the 
result of unequal social environments; Cochrane & Harpending’s evolutionary 
argument, by contrast, implies that social inequalities may also be partly the result 
of genetic differences between peoples themselves.  
Darwinian reasoning about racial differences, then, can readily result in 
politically unpalatable conclusions, especially for political egalitarians. How, then, 
should Peter Singer’s posited Darwinian left proceed if accepting the fact of human 
evolution implies that some aspects racial inequality might be the result of biological 
differences between racial populations? 
Here, Steven Pinker makes an apposite point: “The fact that a hypothesis is 
politically uncomfortable does not mean that it is false, but it does mean that we 
should consider the evidence very carefully before concluding that it is true”.71 In 
respect of The 10,000 Year Explosion, for example, Pinker argues that, while 
Cochrane & Harpending speculate about recent evolved changes in psychological and 
behavioural traits, “none of the selected genes they describe has been implicated in 
behavior; all are restricted to digestion, disease resistance, and skin pigmentation”.72 
Thus, in contrast to Cochrane & Harpending’s evolutionary account of 
reduced aggression or ‘self-domestication’ in agricultural populations, Pinker 
concludes that while human predispositions towards violence and nonviolence may 
have been affected by recent biological evolution, at least in theory, as yet there is no 
firm evidence that this has occurred.
73
 Similar caveats could be raised against other 
aspects of Cochrane & Harpending’s thesis discussed above. 
Nevertheless, while hard evidence for meaningful cognitive or psychological 
differences between races may be lacking, the possibility of such differences is 
consistent with modern evolutionary theory. Indeed, in criticizing the political 
inferences that are often drawn from the lack of evidence of behavioral or cognitive 
differences between racial groups, Pigliucci & Kaplan argue that “it is intellectually 
dishonest to move from lack of evidence of such differences to claiming that there is 
evidence for an absence of such differences” – for example, to claim that because 
there is no undisputed evidence of psychological differences at present that such 
differences cannot therefore exist. According to Pigliucci & Kaplan, this is an 
argument often, but illegitimately, advanced by evolutionary scientists themselves.
74
  
This, though, is as far as I will take this line of argument. My aim has been to 
indicate grounds for questioning standard assumptions about race – or, rather, of the 
significance of genetic differences between racial populations (which do not 
necessarily overlap with folk conceptions of ‘race’).  
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≈ 
 
Historically, many of the more pernicious beliefs about race – including ideas 
about the deep ‘biological’ nature of racial differences – have been used to justify 
discrimination, segregation, oppression, slavery and genocide; thus, as Philip 
Kitcher emphasizes, such beliefs have caused incalculable harm. As a result of this 
appalling history, modern scholars are understandably wary about if and how the 
term ‘race’ should be employed in a human context, with some suggesting that 
any discussion of race should be eliminated entirely.
75
 Similarly, the biological 
aspects or connotations of race are often downplayed or denied.   
Given the highly politicized nature of the race debate, therefore, the 
scientific or empirical facts about race (as a biological phenomenon) are difficult 
to clearly discern, especially by non-scientists. The (albeit brief) assessment of 
various arguments above suggests that blanket denial of biological aspects of race 
is likely to be misplaced. Most especially, if we are to accept that human beings 
are evolved animals, and that over the course of our evolution our species has 
been subject to similar Darwinian processes experienced by other organisms, then 
some degree of racial divergence is only to be expected. 
Of course, an implicit assumption here is that a Darwinian perspective on 
racial difference should be adopted. In the next chapter I defend the belief that racial 
diversity warrants more open discussion by examining a counter proposal: the 
argument that, however well-intentioned our motivation for investigating human 
genetic diversity may be, this is likely to have wider negative social consequences – 
most especially, by reviving deleterious popular beliefs about racial differences.  
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There are certainly real genetic differences between human populations and the scientific study of these 
differences can help unravel the roots of disease, develop new medicines, unpick the details of deep 
human history; perhaps even eventually even tell us something about the nature of intelligence. Such 
genetic differences are, however, not the same as racial differences.  
Kenan Malik, Strange Fruit 
 
 
Chapter 10: Researching ‘Race’ – Beyond the Pale? 
 
In his 2007 memoir, Avoid Boring People, molecular biologist and co-discoverer 
of the structure of DNA James Watson argued:  
 
There is no firm reason to anticipate that the intellectual capacities of 
people geographically separated in their evolution should prove to have 
evolved identically. Our wanting to reserve equal powers of reason as 
some universal heritage of humanity will not be enough to make it so.
1
  
 
As Watson implies, many egalitarians would be uncomfortable with the 
idea of evolved cognitive differences between racial groups; nevertheless, his 
reference to our ‘wants’ not being enough to alter biological facts is a clear 
example of the fact/value distinction of most concern to Peter Singer. Thus far, 
then, Watson’s claims about human difference, while perhaps unwelcome, could 
still be accommodated within Singer’s Darwinian left project: egalitarians should 
not let normative considerations blind them from at least considering this 
possibility. 
In promoting his memoir, however, Watson expanded on the likelihood of 
psychological variation between races by suggesting, in a now-notorious 
newspaper interview,
2
 that possible evolved cognitive differences might also 
explain some of the social problems faced by those of black African descent. As 
science writer Keenan Malek puts it: “Watson translated the careful wording of 
the book into the language of the street. People expect everyone to be equal, he 
claimed, but ‘people who have to deal with black employees find this is not so’”.3 
In the same interview, Watson concluded: “I am inherently gloomy about the 
prospect of Africa … All our social policies are based on the fact that their 
intelligence is the same as ours – whereas all the testing says not really.”  
Here, Watson – a towering figure in modern genetic science – implies that 
some races are less intelligent, and less capable, than other races. Moreover, he 
supports this argument with reference to the likely divergent evolution of different 
human groups (and in doing so, neatly illustrates why many social theorists are 
reluctant to engage with human evolutionary theory).  
The problem (for evolutionary-informed egalitarians) is that Watson’s 
claims might seem to have at least a sheen of plausibility – for, if evolved racial 
differences really do exist, this might appear to make sense of some of the obvious 
social and economic disparities between races. Nor is Watson alone in coming to 
this conclusion through evolutionary reasoning; behavioural geneticist Philippe 
Rushton, in his controversial Race, Evolution, and Behaviour, similarly links 
supposed differences in intelligence between races with differences in the social 
well-being of members of these racial groups.
4
 
Writing in 1995, science writer Marek Kohn notes how research into the 
biological basis of race has “the embarrassing capacity to demonstrate just how 
readily modern evolutionary ideas lend themselves to racialization”.5 A decade or 
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so later, Watson’s off-the-cuff musings bear out Kohn’s point.  
In chapter 9, I pointed out how the fact of divergent human evolution does 
suggest the possible existence of meaningful racial differences (or, at least, does not 
deny this possibility). However, it does not follow that this possibility should 
therefore be acknowledged or explored. As the Watson example illustrates, 
evolutionary reasoning has the potential to cause real social harm: in this case, the 
possibility that racist ideologues could co-opt the prestige of science (and of James 
Watson) to bolster their political arguments – say, about the detrimental social 
consequences of immigration or of the inevitability of racial inequality. 
In this chapter, therefore, I examine the possible wider consequences of 
research into racial differences. Evolutionary-informed egalitarians have a choice 
between endorsing scientific research into this area or of opposing such research. One 
motivation for the first course of action is the hope of gaining a deeper understanding 
of, say, possible evolved differences into susceptibility to disease, and of means to 
combat their deleterious social effects (e.g., health disparities). The justification for 
resisting such research is that it has the potential to revitalize socially harmful 
practices and beliefs, regardless of how well-intentioned the researchers themselves 
may be. 
I begin with a consequentialist approach to research into human diversity by 
asking, irrespective of the facts (or possible facts) of human genetic diversity, whether 
egalitarian aspirations for a racial equality would be more readily realized by 
accepting evolutionary biological perspectives on ‘race’ or by rejecting them. I will 
examine two extreme positions on this issue: the idea that scientific research (or the 
search for ‘truth’), such as that into human diversity, should be pursued no matter 
what the social consequences; and the opposing view that, in the case of our own 
species, we might be better off curtailing (or even abandoning) certain areas of 
evolutionary genetic research. The recent Maori ‘warrior gene’ controversy is used as 
an example of the costs and benefits of genetic research focused on distinct racial 
populations. 
I end up advocating a pragmatic approach to research into human genetic 
diversity – essentially, that egalitarians should be open to the possibility of evolved 
racial differences, while being fully aware of both the potential costs and benefits of 
genetic research that touches upon the question of race. The pragmatic task is to steer 
and open an honest course away from the possible deleterious consequences of such 
research and towards that which will provide genuine benefits to otherwise oppressed 
or marginalized people. The chapter concludes with a real world case study of how 
such pragmatism may work in practice. 
  
≈ 
 
Evolutionary psychologist Satoshi Kanazawa, whose own research into racial 
differences has provoked strong censure,
6
 is forthright in arguing that scientists 
should ignore political misgivings about ETOHN: “Truth is the only criterion that 
should matter or be applied in evaluating scientific theories or conclusions. They 
cannot be ‘racist’, ‘sexist’, ‘reactionary’, ‘offensive’ or any other adjective. Even if 
they are labelled so, it does not matter.”7 
According to Kanazawa, applying scientific knowledge in an attempt to 
improve human lives is a job for politicians, doctors and policy-makers, not for 
research scientists themselves. Nevertheless, he goes on to argue: 
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Any successful intervention … must be based on the true understanding of 
nature. If social engineers do not know the causes of what they are trying to 
create or eliminate, how can they possibly hope to do so? By opposing and 
entirely disregarding certain scientific theories and conclusions a priori on 
ideological and political grounds, because they believe they should not be true, 
they risk not achieving their aim of helping people.
8
 
 
Initially, this argument appears compatible with that of Peter Singer: that the 
left must base its policies on what is the case with human beings, not on what they 
might wish ought to be the case (in other words, that egalitarians must maintain the 
distinction between biological facts and political values).  
Yet, most especially in the case of race, is this not a naïve stance? After all, 
Darwinism’s own dark history reveals how easily scientific facts (or supposed facts) 
can be misinterpreted and misapplied. If nothing else, the appalling historical 
examples of Nazi racial science should make us pause before accepting Kanazawa’s 
blunt opinion that “Nothing else should matter in science except the objective, 
dispassionate pursuit of truth, and [that] scientists must pursue it no matter the 
consequences”.9 
Philosopher Philip Kitcher presents a more nuanced appreciation of the 
possible social consequences of research into human genetic diversity. In Kitcher’s 
view, the difficulty with such biological projects “is that they appear to introduce a 
conceptual framework that can easily revive unjust and damaging social practices”10 – 
i.e., racist beliefs and attitudes. As regards the scientific pursuit of ‘truth’, no matter 
what the consequences, Kitcher goes on to argue: 
 
We would rightly worry about the continual deployment of a concept in 
fundamental physics, if thinking about nature in terms of these concepts could 
lead, relatively directly, to the discovery of principles about the release of 
energy that would make massively destructive bombs available to anyone. 
Similarly, if a concept, valuable to some investigators pursuing a particular 
research question, might cause, in the social world into which that concept is 
likely to make its way, considerable burdens for many people, then one ought 
at least raise the question of whether such research is warranted.
11
 
 
This raises a crucial dilemma for any Darwinian left attempt to apply 
evolutionary reasoning to racial inequality. On the one hand, the possibility of 
meaningful genetic differences between racial populations does not impact directly on 
the egalitarian political desire to address racial inequality, especially if a better 
understanding of these differences could be used to effect beneficial social change. 
On the other hand, and as graphically illustrated by the historical misuse of Darwinian 
ideas, biological concepts of race, when combined with pre-existing social prejudice, 
play into the hands of those promoting oppressive racist political practices. The 
potential benefits of an open and accurate account of human genetic diversity, 
therefore, might be outweighed by the detrimental consequences of reinforcing 
harmful social beliefs about deep or ineluctable divisions between races.  
Such are the problems associated with the biological concept of race, Kitcher 
argues, “it might be reasonable to suggest that, when all the consequences of using 
that notion are taken into account, we would be better off to give up on particular 
lines of research”.12 For instance, while a biological notion of race (say, of genetic 
‘clusters’ identifying distinct human populations) might be useful in enquiries into our 
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species’ prehistoric patterns of migration, the simple desire to better understand this 
aspect of human history must be weighed against the possible social harm that the 
‘race’ concept carries with it. Here, Kitcher points to the potential for 
misunderstanding when discussion of genetic diversity enters the public domain, 
especially given “the pressure on scientific journalism, even in the most apparently 
respectable media, to sensationalize recent findings”.13 
The recent Maori ‘warrior gene’ controversy, centred on apparent genetic 
differences between racial populations in New Zealand, provides a contemporary 
example of the issues at stake here – that is, of the potential social costs and the 
potential social benefits of such research. I will use this as a real world case study to 
which the more abstract philosophical discussion can then be applied. 
 
≈ 
 
To provide a brief background: in mid-2006 (and again in 2009) popular media 
sources in New Zealand and Australia reported a scientific claim that Maori carry a 
‘warrior gene’, making them prone to violence, criminality and risky behaviour.14 The 
basis of this story, reported under headings such as “Maori are genetically wired to 
commit acts of violence”,15 was an epidemiological study of monoamine oxidase 
(MAO) genes (those linked to various behavioural disorders, including depression, 
addiction and aggression). The study’s particular focus was on the gene sub-type, 
MAO-A, which had earlier been dubbed the ‘warrior gene’ due to its apparent 
association with aggressive behaviour in Rhesus macaque monkeys.
16
 
The medical basis for the New Zealand research, however, was not on 
aggressive behaviour, but rather on the association between MAO-A and addiction; 
more especially, the relationship between racial variation in MAO-A frequency and 
differential patterns of alcohol and tobacco dependence. As genetic data indicated that 
the frequency of the relevant gene allele was almost twice as high amongst Maori as 
Pakeha males, the ultimate purpose of the research was to investigate whether genetic 
information on alcohol/tobacco dependence could be used in developing more 
appropriate treatments and better health outcomes for Maori (i.e., those statistically 
more prone to alcohol- or tobacco-related illnesses).  
Up to this point, the epidemiological rationale of this study illustrates the 
potential benefits of genetic investigation into differences between racial populations: 
that such research may have had positive health benefits for marginalised groups such 
as Maori. How, then, did this benign-seeming study result in such sensational news 
reports and headlines – reports, moreover, that could reinforce existing prejudiced 
beliefs about the causes of social inequality between Maori and non-Maori?  
In providing an evolutionary explanation for the apparent higher frequency of 
MAO-A in modern Maori, the lead researchers, epidemiologists Rod Lea and 
Geoffrey Chambers, developed a ‘warrior gene hypothesis’, speculating that the gene 
may have been positively selected during the ocean voyaging and inter-tribal wars 
that supposedly characterised ancestral Polynesian migrations across the Pacific, and 
during the Maori people’s own discovery and settlement of New Zealand. They 
supported this hypothesis by arguing that Maori martial prowess was historically 
well-recognised and that “reverence for the ‘warrior’ tradition remains a key part of 
Maori cultural structure today”.17 
In defending their hypothesis in print, Lea & Chambers denied that this 
provided a biological explanation for present-day social dysfunction in Maori 
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communities; nevertheless, Lea was less guarded in a media interview about the 
implications of the apparent prevalence of MAO-A in Maori: 
 
Obviously, this means they are going to be more aggressive and violent and 
more likely to get involved in risk-taking behaviour. … It is controversial 
because it has implications suggesting links with criminality among Maori 
people. I think there is a link. It definitely predisposes people to be more likely 
to be criminals and engage in that type of behaviour as they grow older.
18
  
 
Here, the explicit claim is that Maori are genetically and behaviourally 
different from other populations, and that they are inherently more aggressive than 
non-Maori. That such claims are apparently based on scientific evidence reflects 
Philip Kitcher’s concerns about the potential social costs of this sort of genetic 
research, especially when it is reported in the public domain. In this case, by 
reinforcing simplistic biological explanations for complex social issues – say, that 
Maori are inherently and ineluctably violent – political support for ameliorative social 
policies could be eroded. Why waste taxpayer dollars on problems that seemingly 
cannot be fixed? 
Nevertheless, a more constructive egalitarian argument could also be 
constructed from the genetic research into the Maori ‘warrior gene’ – or, at least, into 
the apparent prevalence of MAO-A in Maori males. As MAO-A is implicated in risk-
taking behaviour, it initially appears plausible that it was positively selected during 
the Polynesian expansion across the Pacific (e.g., with those spear-heading each new 
migration, such as that to New Zealand, likely less risk-averse than those choosing to 
stay behind). This could, conceivably, account for the gene’s apparent frequency 
among M ori. Importantly, however, in the relevant genetic studies upon which the 
‘warrior gene’ hypothesis was based, the highest frequencies of MAO-A were not 
found among M ori but, rather, among Chinese males.19 This could immediately cast 
doubt on any evolutionary speculation about how or why this gene varies between 
racial populations. 
Alternatively, one could speculate that, just as risk-taking traits may have 
proved advantageous in island-colonising ancestral Polynesian environments, so 
too may similar traits have been in the different environments faced by ancestral 
Chinese. In a modern context, certainly in New Zealand, risk-taking traits may 
continue to be advantageous in the commercial settings stereotypically associated 
with Chinese; in an economically-deprived environment, stereotypically 
associated with many Maori, these self-same characteristics may prove 
disadvantageous, especially if they are expressed in drug-taking, alcohol abuse or 
criminal behaviour. Given a different social environment, the ‘warrior gene’ might 
be better described as an ‘entrepreneurial gene’. 
At the same time, however, the ‘warrior gene’ case also illustrates the 
slippery slope nature of research into human biological diversity. For example, if 
we accept the potential benefits of genetic research into addictive behaviour, why 
not also investigate the possible genetic aspects of other behaviours, such as crime 
and violence, which also have a deleterious impact on many indigenous 
communities? Understanding the genetic basis of violence, say, and of how this 
impacts on certain racial populations in particular, may help us discover additional 
means to tackle this social issue, too. And why stop there? Research might be 
directed at uncovering the genetic basis (if any such exists) of criminal behaviour, 
or of the educational underachievement and greater family dysfunction often 
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reported in marginalised racial communities.  
Genetic enquiry might even focus on finding a ‘cure’ for these social 
problems.
20
 Expressed like this, egalitarians would quite rightly be concerned about 
the political implications of any such research. Furthermore, as a slippery slope 
argument, there seems no principled way of drawing a line between genetic 
investigation of some recorded differences between populations (e.g., in tobacco 
addiction) but not others (e.g., in crime rates). 
 
≈ 
 
With the ‘warrior gene’ controversy as a real-world example of the social and 
political pitfalls of purportedly objective genetic research, Kitcher’s caution (that 
scientists should at the very least consider the possible social costs of their research) 
appears reasonable.  
In respect of this type of human genetic research, therefore, Kitcher suggests 
that “we need a thorough survey that considers all the potential uses and abuses”.21 In 
contrast to Kanazawa’s belief that scientific truth must be pursued regardless of 
consequences, it appears prudent to first weigh up the possible social costs of a 
particular action before deciding whether to pursue it. Thus, from a consequentialist 
perspective, evolutionary-informed egalitarians could reject any scientific research 
likely to have a detrimental impact on attempts to bring about greater social equality.  
Nonetheless, the situation here is far from straightforward. How, for example, 
would the potential ‘uses and abuses’ or social costs/benefits of genetic research be 
assessed? To again use the ‘warrior gene’ case as illustration: an epidemiological 
study into the MAO-A30bp-rp variant, its associations with tobacco and alcohol 
dependence, and the variation in this gene allele’s frequency between different racial 
groups would probably excite little media or political controversy, while still 
providing useful information for diagnostic, preventative or treatment regimes for 
those whose health is affected by these substances. In terms of an initial cost/benefit 
analysis (or uses/abuses survey), the actual genetic research on tobacco/alcohol 
dependence among Maori would appear justified – i.e., as potentially beneficial to an 
otherwise marginalised group. Much of the furore surrounding the Lea & Chambers’ 
hypothesis, however, was due to the attention-grabbing term ‘warrior gene’ and the 
hyped media speculation on its relevance to contemporary social issues.  
How, then, might those conducting Kitcher’s proposed uses/abuses survey 
proceed if potentially beneficial genetic research was open to possible but not 
inevitable media misreporting or sensationalizing? Kitcher himself is quick to 
emphasise that his suggestion “is not a matter of censorship – the idea of a ‘thought 
police’ that supervises research and issues interdictions against some programs is 
obviously counterproductive (as well as being distasteful)”.22 But this simply begs the 
question of how ‘political’ scrutiny of human genetic research – that which assessed 
potential social or political costs and benefits – could be effectively carried out if not 
via some form of heavy-handed scientific censorship.  
Indeed, the present confusion and uncertainty about race, and the taboo-like 
nature of the topic, itself hinders research of potential benefit to marginalised peoples: 
for instance, given the potential for controversy, health researchers may avoid 
investigating the genetic basis of addiction and thus fail to develop more efficacious 
treatments for deleterious addictive behaviours.  
Kitcher himself arguably helps to maintain the taboo on open discussion of 
biological aspects of race by likening it to freely available information on ‘massively 
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destructive bombs’. By use of this analogy, Kitcher implies that, just as we cannot but 
be negatively affected by the detonation of a bomb (or by the threat of such a bomb), 
so too would we be negatively affected by widely disseminated genetic concepts of 
‘race’. Yet is this really the case? For instance, if evidence of meaningful genetic 
differences between racial populations were widely broadcast, would this unavoidably 
impact upon our political beliefs? Would such evidence inevitably lead to racism?  
Surely not: the egalitarian moral belief that people should be treated equally is 
not dependent on people actually being equal in all respects; regardless of the 
question of race, human individuals vary in all manner of important ways, but this 
does not deny the moral concept of equal treatment and respect. Thus, if it did turn 
out that racial populations differ in various meaningful ways, this would not in itself 
impact on our egalitarian beliefs (even though it might be highly relevant to our 
egalitarian practices – i.e., efforts to bring about greater equality of outcome).23 
In the opinion of a scientific purist like Kanazawa, the costs of taking political 
considerations into account are themselves likely to outweigh any benefits, especially 
if scientists “become tempted to shade the truth” or to self-censor potentially 
offensive findings: 
 
What if a scientific conclusion is offensive and true? What is a scientist to do 
then? Many scientific truths are highly offensive, but scientists must pursue 
them at any cost. … Academic freedom must be upheld, not because it is an 
inalienable, God-given right of all scientists, but because it is the best way to 
attain the truth. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.
24
 
 
Leftist political scientist James Flynn (discoverer of the eponymous ‘Flynn 
effect’ of rising IQ levels) similarly indicates the counter-productive nature of 
creating academic ‘no-go zones’. With respect to the controversial question of race 
and intelligence, Flynn argues that making it taboo to even discuss this issue does 
more that simply restrict freedom of debate and inquiry: “those who boycott debate 
forfeit a chance to persuade. They have put their money on indoctrination and 
intimidation. A good bet in the short run but over the long course that horse never 
wins”.25 
Without a scientifically accurate account of racial diversity, how are we to 
know what to believe? In addition, failing to address or to understand the evolutionary 
biological aspects of race leaves egalitarians unable or unprepared to challenge 
misinterpretations of genetic research, beyond refusal to engage in debate. How, 
therefore, are egalitarians to convincingly counter racist distortions of the concept of 
race? Human genetic research will continue to expand, and the views of the 
egalitarian left risk becoming sidelined unless egalitarians themselves adopt an open 
and honest approach to the subject. 
Given the odious history of Darwinian theories of race, Philip Kitcher is 
indeed warranted to suggest some form of cost/benefit (or use/abuse) analysis of 
proposed genetic research into racial differences. However, as part of any such 
analysis, the detrimental consequences of creating a taboo on discussion must also be 
taken into account – i.e., that making certain subjects off limits to debate may cause 
people to lose confidence in politically palatable accounts of racial inequality and of 
social policies aimed at ameliorating such inequality. This, in turn, risks playing into 
the hands of racist ideologues who may present themselves as simply telling the 
unpalatable ‘truth’ that others are too scared to discuss (a tactic adopted, for instance, 
by the anti-immigration European far right
26
). 
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At the same time, another obvious negative consequence of avoiding 
biological aspects of human diversity is that it could prevent a clearer understanding 
of the genetic basis of disease, and thus hamper research that could genuinely 
improve peoples’ lives. The epidemiological rationale of the MAO-A study of Maori 
is a case in point: that is, as an attempt to understand tobacco and alcohol addiction it 
could provide a better understanding of an issue that has a major deleterious impact 
on Maori communities. 
How, then, might an evolutionary-informed left steer a course between genetic 
research that may be of benefit to marginalized peoples, and the potential revival of 
social theories and attitudes that may have a deleterious impact on these peoples? My 
own answer to this question is a version of the pragmatism advocated by Philip 
Kitcher (albeit that Kitcher’s own pragmatism is aimed at circumscribing certain areas 
of human evolutionary genetic research). 
 
≈ 
 
Briefly, Kitcher suggests that while certain biological concepts, such as races or sub-
species (or even incipient species), may be useful in describing the non-human natural 
world, this may not be the case with our own species. In his view, in some 
circumstances it may be justified to treat human beings as separate from the rest of the 
living world. For instance, a pragmatic approach to human biology would allow us to 
question the applicability of standard biological descriptions to our own species; thus, 
as regards the question of ‘race’: 
 
[P]ragmatism renders suspect a crucial part of the argument for grounding 
races in biology. Once you move to pragmatism, you lose the general license 
to introduce a subdivision of Homo sapiens on the grounds that the principle 
of division accords with the intraspecific distinctions biologists make in other 
cases. The fact that it is useful for certain purposes … in a widespread species 
of oak to talk about local varieties, or local races, does not mean it will be 
useful to mark out similar divisions in the case of our species. Pragmatism 
insists that the usefulness be demonstrated in the particular case at hand.
27
  
 
Kitcher adopts such pragmatism largely for ‘negative’ purposes – i.e., to 
provide a bulwark against biological realism about the likely existence of human 
racial divisions, and thus prevent the reintroduction of socially harmful concepts of 
race.  
Here, however, I will argue that similar pragmatism could be used as a more 
‘positive’ analytical tool; that is, as a means for an evolutionary-informed left to 
accept the potential reality of distinct racial populations in certain circumstances or 
for certain purposes, while being ready to question the use of biological concepts in 
other situations.  
In effect, I am arguing for a change of focus from standard leftist perspectives 
on race. Instead of simply rejecting or avoiding biological aspects of race – an 
approach that, as argued at length above, has resulted in much confused and 
contradictory argument – evolutionary-informed egalitarians could instead begin by 
accepting, at least in principle, the possible existence of biologically-meaningful 
human races and therefore move beyond the left’s counter-productive unwillingness 
to openly address the issue. 
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The huge danger, as Kitcher quite rightly points out, is how biological 
concepts of race can so easily be twisted by racists. But egalitarians who are informed 
about evolutionary theory would be more able to challenge the spurious arguments of 
racists than those who avoid the issue, or who attempt to defend their position through 
intimidation. Just as a belief in equality is not denied by the possibility of difference, 
no more is racial hatred defensible by the possible existence of genetic differences 
between racial groups.  
Indeed, the more light that is shone upon obvious racial inequalities in social 
outcomes, the more we will come to understand how genetic influences are 
themselves dependent on environmental conditions – in which case, the moral 
imperative is to change these conditions. Given the political will, a more equitable 
society, and a decent standard of living for all, is achievable even if human groups 
indeed differ more than egalitarians have traditionally assumed.  
The Maori ‘warrior gene’ case can usefully illustrate what I mean by this 
(positive) pragmatism about human race. For instance, for the purposes of 
understanding the high incidence of alcohol and tobacco addiction amongst Maori, in 
which genetic factors are implicated, making some sort of biological racial division is 
useful – e.g., identifying relevant genetic differences, such as the prevalence of MAO-
A, between different racial populations. This would be similar to the way in which a 
sociological racial division is useful in identifying environmental influences on health 
disparities, such as differences in health provision, education, income, discrimination, 
and so on.  
However, in the particular case of MAO-A, a more detailed evolutionary 
explanation for genetic differences between racial groups is not obviously necessary. 
Indeed, as the sensationalised media headlines graphically illustrate, the pitfalls of 
speculating about the selection of ‘risk taking traits’ in an ancestral environment, 
outweigh the benefits of providing an evolutionary explanation for any racial 
variation in MAO-A. From a health perspective, the (apparent) fact that such genetic 
differences exist is the relevant issue.  
The guiding principle here would be that suggested by Kitcher above: that the 
usefulness of research (or speculation) be demonstrated in the particular case at hand. 
In the example of Maori and MAO-A, a pragmatic Darwinian left could accept an 
evolutionary biological race division as warranted, say, in identifying variation in 
gene prevalence for remedial medical purposes, but remain cautious about how 
further speculation on the evolutionary cause of this genetic variation may be 
perceived (or misperceived) by a more general audience. 
In some circumstances, of course, an evolutionary perspective may be 
illuminative. In the case of Maori and other Polynesians, for example, a fuller 
understanding of ancestral migrations across Asia and into the Pacific may provide 
important insights into contemporary Pacific peoples’ health and social well-being 
(such as a clearer understanding of the causes of rising diabetes rates among Pacific 
peoples). This rationale would, of course, apply to similar genetic research into 
human migration and human diversity in other regions of the world.
28
  
The positive pragmatic approach I am here advocating would also avoid the 
contradictions in Jared Diamond’s influential claim that differences in peoples’ 
environments, and not in peoples’ biology, provides the ultimate explanation for 
modern racial inequality.  
The very title of Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel indicates the important 
qualification to any exclusively environmentalist account of the history of human 
societies; that is, according to Diamond, not only did European explorers and empire-
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builders have certain technological advantages over the indigenous populations with 
whom they came into contact (with these advantages explicable in terms of 
environment), they also had a crucial biological one: resistance to germs. In other 
words, Europeans were genetically endowed with partial immunity to the endemic 
diseases that had swept the more densely populated Eurasian landmass for millennia, 
but for which peoples elsewhere in the world were evolutionarily unprepared.
29
 
Despite his claim that environment alone accounts for the different historical 
trajectories of different peoples, Diamond’s ultimate explanation for the emergence of 
a divided world of haves and have-nots explicitly invokes evolved biological 
differences between distinct peoples. What is more, this explanation is premised on 
Darwinian adaptive response to changes in the environment (e.g., the cultural shift to 
sedentary agricultural lifestyles); changes, moreover, that occurred relatively recently 
in evolutionary time. Diamond’s own Guns, Germs and Steel thesis, in other words, 
contradicts both his claim that any ‘biological’ explanation for inequality is racist, and 
that human beings have not diverged in any meaningful way since our species’ 
exodus from Africa.  
A pragmatic approach to the question of racial difference, by contrast, would 
avoid this inconsistency by acknowledging the possibility of some biological 
explanation for racial inequality (e.g., differences in disease resistance), and accepting 
the possibility of some meaningful divergence between populations over the course of 
our species’ history. The point, however, is that it is up to us how and where we apply 
possible evolutionary genetic explanations. 
For example, as pointed out in Chapter 9, New Zealand’s health statistics 
show appalling disparities between Maori and non-Maori in the incidence of disease, 
chronic ill-health and average life expectancy, with similar disparities recorded 
between indigenous and more recently-arrived populations in many other parts of the 
world. And while such health disparities have obvious social causes (stemming from 
post-colonial discrimination, oppression and marginalisation), genetic factors are also 
implicated. From an egalitarian political perspective, addressing these health 
disparities could have positive knock-on effects for other social inequalities, such as 
differences in income, employment, education and overall quality of life.  
To conclude this chapter, therefore, I will examine evolutionary-informed 
arguments about one particular disease – gout – that impacts particularly strongly on 
Maori (and other Pacific Islanders) in New Zealand, and use this as a case study of 
how the pragmatic approach advocated above may be put into effect. 
 
≈ 
 
Gout is a disease that causes painful swellings and joint movements, and which may 
develop into progressive joint destruction and disability. It occurs in 1-2% of 
Europeans, but is found in 15% of men in Maori and Pacific Island populations – the 
highest prevalence in the world.
30
 A clearer understanding of the genetic basis of 
gout, and thus of genetic differences between racial populations, is likely to have a 
major beneficial impact on the well-being of a sizable proportion of the Maori and 
Pacific Island community in New Zealand.  
Unlike the speculative evolutionary hypothesis to account for the prevalence 
of MAO-A in Maori males, the evolutionary genetic history of gout in modern Maori 
is based on firm scientific evidence. For instance, according to medical biochemists 
Tony Merriman and Nicola Dalbeth, evidence of gout has been found “in skeletons 
from the 3000-year old Polynesian Lapita culture in Vanuatu”, with the high 
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incidence of gout in modern Polynesian populations “likely to be caused by the 
founder events that occurred during the Polynesian settlement of the Pacific”.31 
Here, however, the most relevant aspect of gout’s evolutionary history is that, 
despite being found in ancestral Maori populations in the Pacific islands, and being 
prevalent in modern Maori populations, it was not recorded in pre-European Maori 
populations in New Zealand. How can this be the case?  
According to Merriman & Dalbeth: “Gout may have been rare in pre-
European Maori owing to a diet consisting largely of kaimoana (seafood), birds and 
tuberous vegetables.”32 This is highly significant: that is, it provides a dramatic 
example of the crucial influence of the environment on how and if genetic traits are 
expressed – in this case, that environmental conditions (i.e., diet) limited the 
expression of gout in pre-European Maori populations, despite a genetic 
predisposition for that disease. Furthermore, the subsequent re-emergence of gout 
demonstrates the same significant point about the role of the environment; as 
Merriman & Dalbeth argue: “The modern diet rich in processed sugar (and fructose) 
may impact severely on New Zealand Maori and Pacific Island people, who are 
genetically vulnerable to developing gout.”33 
Importantly, this finding can be incorporated into egalitarian political 
arguments. Gout is simply one of a number of diseases that has a detrimental impact 
on Maori communities in New Zealand, with the high incidence of gout in the Maori 
population the result of both environmental conditions and divergent human 
evolution. The point, however, is that while Maori and Pacific Islanders are 
genetically predisposed to gout, this does not mean that the disease is therefore 
inevitable (as the pre-European New Zealand situation demonstrates). Appropriate 
action to tackle gout, therefore, must take account of both environmental and genetic 
influences.  
The high incidence of gout (and of diabetes) in Maori and Pacific Island 
communities is directly related to the ready availability of cheap processed foods. 
And because Maori and Pacific Islanders are, on average, economically less well off 
than other New Zealanders, they are also more likely to consume such foods, or live 
in areas where this food is all that is available. In respect of a disease like gout, there 
is likely a negative feedback of poor diet contributing to ill-health and reduced 
income, leading back to poor diet. In addition, ill-health (such as disability brought 
about through gout or other diseases) contributes to other aspects of social inequality: 
unemployment, crime, child poverty and neglect, and so on – again with negative 
feedback effects. 
To the extent that poor health is a contributing factor to social dysfunction, 
therefore, and if changing the environment could alleviate poor health, then the 
standard egalitarian focus on changing the environment still applies. In the particular 
case of gout, genetic research could form the basis for a strong argument to regulate 
the sale of certain foodstuffs (e.g., sugary foods) or to counter the libertarian belief 
that free markets provide the best outcomes for consumers; in poorer communities, 
unregulated market forces provide cheap but unhealthy foods, and this exacerbates the 
poor social conditions in which people find themselves. Genetic research into racial 
differences in health outcomes, therefore, could help sustain the traditional leftist 
argument that if we want to improve people’s lives, we must change their 
environment. 
The point is that the social consequences of genetic traits are contingent on 
environment. As with the case of gout (or, indeed, the ‘warrior/entrepreneurial’ 
gene), a different environment would lead to different social outcomes. Thus, even 
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if some racial differences in behavioural traits exist, and even if these play some 
role in the negative social outcomes of groups such as Maori, our social and 
political goals would remain the same: improving these groups’ social and 
economic environment. 
At the very least, positive pragmatism would allow evolutionary-minded 
egalitarians to challenge the widespread belief (held by both the left and the right) 
that, if such differences exist, then social inequality is somehow inevitable. Such 
pragmatism, and especially a willingness to accept the possibility of evolved racial 
differences, appears a much better option than the current opposition and uncertainty 
about race and genetic research. 
Whether the ultimate causes of social inequality are solely environmental or, 
as seems increasingly likely, the result of genetic and environmental influences, the 
egalitarian goal of improving people’s (and peoples’) lives remains the same. Gout 
provides a particularly clear example of how evolutionary-informed research can be 
used as the basis for egalitarian political argument. In the next chapter, I examine 
whether a similar approach could be adopted with more contentious examples of 
possible behavioural and cognitive differences between races.  
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[H]ope and pride and not despair are the ultimate legacy of genetic diversity, because we are a single 
species, not two or more, one great breeding system through which genes flow and mix in each 
generation.                                                                     
Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature 
 
 
Chapter 11: A Pragmatic Approach to Genes & Environment  
 
An evolutionary-informed left would have to accept the theoretical possibility of 
physical and cognitive or behavioural differences between racial populations. An 
important pragmatic issue, however, is the wider social consequence of any 
evolutionary perspective on racial inequality. For instance, as Jared Diamond’s Guns, 
Germs and Steel thesis indicates, Darwinian reasoning has great explanatory force in 
accounting for differences in susceptibility to disease, with genetic research in this 
area likely to provide information of benefit to those seeking to address health 
disparities between different racial groups.  
At the same time, however, an evolutionary genetic perspective on race may 
result in socially divisive explanations for observed social inequalities between racial 
groups (e.g., in income, education, employment, and so on) – for example, as implied 
by James Watson and explicitly argued by ‘race theorist’ Philippe Rushton, that these 
obvious social disparities are the result of evolved differences in intelligence and 
behaviour.  
Nevertheless, a pragmatic Darwinian approach to racial differences in, say, 
educational achievement or crime rates or levels of employment need not lead directly 
to the sort of conclusions touted by Watson and Rushton. Rather, a more nuanced 
evolutionary account of racial differences could highlight the environmental factors 
(such as poor diet) likely to have a much wider and more deleterious impact on the 
social outcomes of marginalised groups.  
The prevalence of gout in Maori populations is a case in point. Evolutionary 
genetic research indicates not only why Maori are particularly prone to this disease, 
but also the crucial role of the environment (i.e., available food) in determining 
whether or not gout will arise. And gout is only one of a number of diseases that 
contributes to the poor health statistics of Maori – poor health that, in turn, 
exacerbates other negative social phenomena such as unemployment or educational 
underachievement. The point is that, if differences in Maori health are addressed (say, 
through informed evolutionary genetic research), this could have an ameliorative 
effect on other aspects of social inequality.  
Thus, the social environment in which possible genetic influences are 
expressed remains the crucial issue, and the egalitarian desire to improve people’s 
(and peoples’) social environments is potentially reinforced, rather than undermined, 
by the research into evolved genetic differences.  
In this chapter, I extend this line of argument and examine in more detail how 
a pragmatic Darwinian approach to possible racial differences may be useful to 
egalitarians in a wider social and political context. I use Philippe Rushton’s 
controversial biological account of racial differences as an initial starting point. In his 
Race, Evolution and Behavior, for example, Rushton attempts to explain present day 
racial inequalities as the result of evolved differences between separate human 
populations or ‘races’. Unfortunately, many egalitarians assume that Rushton’s 
repellent conclusions are all that could be drawn from an evolutionary approach to 
human diversity. This is not the case; indeed, Rushton’s arguments can themselves be 
challenged on evolutionary grounds. 
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I contrast Rushton’s analysis of the social consequences of supposed racial 
differences with a more nuanced evolutionary analysis, one that emphasises the 
effects of genes and environment on human behaviour. As part of this discussion, I 
argue that the genetic influences on behaviour that Rushton ascribes largely to racial 
differences are more appropriately explained as the result of gene-environment 
interaction.  
I then assess various other evolutionary approaches to social inequality and 
conclude that, if egalitarians continue to treat the subject as taboo, they are likely to 
overlook potentially important information about how to create a more equal society. 
Indeed, the preoccupation with race (by both ‘racial scientists’ such as Rushton and 
by anti-racist egalitarians such as Jared Diamond) may prevent us gaining a clearer 
understanding of likely universal evolved human behaviours. 
I begin by examining how a pragmatic Darwinian left might respond to Philip 
Rushton’s biological account of race – that is, to the sort of account that many leftists 
fear is an inevitable outcome of applying evolutionary reasoning to human beings. 
Here, I show that there is no need to reject an evolutionary perspective on our species 
in order to fend off the sort of argument presented by Rushton. 
 
≈ 
 
Briefly, in his Race, Evolution and Behavior, Rushton differentiates three major race 
categories, Negroids (blacks), Caucasoids (whites) and Mongoloids (East Asians), on 
the basis of supposed differences in brain size, intelligence, life expectancy, 
personality, social behaviour, and the like. To account for these apparent racial 
differences, Rushton posits an evolutionary story: essentially, that the ecological 
challenges faced in migrating across temperate Eurasia selected for the particular 
characteristics that now distinguish ‘Caucasoids’ and ‘Mongoloids’ from ‘Negroids’, 
whose ancestors remained in tropical or sub-tropical Africa. 
Rushton then applies this evolutionary account to the observed social 
inequalities between races today, arguing that differences in peoples’ cultural and 
economic surroundings are the result, not of prevailing environmental factors, but 
ultimately of evolved differences in racial genotypes. Rushton provocatively argues 
that “the two races most successful in building socially and economically developed 
niches in which to live and rear their children have been the Caucasoids and the 
Mongoloids”.1 Thus, in contrast to the orthodox environmentalist accounts of racial 
inequality, Rushton instead argues that it is evolved human biology that best explains 
the broad sweep of human history leading to today’s unequal human world. 
Leftist reactions to Rushton’s research have ranged from insults to 
intimidation, and even to the threat of criminal prosecution.
2
 How, though, might a 
more pragmatic Darwinian left respond to Rushton’s biological account of racial 
inequality? Mindful of the counter-productive nature of creating taboos, evolutionary-
informed egalitarians could begin, not with a moralistic condemnation of Rushton’s 
conclusions (which, after all, are based on evidence and argument that is open to 
scientific refutation), but rather by enquiring into the purpose and the possible wider 
political consequences of Rushton’s research. Indeed, in the preface to Race, 
Evolution, and Behavior, Rushton himself suggests that investigations of genetic 
variation between human groups, in addition to environmental studies, “offer 
numerous ways for intervention and the alleviation of suffering”.3  
Initially, therefore, Rushton’s research – however unpalatable his conclusions 
may be – appears congruent with Singer’s claim that political planners must begin 
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with a realistic appreciation of human evolution in their designs for a better future 
society. Indeed, like Singer, Rushton himself emphasises the fact/value distinction: 
“There are no necessary policies that flow from race research. The findings are 
compatible with a wide range of recommendations: from social segregation, through 
laissez-faire, to programs for the disadvantaged.”4 And while egalitarians would baulk 
at the very idea of ‘social segregation’ (i.e., apartheid), any such political suggestions 
would remain distinct from whatever the facts of human behaviour turn out to be. The 
point here is that potential racial differences do not alter our egalitarian political 
values; at the same time, an understanding of the nature of these differences, should 
they exist, could help facilitate egalitarian social change (e.g., improvements in 
health). 
Nevertheless, given the sort of provocative rhetoric quoted above, Rushton’s 
protestations of disinterested objectivity appear disingenuous; it is, for example, 
hardly surprising that, as a converse to leftist outrage at Rushton’s work, the extreme 
right have embraced his findings.
5
 Again, as with the James Watson and the Maori 
‘warrior gene’ controversies, it is not necessarily the evolutionary research itself that 
has potentially harmful social consequences, but rather the manner in which the 
research or speculation is presented. While Rushton is indeed correct that, in some 
circumstances, evolutionary genetic research into racial differences may offer means 
to alleviate suffering, the deliberately confrontational style that he adopts is both 
unnecessary and likely to reinforce deleterious social beliefs about race. (Similar 
conclusions could be reached about the ill-considered speculation provided by 
epidemiologist Rod Lea in the Maori ‘warrior gene’ case.) 
As an example of how an evolutionary-informed left could engage on 
scientific terms with the sort of politically problematic argument presented by the 
likes of Rushton, I will examine his race-based explanation for the well-documented 
correlations between birth rates and economic well-being (e.g., between high numbers 
of children and low levels of income, or between solo-motherhood and poverty). 
Here, my aim is to initially demonstrate why egalitarians have good grounds to be 
suspicious of biologically-based accounts of this aspect of human social behaviour 
before indicating how a more nuanced Darwinian account may actually complement 
standard environmentalist approaches to this issue. In particular, I emphasise how 
Rushton’s evolutionary account of supposed racial differences in behaviour overlooks 
crucial social and environmental factors, such as differences in access to resources 
and in political power.   
 
≈ 
 
According to Rushton, observed differences in sexual and reproductive behaviour 
between different racial populations are due, not to social or cultural conditions, but 
ultimately to evolved physiological and hormonal differences between races. For 
instance, to back up his claim that “Blacks are the most sexually active, have the most 
multiple births, and have the most permissive attitudes”,6 he provides the following 
statistics:  
 
In the US the average woman will have 14 descendants including children, 
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. An average African woman will have 
258. The African continent accounted for 9% of the world’s population in 
1950. Despite AIDS, warfare, disease, drought and famine, Africa has grown 
to 12% of the world’s population today.7 
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Rushton concludes that, because the stable conditions in America appear 
conducive to reproduction, and the unstable conditions in Africa do not, the fact that 
Africans (apparently) leave an order of magnitude more descendants than white 
Americans can only be the result of biological differences in sexual behaviour (e.g., in 
fecundity, sexual activity, promiscuity, etc.). Furthermore, Rushton identifies a 
similar racial difference in behaviour in the United States (pointing out, for instance, 
that the number of out-of-wedlock births in poorer black communities is three times 
higher than in more affluent white ones.
8
)  
Rushton then provides an evolutionary explanation for these apparent 
differences in sexual behaviour. Briefly, Rushton turns to evolutionary life-history 
theory, and to the two extremes of reproductive strategy evidenced in nature: either 
producing many off-spring, with minimal parental provision (known as the r-
strategy), or producing fewer off-spring, with greater parental provision of resources 
and care (the K-strategy).  
In typically provocative style, Rushton argues: “The r end of the scale means 
having more offspring, maturing earlier, having smaller brains and providing less 
parental care. The K end of the scale means having fewer offspring, maturing later, 
having larger brains, and providing more parental care”.9 Applying this r-K theory to 
human populations, Rushton suggests that blacks are r-strategists, Asians are K-
strategists, and whites somewhere in between. He bases this conclusion on evidence 
that people of sub-Saharan African descent mature and reach puberty more quickly 
than other racial groups, have intercourse and children at an earlier age and more 
often, have higher rates of child neglect, and have shorter life expectancies. 
The r-K theory, Rushton concludes, can help explain the observed contrast 
between high birth-rates in Africa and low birth-rates in Europe, or the similar 
contrast in birth-rates between black and white sub-populations in the United States. 
In Rushton’s view, therefore, the social and economic consequences of high-birth 
rates in black communities – poverty, overcrowding, poor health, neglect, and so on – 
are explicable in terms of evolved predispositions to behave in this way.  
Even without Rushton’s provocative use of language, therefore, leftists would 
be understandably concerned at such a deterministic interpretation of human 
reproductive behaviour – that is, the notion that the number of children that people in 
different racial groups have, and the level of parental care that they provide, is 
somehow dictated by their genes, rather than by their socio-economic or cultural 
circumstances, or by their individual choices. The widespread moralistic rejection of 
this sort of evolutionary genetic account of human reproductive behaviour is 
obviously understandable – as is moral and political concern about the sort of claims 
that Rushton makes: such evolutionary arguments could be used (by white 
supremacists, say) to sustain the harmful belief that racial inequality is inevitable or 
eradicable, or that it truly is ‘in our genes’.  
How, then, might an evolutionary-informed egalitarian respond to Rushton’s 
disturbing race-based claims about human reproduction and life history? For a start, 
an obvious counter-argument to Rushton’s hereditarian position, in which 
reproductive behaviour is seen as largely determined by genes, is the strong evidence 
of environmental (including cultural) influences on human childbearing practices. For 
instance, the belief that r- or K-strategies are genetically fixed is belied by the post-
industrial demographic transition – in which birth rates fall as economic affluence 
rises – which is far too rapid to support a genetic determinist account: as a recent 
example, South Korea’s dramatic change from high to low birth-rates occurred 
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largely within a single human generation (i.e., with no time for major genetic changes 
within the Korean population).  
Furthermore, as behavioural ecologist Sarah Hrdy argues (and in line with the 
theory of differential parental investment), it is more in males’ interests to have large 
numbers of offspring than females’; if given a choice, women everywhere opt to have 
fewer ‘high quality’ children, regardless of race.10 Rushton’s preoccupation with race 
overlooks this important (and much deeper and more universal) aspect of human 
reproduction – the disjunct between the optimal reproductive strategies of females and 
males.  
A more sophisticated evolutionary analysis of differences in reproductive 
behaviour between populations, therefore, would have to take account of the power 
dynamics between males and females. From this more nuanced perspective, different 
reproductive rates in different societies could be seen, at least in part, as a causal 
correlate of the different levels of political power that women have, irrespective of 
race: in more sexually equal societies, for instance, where women have more control 
over their reproductive behaviour, birth rates are likely to reflect the evolved female 
tendency towards fewer offspring; in more sexually unequal societies, by contrast, 
where men can more readily control women’s behaviour, birth rates are likely to 
reflect the evolved male tendency towards having more offspring.  
According to Hrdy, (and discussed earlier, in Chapter 8), while there are 
indeed evolved instincts regarding sexual behaviour and parenting, these instincts 
allow for a range of behaviours as a flexible response to environmental cues, 
including prevailing cultural attitudes (which in traditional societies, where men 
remain politically dominant, are more likely to reflect the interests of males). Thus, 
while the kind of evolutionary argument promoted by Rushton emphasises relative 
fixity of behaviour, that presented by the likes of Hrdy highlights the malleability of 
evolved behaviours, depending on socio-cultural conditions. Similarly, where 
Rushton focuses on supposed racial differences to explain disparities in birth rates, a 
more nuanced evolutionary account would also highlight cultural beliefs and attitudes 
(albeit that these, too, could be influenced by evolved psychological predispositions). 
In respect of the prevailing socio-cultural environment, Darwinian pragmatists 
could also present a much more balanced account of human life-history theory than 
that presented by Rushton – a nuanced account, moreover, that could perhaps help 
ameliorate (rather than exacerbate) racial inequality.  
For instance, the r-K theory upon which Rushton bases much of his argument 
is an aspect of the wider evolutionary principle of optimality – the idea that natural 
selection will opt for an optimal or ‘best fit’ solution to the conflicting and 
irreconcilable demands placed on organisms to survive, to grow and develop, and to 
reproduce within a given environment. In effect, because evolution’s ultimate 
selective criteria is behaviour that best ensures future descendants (rather than 
behaviour that best ensures the well-being of an individual organism), a trade-off 
must be made in the allocation of currently available resources. Would these 
resources be better devoted to survival (i.e., living longer)? Or to further growth and 
development? Or to speedy reproduction (i.e., having offspring)?  
The principle of optimality, therefore, encompasses r-K theory: in adverse 
conditions, for instance, in which the prospects of individuals’ long-term survival or 
development are limited, the optimal behaviour may be to rapidly reproduce (i.e., to 
ensure that at least some descendants continue into the next generation); conversely, 
in favourable conditions, in which survival and development are more assured, 
delaying or limiting reproduction could instead be the optimal behavioural strategy 
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(e.g., by investing more care in fewer offspring, who in turn will have a higher 
potential for future reproduction).  
If applied to human beings, therefore, and in contrast to Rushton’s emphasis 
on supposed racial differences in r-like or K-like behaviour, observed variation in 
human rates of reproduction (e.g., having large numbers of low quality off-spring or 
having small numbers of high quality off-spring) could be seen as contingent 
responses to environmental conditions, which include people’s socio-economic 
circumstances. 
Indeed, a more nuanced approach to optimality theory, in which 
environmental influences are emphasised, may provide a more balanced and more 
revealing evolutionary account of social inequality than that provided by the likes of 
Rushton. For instance, contra Rushton’s argument that ‘race’ determines whether an 
r- or K-strategy is followed, epidemiologists James Chisholm and Victoria Burbank 
instead apply evolutionary reasoning to highlight the important role that 
environmental conditions have on universal human behaviour. They argue: 
 
In risky or uncertain environments … parents often lack the capability – the 
material or social capital – to make much difference in offspring reproductive 
value (health, nutrition, safety, education, etc.) Throughout evolution the 
optimal reproductive strategy under such conditions would generally have 
been the short-term strategy of maximizing current reproduction, for by 
maximizing the probability of having some offspring who survived and 
reproduced, organisms minimized the probability of lineage extinction.
11
 
 
Chisholm & Burbank go on to indicate some of the political implications of 
this sort of evolutionary account of human behaviour – for example, that “contrary to 
a great deal of popular wisdom, under risky and uncertain conditions producing 
offspring at an early age and/or a high rate, and investing minimally in each one, can 
be the optimal reproductive strategy”.12 Importantly, they also indicate some of the 
social consequences of these evolved human tendencies and, especially, of the 
deleterious impact such behaviour may have on the poor (i.e., those most of concern 
to egalitarians): that the cost of adopting the optimal reproductive strategy in an 
insecure environment “may be shocking ill health and shortened lives, for both 
parents and offspring”. 
 
[If people] find themselves in risky and uncertain environments that threaten 
their capacity to continue – to leave any descendants at all – we should not be 
surprised to find that their limited resources are not always allocated to 
improving their health, wealth, happiness, lifespan, vigour and so forth, or 
even that of their children. … [W]hen people lack the material or social capital 
to limit risk and uncertainty or to make a difference in their children's 
reproductive value, their optimal reproductive strategy will often be to 
maximize current reproduction – even at the cost of ill health, despair and 
shortened lives.
13
 
 
In contrast to Rushton’s genetic determinist interpretation of biological life-
history theory, therefore, a more sophisticated analysis would suggest that possible 
evolved influences on human behaviour are themselves contingent on environmental 
cues. Furthermore, many of the features that Rushton attributes solely to genetic 
differences between races – earlier maturity, puberty, intercourse and pregnancy, or 
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shortened life expectancy – could instead be attributed to universal human responses 
to prevailing conditions.
14
  
In the same way, an environmentally-sensitive Darwinian perspective on 
human sexual behaviour seems better able to account for the change from an r- to a 
K- reproductive strategy during the demographic transition. For example, in the 19th 
century industrial cities described in Friedrich Engels’ The condition of the working 
class in England, birth rates were high and life expectancy low; optimality theory 
helps explain why this r-type reproductive strategy moved towards a K-strategy as 
urban conditions improved (as, indeed, it did in other developed countries 
worldwide), and how this change could occur over a timescale that, in evolutionary 
terms, is instantaneous. Furthermore, as with the similar transition witnessed more 
recently in South Korea, this change in reproductive behaviour occurred within a 
racially-homogenous population – further undermining Rushton’s claim that 
biological race is the main determinant of human reproductive behaviour. 
The typical leftist distrust of evolutionary biological approaches to inequality, 
therefore, could be focussing on the wrong issue. That is, because much inequality 
overlaps with folk racial categories (e.g., ‘black’ or ‘white’), leftists may assume that 
evolutionary genetic analysis will result only in the unwelcome conclusion that 
inequalities are biologically fixed – hence the desire to curtail such genetic analysis. 
However, a more complete evolutionary perspective, such as that presented by 
Chisholm & Burbank, suggests that ‘race’ is a red herring, and that it is the poor 
environments in which marginalised peoples find themselves that is a major cause of 
on-going poverty and inequality – a conclusion that matches the traditional leftist 
argument that environment matters.  
In short, by dismissing all evolutionary accounts of human behaviour, leftists 
may also be ignoring strong evidence that supports their own egalitarian arguments 
for social change; as with the gout example in the previous chapter, biological 
perspectives on human behaviour can actually highlight the importance of 
environment and thus the need to improve social conditions.  
A further example of apparent racial differences in social outcomes, that of 
differences in rates of solo-motherhood between racial groups, can further illustrate 
the argument that an evolutionary perspective on our behaviour could be used to 
further the egalitarian cause. Here again, I emphasis how taking account of gene-
environment interaction may provide egalitarians with a better understanding of the 
causes of social inequalities. 
 
≈ 
 
In the sort of evolutionary analysis advocated by Rushton, the high rates of solo-
motherhood (and consequent high levels of poverty and social dysfunction) in poor 
black communities in the United States would be attributed to racial genotypes – that, 
say, African Americans are biologically more fecund and promiscuous, and less likely 
to form stable relationships, than members of other racial groups. By way of contrast, 
Hispanic Americans, despite experiencing similar socio-economic hardships, do not 
face the same problems of out-of-wedlock children and lack of paternal support as 
their black peers.
15
  
Here, however, it is worth noting the analysis of sexual behaviour in black and 
Hispanic communities provided by political scientist James Flynn. According to 
Flynn, many of the relevant differences between these two communities (especially as 
regards illegitimate children) are due to the fact that there are only six males for every 
 158 
10 females in poorer black communities.
16
 This is due to more black males being in 
prison, victims of homicide, or otherwise removed from the pool of eligible partners. 
As Flynn colourfully puts it, black males in many American cities are “in clover”, at 
least in a sexual sense, with a choice of female partners and little incentive to commit 
to any one of them.
17
 Many poor black women are left with a choice between giving 
up on any hope of a relationship and children, on the one hand, and risking 
unreciprocated commitments and possible solo-motherhood, on the other. Thus, in 
Flynn’s scenario, the amenability of African American women for sex without 
commitment appears predicated on the behaviour of African American men, which in 
turn hinges on a sex ratio imbalance itself caused by social factors. 
Flynn then contrasts the situation of poor black women in the USA with that 
of poor Hispanic women; in the latter case, the sex ratios of Hispanic men and women 
are more nearly equal, and women have more choice of partners. In respect of child-
rearing, then, Hispanic women have more ability to reject potential ‘fly-by-night’ men 
in favour of those more willing to commit themselves to supporting a family; solo 
motherhood is, consequently, less of a social problem in Hispanic communities.
18
  
The relevant point here is that, while Flynn’s is primarily an environmentalist 
explanation for differences in behaviour and outcomes, it is compatible with 
Darwinian understanding of male and female sexual behaviour. In particular, Flynn’s 
analysis of sexual and reproductive behaviour reflects a key assumption in modern 
ETOHN: that males and females are likely to differ in ways that best ensure the 
reproductive prospects of each sex (i.e., that males are likely more predisposed 
towards quantity of sexual partners, while females tend more towards quality of 
sexual partner).  
From a Darwinian perspective, the differences in sexual behaviour in black 
and Hispanic communities appear to reflect the relative political power of men and 
women. In black communities, where the gender imbalance favours men, male sexual 
preferences (i.e., more sex with less commitment) come to the fore; in Hispanic 
communities, where women have more choice, female sexual preferences (especially 
for greater male commitment) are more likely to prevail.  
As in the earlier discussion, therefore, Rushton’s race-based analysis of sexual 
behaviour in black communities overlooks this basic premise of modern ETOHN – it 
assumes that black men and women are more similar to each other than they are to 
men and women of different racial groups. A more plausible evolutionary perspective 
is that the sexual behaviour of women in general is more likely to be similar to that of 
other women, irrespective of race; the same would also be true for men. Thus, even if 
levels of sexual activeness/permissiveness differed to some extent between races, this 
would be relative to the respective sexes. Thus, even if black males were more 
sexually active than non-black males, or black females were more sexually permissive 
than non-black females, the crucial issue would still be male/female power dynamics. 
A more rounded Darwinian account, therefore, would predict fewer solo mothers (and 
consequently less socio-economic hardship) in black communities if the male/female 
sex ratio was more like that of Hispanic communities. 
Furthermore, and in direct contrast to the leftist assumption that evolutionary 
approaches to society are inherently conservative or right-wing, a pragmatic 
Darwinian perspective on human behaviour could be used to challenge widely-held 
conservative beliefs about the observed correlations between solo-motherhood and 
poor social outcomes. For example, many political conservatives advocate reducing 
social welfare, in the belief that such payments provide a perverse incentive to “breed 
for business” (to quote New Zealand’s conservative Prime Minister, John Key19). The 
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evolutionary analysis provided above, however, would suggest that any such 
reduction in welfare may have the opposite effect; i.e., that it is pre-existing economic 
and social circumstances that potentially provide an ‘incentive’ to have out-of-
wedlock children, with any further deterioration in these circumstances likely only to 
exacerbate this situation. This evolutionary argument, then, is compatible with 
egalitarian beliefs about redistributive social policies. 
 
≈ 
 
According to anthropologist George Gill, “the politically correct ‘race denial’ 
perspective in society as a whole suppresses dialogue, allowing ignorance to replace 
knowledge and suspicion to replace familiarity. This encourages ethnocentrism and 
racism more than it discourages it”.20 
Evolutionary-informed egalitarians, by contrast, could be open to further 
research into the relationship between evolved behaviours and social outcomes, while 
avoiding leftists’ standard knee-jerk rejection of any suggestion of evolved genetic 
influences. Similarly, such informed egalitarians could engage in debate rather than 
trying to suppress it. 
Darwinian reasoning, or the application of evolutionary theory to human 
behaviour, does not inevitably lead to political conclusions that are more compatible 
with the right than with the left. If we genuinely wish to reduce social inequality, then 
egalitarians must understand its causes, both environmental and genetic. In the case of 
reproductive behaviour, for example, if possible biological influences are contingent 
on social circumstances, and if poor environmental circumstances result in poor 
outcomes, then the egalitarian imperative remains the same: improve the 
environment, but do so in a way that is informed by, and able to respond to, all 
relevant sources of information. 
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Can there be a more important subject that human nature? If the subject can be truly fathomed, then our 
species will be more precisely defined, and our actions perhaps more wisely guided.                                                                     
Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature 
 
 
Chapter 12: Status For What? 
 
Singer’s ideas about how a better understanding of our evolved nature may help us 
create a more cooperative society should resonate with many on the egalitarian left. 
Unfortunately, ill-informed or mistaken beliefs about what must follow from a 
Darwinian perspective on human behaviour are a major obstacle to egalitarians 
paying heed to Singer’s argument. If this stumbling block can be removed – if, for 
example, the left accept that the facts of our evolved nature do not determine our 
political ideals, or that Darwinian reasoning does not inevitably lead to sexist or racist 
beliefs – then modern ETOHN could, as Singer claims at the very beginning of A 
Darwinian Left, become a source of new ideas and new approaches to bringing about 
a better and more equal society. 
Among Singer’s key claims is that an evolutionary-informed appreciation of 
human nature – both our evolved selfless and cooperative traits and our self-interested 
and competitive ones – could provide the left with a more effective means to critique 
modern consumer capitalist society. To accept that human nature is often self-serving 
is not to condone selfish behaviour; to understand why humans often behave selfishly 
to the detriment of others, however, is to better arm ourselves to do something about. 
Indeed, evolutionary insights may indicate why such behaviour is itself often 
detrimental to the wellbeing of self-serving individuals themselves. 
In this chapter, I assess and extend Singer’s Darwinian critique of modern 
competitive society. I begin with Singer’s acknowledgement that capitalism exploits 
certain of our evolved traits (especially our competiveness and status seeking) in ways 
that do provide wider social benefit, and his claim that capitalism also downplays and 
obscures other important aspects of meaningful human existence, such as the desire 
for happiness and meaningful social interaction. I develop Singer’s argument by 
exploring, from a Darwinian perspective, how the seemingly mindless pursuit of 
wealth evident in modern societies could have come about. I suggest that a deeper 
appreciation of why we are motivated to act in this manner may provide us with the 
means to rationally reflect on whether this is indeed a worthwhile way to lead our 
lives. 
I then examine and develop Singer’s related criticisms of the type of socially 
unequal capitalist society epitomised by modern America, and, in particular, the fact 
that, beyond a certain point, rising levels of affluence do not correlate with increasing 
happiness. Here, I turn to the work of evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller to 
demonstrate how a Darwinian perspective on human behaviour can actually 
complement traditional leftist beliefs about the disadvantages of social competition 
and the value of social inclusion and cooperation. 
Next, I turn to Singer’s suggestions about how we could further promote 
human beings’ evolved altruistic predispositions in ways that bring benefit to wider 
society. I conclude the chapter with the argument first raised in Chapter 7: that human 
beings have evolved to a point where, uniquely in the natural world, we can reflect 
upon the evolved constraints on our behaviour. I suggest that Singer is correct in 
arguing that this ability could allow us to reason our way to a new form of freedom. 
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In asking how egalitarian reformers can learn from Darwin, Singer argues that we 
must understand our inherent tendencies, and modify our political plans in order to 
suit them. Singer accepts that there are different ways of working with our evolved 
predispositions, some of which may go against the left’s traditional (abstract) beliefs 
about how society should be organised. The traditional left has often argued, for 
example, for a centrally planned economy on the grounds that “[i]n theory – abstract 
theory that is, without any assumptions about human nature – a state monopoly 
should be able to provide the cheapest and the most efficient utility services or 
transport services or, for that matter, bread supply, because such a monopoly would 
have enormous advantages of scale, and would not have to make profits for its 
owners”.1  
If we take our evolved self-interested tendencies into account, however, the 
flaws in this abstract model become apparent; as Singer indicates, because the 
economic interests of a community enterprise do not necessarily coincide with those 
of its managers, the result can be inefficiency, corruption and theft.
2
 One way to make 
such an enterprise more efficient, Singer argues, could be to privatize it, and to reward 
managers in relation to their performance, based on the underlying (capitalist) 
assumption  “that human beings can be relied upon to work hard and show initiative 
only if by doing so they will further their own economic interests”.3  
In contrast to the left’s traditional support for a rationally planned ‘altruistic’ 
economy, the economic model that seems most in keeping with evolved human 
tendencies is that famously proposed by philosopher Adam Smith, in which “the self-
interested desires of a multitude of individuals are drawn together, as if by a hidden 
hand, to work for the benefit of all”.4  
Here, Singer appears to be moving in the direction that he earlier decries in 
modern mainstream leftist parties; of acceding to the capitalist belief that society 
should be organized on the basis of competitive and self-interested behaviour. 
However, this is not Singer’s ultimate argument. While he accepts that Smith’s 
‘invisible hand’ has worked better than leftist alternatives (such as the failed 
communist experiments), this does not therefore imply that unfettered capitalism is 
the best means of organising an economy. As Singer is quick to point out, while an 
economy that provides incentives for personal gain “is one way of tailoring our 
institutions to human nature, or at least to one view of human nature … it is not the 
only way of doing so”5.  
In some circumstances, such as ensuring that public institutions function as 
efficiently as possible, channeling our evolved self-interested behaviour in ways that 
benefit wider society may be appropriate; in other circumstances, such as broader 
attempts to create a more cohesive or harmonious society, emphasizing these same 
self-serving tendencies may be entirely inappropriate. 
Singer draws attention to the way in which those in capitalist countries all too 
often equate self-interest solely with monetary wealth, or interpret it solely in 
materialist terms. In Singer’s view, this is a mistake because wider self-interest does 
not equate solely with economic self-interest – as the trite aphorism ‘money can’t buy 
happiness’ implies, for instance, being happy is often more in our interests than being 
rich: “Most people want their lives to be happy, fulfilling, or meaningful in some way, 
and they recognize that money is, at best a means to achieving part of these needs.”6 
Thus, while capitalists are correct to identify some self-interested tendencies 
as intrinsic to human beings (and the left wrong to deny these traits), focusing 
exclusively on this aspect of our behaviour can obscure other more important facets of 
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our nature. Singer therefore challenges the idea that political policies should focus 
primarily on facilitating the individual pursuit of wealth, and that such policies could 
instead “appeal to the widespread need to feel wanted, or useful, or to belong to a 
community – all things that are more likely to come from cooperating with others 
than from competing with them.”7 
Although these traits – the need to ‘feel wanted’ or ‘feel useful’, or the desire 
‘to belong’ – could appear trite or woolly, they are, as Singer emphasises, likely to be 
as much a part of universal human nature as our self-interested desire for wealth. 
Importantly, Singer’s evolutionary-informed view of human nature is not only more 
convincing than that normally offered by the left, it is also more complete than the 
one-dimensional view often presented by the capitalist right. Accepting that some of 
our traits may indeed be self-serving would not require the left to abandon its 
challenge to capitalist beliefs about the primacy of human self-interest, and 
egalitarians could still champion the socialist vision of a more harmonious and 
cooperative society. This, in turn, could allow for a more pragmatic approach to social 
change than that traditionally advocated by the left.  
For instance, a more pragmatic left could accept, as Singer does, that directing 
“our acquisitive and competitive desires so that they work for the good of all” can 
result in genuine benefits. The proof of this is evident, say, in comparisons between 
capitalist Western Europe and communist Eastern Europe in the decades following 
World War 2. Nevertheless, despite this evidence of capitalism’s success in raising 
living standards, say, this is not to claim that there is no better alternative to the 
current capitalist system. As Singer points out, “even when the competitive consumer 
society works at its best, it is not the only way of harmonizing our nature and the 
common good” – in his view, evolutionary-informed egalitarians should instead 
“encourage a broader sense of our interests, in which we seek to build on the social 
and cooperative side of our nature, in addition to the individualistic and competitive 
side”.8 
Unfortunately, by continuing to reject the notion of a fixed human nature, the 
idealistic left concedes the argument to the capitalist right, who can (quite rightly) 
claim to have a better appreciation of human behaviour. An additional advantage of 
Singer’s more realistic Darwinian left, therefore, is in revealing the limitations of the 
capitalist vision of human nature, and the way in which it neglects other important 
aspects of our nature – most especially our evolved desire to be valued members of a 
social group. 
Singer himself does not provide an explicit evolutionary analysis to support 
his political point; rather, he merely suggests that pro-social tendencies are as inherent 
in our nature as individualistic ones, and that the left should encourage the former 
without overlooking the latter. In order to illustrate how egalitarians could perhaps 
incorporate Darwinian ideas in their political arguments, therefore, it is here 
worthwhile to provide a brief evolutionary gloss on human attitudes towards ‘money’ 
and ‘happiness’.  
 
≈ 
 
According to Singer, “there is no reason to assume that earning more than a modest 
amount of money will maximize the number of descendants we leave”.9 In other 
words, even if we accept that our evolved patterns of behaviour are ultimately 
designed to ensure the future survival of our genes, we still cannot identify (genetic) 
self-interest with the wealth that we accrue; despite our evolved selfish desires for 
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wealth, accumulating more and more money beyond a certain limit serves no 
evolutionary purpose.  
Here, Singer seems to be taking aim at the fallacious belief that because a 
behaviour (such as the self-interested pursuit of wealth) is a feature of our nature, it 
should therefore be encouraged or promoted. While Singer does not pursue this point, 
it is illuminating to ask how our desire to accrue wealth might be further explained 
from an evolutionary perspective. 
A plausible evolutionary account can easily be constructed. For instance, in 
our species’ ancestral environment, accruing resources (such as food) could have 
maximized the number of descendants that individual humans left (e.g., if food were 
traded for sex). (‘Meat-trading’ in early hominid groups, for instance, has been 
proposed as a possible origin of human sharing behaviours, which are highly 
developed in comparison with those of our primate relatives.
10
) If this were indeed the 
case, those individuals who acquired more resources would have had more offspring, 
who would also have inherited this tendency. Our present-day desire to accumulate 
wealth is, therefore, plausibly due in part to the self-interested ‘resource-accruing’ 
behaviours that were naturally selected amongst our ancestors. 
However, in our ancestral hunter-gatherer environment, most of the available 
‘wealth’ was not portable or was not permanent (e.g., food spoils rapidly, and over-
many possessions are not easily carried); thus only a ‘modest’ amount of resources 
could have been accrued by any one individual. In modern settled societies, however, 
where resources (i.e., monetary riches) are both portable and permanent, ‘immodest’ 
amounts of wealth can be acquired, regardless of whether this directly leads to a 
maximization of descendants. If such evolutionary reasoning is on the right track, 
then our evolved desire to acquire resources may have become increasingly 
disconnected from its evolutionary raison d’être, and behaviour that was ‘rational’ 
(from natural selection’s perspective) is now no longer so.  
This argument can then be developed in a political direction – for it provides 
us with a means to critically reflect on our inherent materialism. Rather than treating 
this behaviour as something that humans just ‘naturally’ do, we can, with this 
evolutionary back-story in mind, examine it more rationally, and ask whether that 
behaviour is appropriate or sensible, or whether it is the best way to lead fulfilling 
lives. And while this approach is not wholly dependent on evolutionary theory, by 
understanding our behaviour from the perspective of our evolved psychology, we may 
be better able to control it, or to direct it in more rationally desirable ways. An 
evolutionary account of this behaviour can thereby potentially provide egalitarians 
with a much stronger argument against the unthinking pursuit of money than the usual 
vague or woolly suggestions, often spouted by the idealistic left, that wealth is in 
some way ‘wrong’ or ‘immoral’. 
Any such evolutionary account of why we have the tendencies we do could 
then be further developed by Darwinian-minded egalitarians. For example, accruing 
resources would not have been the only means to maximize descendants in our 
species’ ancestral past. As an ultra-social animal, we are heavily reliant on our 
conspecifics for our survival and well-being. In addition to the ability to acquire 
resources, therefore, the capacity to form strong social bonds and cooperative 
relationships would also have been vital – not only to an individual’s survival, but 
also to that individual’s prospects of reproduction. Thus, human beings’ deep desires 
to be trusted and valuable members of a social group are likely to be every bit as 
much an evolved aspect of our psychology as our more self-serving tendencies.  
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As rational beings, we are able to consider which behaviours are more or less 
likely to ultimately achieve a desired goal. If we wish for some ultimate state of 
happiness or fulfillment, then egalitarians can argue that encouraging our other-
orientated behaviours rather than our self-orientated ones may make us more likely to 
succeed in this goal.  
Of course, this is merely adding detail to the general claim that Singer makes 
about how both selfishness and selflessness are features of human nature. However, 
by adding this detail, we can better illuminate how present-day consumer societies 
(and contemporary free market ideologies) fixate on satisfying limited facets of our 
nature, to the detriment of other crucial traits. Armed with a more comprehensive 
appreciation of our evolved behaviour, therefore, egalitarians could welcome the 
genuine benefits of the capitalist system (compared to existing alternatives) while 
emphasizing how this model fails to satisfy our pro-social desires.
11
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How then could a Darwinian left go about ‘building a more cooperative society’ (the 
sub-title of A Darwinian Left’s Chapter 3)? According to Singer, all human societies 
will display some competitive tendencies and some cooperative ones, and while we 
cannot change this “we may be able to change the balance between these two 
elements.”12 The sort of competitive society that Singer has in mind is that epitomised 
by 20
th
 century America, “in which the drive for personal wealth and to get to the top 
is widely seen as the goal of everything we do”.13  
However, while Singer presents modern America as the model of an 
undesirable competitive society, he does not offer a clear illustration of a more 
desirable cooperative alternative; rather, his focus is primarily on the downsides of the 
sort of competitive society that America represents. Much of Singer’s argument, 
therefore, relates to how an evolutionary-informed left could mitigate the unwelcome 
aspects of competitive social organisation. The purpose of Singer’s nascent Darwinian 
left is not, as so often the case with utopian leftist theories, to come up with an 
abstract plan of an ideal future society; instead, he wishes to provide informed 
suggestions of how to move the existing competitive social model in a more 
cooperative direction.  
In this respect, one of the main deficiencies of the modern competitive society 
identified by Singer is the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and the 
correlated reduction in support for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.
14
 
According to Singer, and despite the fact that the free market has boosted average 
prosperity in the developed world, the greater affluence of the middle and upper 
classes must be measured against the increasing misery of the very poor. Here, Singer 
highlights the lack of correlation between an increase in wealth and an increase in 
happiness, once basic needs are met – a finding that again suggests that the 
competitive society fails to provide for other intrinsic human desires, despite the rise 
in material affluence. 
In Singer’s view, the extreme of competitive self-interest is captured in the 
sentiment expressed “by the Wall Street entrepreneur Ivan Boesky (the putative 
model for Gordon Gekko in Oliver Stone’s film Wall Street): ‘He who has the most 
toys when he dies, wins’.” 15 The ultimate futility of this way of thinking is obvious, 
and, as Singer goes on to argue, it does not take much reflection to realise that a 
society whose citizens are motivated primarily by the desire to have more than others 
(or, rather, by the fear of having less) is unlikely to be a society in which people are 
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happy or fulfilled.
 
Despite rising material affluence, therefore, social competition 
carries a cost; and while those at the bottom of the social hierarchy may suffer more 
directly and more obviously, even those further up the scale experience the ill-effects 
of the lack of social cohesion and cooperation: “One cannot live a rich private life in a 
state of siege, mistrusting all strangers and turning one’s home into an armed camp”.16 
Again, this is not an original argument, with social commentators having 
reached similar conclusions for millennia (e.g., the Bible’s admonition that ‘the love 
of money is the root of all evil’). The originality of Singer’s approach, especially as a 
leftist, is in trying to provide a credible scientific account of these evident human 
tendencies, and in indicating how such an account may inform our political response 
to the consequences of these tendencies.  
Singer himself does not appeal directly to specific evolutionary ideas to back 
up his argument; rather, he bases his thesis on the implicit assumption that we have 
evolved tendencies towards competition, and that modern competitive societies are 
geared towards satisfying these traits, often at the expense of other, more pro-social 
ones. It is thus worthwhile here to briefly assess some of the Darwinian theories that 
are compatible with Singer’s approach – as, for instance, with the evolved 
predispositions to accrue resources discussed above.  
In this case, aspects of evolved human psychology suggest that males (in 
particular) may act in a Boesky/Gekko-type way because, in an ancestral past, this 
behaviour likely paid reproductive dividends. (As science writer Matt Ridley 
suggests, “it’s possible that men still walk around with a relatively simple equation in 
their brains, namely that relative success at obtaining assets results in more sexual 
adventures and more grandchildren”.17) In a modern environment, however, in which 
the manic accumulation of material wealth no longer correlates with reproductive 
fitness, the ultimate futility of this behaviour (i.e., ‘dying with the most toys’) is 
further illuminated. 
To provide a concrete example, I will briefly turn to former All Black captain 
Sean Fitzpatrick (catchphrase: “Show me a good loser and I’ll show you a loser”), 
whose tellingly-entitled autobiography Winning Matters (2011) appears to epitomise 
the undesirable competitive behaviour that Singer most wishes to challenge. To the 
likes of Fitzpatrick, for instance, ‘being the best you can be’ (his self-help manual’s 
sub-title) includes putting career aspirations ahead of other relationships, such as 
family life. Here, Fitzpatrick reflects the more typically male aspects of the human 
psyche discussed in Chapter 8 – most especially, the apparent evolved psychological 
motivations to sacrifice everything for the sake of getting to the top.
18
  
If modern competitive society is grounded, at least to some extent, in the more 
male-like attitudes epitomised by Sean Fitzpatrick, how could the left exploit this fact 
to attain more egalitarian ends? For a start, social status is likely particularly salient in 
our minds because, as ultra-social animals, position in the social hierarchy was hugely 
important to survival and reproduction for ancestral humans, and we possibly cannot 
help but assign significance to striving and ambition for status, or, in a modern 
context, to ascribe importance to the symbols of social ‘success’ – the top-floor office, 
the imposing title, the brand-new car or the massive house. This perhaps helps explain 
why modern competitive societies so often relate status to consumption and media 
interest. Yet, as Singer points out: “In such a society there is little connection between 
status and the benefits one brings to others.”19  
Darwinian thinking, therefore, could provide a ‘reality check’ on the apparent 
tendency to mindlessly accept consumer society’s values and outlooks, and it could 
offer a more objective perspective on whether driving ambition and status-seeking 
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really is the best means to a flourishing life. As Singer succinctly asks about our 
desire for status: “Status for what?”20 Just so that we can die with more toys than 
anyone else? 
Furthermore, if status is measured chiefly in terms of ‘success’ in competition, 
then the only way to succeed is to be competitive – and the question of whether this 
behaviour is of any ultimate worth is thereby obscured. Seen through the Darwinian 
lens, however, the absurdity of some of our behaviour becomes glaringly apparent: as 
evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker points out in relation to male status seeking, 
“the glory that men seek may be a figment of their primate imaginations – the 
symptom of a chemical in their bloodstream, the acting out of instincts that make us 
laugh when we see them in roosters and baboons”.21  
Of course, criticisms of hierarchical status displays, and the social inequalities 
with which they are inevitably entwined, have a long history with the left – e.g., 
Marx’s ‘commodity fetishism’ or the ‘conspicuous consumption’ and ‘conspicuous 
waste’ highlighted in sociologist Torstein Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class. 
Indeed, condemnation of rampant consumerism or of the competitive rat race is a 
stereotypical mark of membership of the modern liberal left. But standard leftist 
counter arguments to consumerism, that we should all just learn to cooperate, say, or 
to ratchet down our consumption, are easy to mock in face of the perceived ‘realities’ 
of day-to-day human social behaviour. 
A Darwinian perspective on existing competitive society, therefore, adds grist 
to the left’s mill by exposing the rooster-like or baboon-like nature of this social 
behaviour. Do the (invariably male) leaders of industry really ‘deserve’ to be paid so 
much more than those further down the status hierarchy whose vital social role goes 
unnoticed? Are the ‘baubles of office’ that our (predominantly male) leaders so 
eagerly covet – the limousines, luxury hotels, lavish banquets – really necessary to the 
efficient and effective running of a country or a company? Or are they simply the 
ludicrously exaggerated ‘status displays’ of a large-brained but not particularly 
insightful hairless ape?  
In contrast to the typical leftist belief that ETOHN merely bolster arguments 
for the social status quo, Darwinian reasoning can actually complement traditional 
leftist criticisms of inequality and competition. Informed Darwinian leftists would 
thus be better able to argue the case for promoting cooperative social behaviour and 
more intrinsically worthwhile outcomes (e.g., strengthening the social relationships 
that human beings inherently value).  
An evolutionary approach to human status-seeking and unreflective 
consumption could also place leftist criticisms of competitive behaviour on a firmer 
psychological foundation. For example, the self-serving actions of a CEO who awards 
himself a massive salary increase would be explained by many on the traditional left 
in terms of an ill-defined ‘culture of greed’; from a Darwinian left perspective, 
however, it could also be explained as a predictable result of human (and particularly 
male) psychology. (This evolutionary analysis, moreover, bursts the inflated sense of 
self-importance displayed by many of those at the top of the social hierarchy.)   
Accepting that competitive behaviour may be a stable aspect of our evolved 
nature is not to accept that certain social outcomes (e.g., social competition or the 
sexual division of labour) are similarly fixed or inevitable. Rather, an understanding 
of evolved inclinations, such as the male desire for status, may provide us with 
valuable information on how to channel competitive tendencies towards more socially 
beneficial ends.  
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For example, in consumer capitalist societies, status (and thus an individual’s 
social ‘value’) is normally indicated through material possessions, and the standard 
way to acquire these trappings of success is to work long hours to earn the money to 
buy them. Our competitive tendencies are thus targeted on the material gains. 
Interestingly, however, Sean Fitzpatrick himself provides an example of why the 
material focus of status-seeking may be more arbitrary than we might realise: for 
uber-competitive males like Fitzpatrick, winning often matters more than what is won 
– else why waste time striving to win pointless rugby matches? 
This indicates the potential fluidity of the markers of status: our current 
society grants status to those, such as Microsoft founder Bill Gates, who are more 
successful in climbing competitive hierarchies. But Bill Gates himself, propelled by 
the same tendencies as earlier high-status males, is now ‘competing’ to become the 
world’s top philanthropist. Gates’ lasting legacy, therefore, may not be so much 
accounted in ‘selfish’ genetic terms (as it was with his male forbears) but rather in the 
millions of fellow humans saved from diseases, such as malaria, that the Bill and 
Melissa Gates Foundation is striving to eradicate. The point is that, in the modern 
world, our evolved tendencies towards acquiring resources and status (ultimately 
designed to secure our genetic stake in the future) can also be turned towards more 
socially beneficial goals.  
Indeed, this is a line of reasoning developed by evolutionary psychologist 
Geoffrey Miller, whose more scientifically-informed accounts of evolved human 
behaviour lend considerable weight to Singer’s less biologically nuanced 
philosophical position. For example, Miller begins his recent book Spent: Sex, 
evolution, and consumer behavior with a question designed to humorously shock the 
reader into contemplating the absurdity of much of our modern consumer behaviour: 
“Why would the world’s most intelligent primate buy a Hummer H1 Alpha sport-
utility vehicle for $139, 771?” – especially as, according to Miller, it is such a poorly 
designed vehicle.
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Miller himself provides a straightforward evolutionary answer to why “we 
keep ourselves on the consumerist treadmill – working, buying, aspiring”: 
 
Humans evolved in small social groups in which image and status were all-
important, not only for survival, but for attracting mates, impressing friends, 
and rearing children.  … Our vast social-primate brains evolved to pursue one 
central social goal: to look good in the eyes of others. Buying impressive 
products in a money-based economy is just the most recent way to fulfil that 
goal.
23
 
 
However, Miller is not attempting to justify this behaviour; rather, he is using 
Darwinian theory to explain it. Like Singer, Miller argues that if we can understand 
why we behave in certain ways, this may provide us with the means to counteract or 
overcome the negative consequences of some of our behaviour, if that is what we 
decide to do. And Miller’s conclusions – informed by research into the evolutionary 
origins of human psychology and behaviour – are compatible with Singer’s 
prescriptions for a Darwinian left.  
For instance, in concluding Spent, Miller argues that, in modern capitalist 
societies, human beings’ ‘wondrously adaptive’ creative capacities are now wasted on 
mindless material consumption:  
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This is an absurd way to live, but it’s never to late to come away from it. We 
can find better ways to combine the best features of prehistoric human life and 
modern life. Eco-communo-privitivism offers little more than squalor, 
ignorance, and boredom. Runaway consumerism alone offers little more than 
narcissism, exhaustion, and alienation. We need the freedom to explore 
different ways of displaying our traits to the people we care about.
24
 
 
Miller’s evolutionary argument, then, aligns closely with that of Singer. True, 
competitive consumer society is an expression of aspects of evolved human 
behaviour. But in promoting only these aspects of our behaviour, this sort of society 
does not satisfy the full range of evolved human needs and desires. Further, in both 
Miller’s and Singer’s view, only by accepting and understanding the evolutionary 
basis of our behaviour will we be able to change it. Indeed, Spent’s concluding 
comments readily match Singer’s desire to shift the balance of inherent human 
behaviour away from competition towards cooperation: “Humans may never give up 
their drives for status, respect, prestige, sexual attractiveness, and social popularity, 
but these traits can be channelled to yield a much higher quality of life than runaway 
consumerism offers.”25 
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Singer’s more abstract political argument appears compatible with other, more 
scientifically-grounded interpretations of behaviour in contemporary capitalist 
societies. How, then, does Singer himself propose to harness Darwinian thinking to 
“build a society that is cooperative and offers a strong safety net for those unable to 
meet their own needs”?26 
To begin with, Singer highlights the fact that, even in the most unpromising 
circumstances, human beings are readily able to recognize the benefits of cooperation. 
For instance, in the trench warfare of World War 1, opposing soldiers “developed the 
extraordinary system known as ‘live and let live’”, in which, despite the orders of 
their superiors, both sides’ troops deliberately avoided killing each other.27 This 
illustrates how adept our species is at making inferences about others’ behaviour (e.g., 
in inferring, in the ‘live and let live’ scenario, that ‘if we don’t shoot at them, they 
won’t shoot at us’); furthermore, we are particularly good at recognizing social 
contracts and at identifying those who violate them.  
By exploring how these traits have evolved, Singer argues, we will better 
understand “the conditions in which cooperation can flourish” – an informed 
approach that could be the starting point “for the development of a field of social 
research that shows the way to a more cooperative society”.28  
Singer develops this argument by turning to evolutionary game theory, and to 
the concept of a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (so called due to its original depiction as two 
prisoners, each given the choice of giving evidence against the other in order to 
reduce their own sentence). The dilemma arises because of the various pay offs and 
costs of either individual ‘defecting’ – i.e., informing on the other prisoner – or of 
staying silent: each is best off if he or she defects while the other remains silent, and 
each is worst off by staying silent if the other defects. Unfortunately, if both prisoners 
defect then they each receive a longer sentence than if both had stayed silent. In short, 
while each is individually better off if he or she defects (as long as the other does not), 
they are both better off by remaining silent – i.e., cooperating. 
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Singer uses the prisoner’s dilemma to illustrate how the rational and self-
interested choices of individuals can end up making everyone worse off than they 
would have been if they had cooperated. For example, commuters would collectively 
be better off if they all took the bus, rather than sitting in their cars stuck in heavy 
traffic: “But it is not in the interests of any individual to switch to the bus because, as 
long as most people continue to use their cars, the buses will be even slower than the 
cars.” Similarly with arms races: while both sides would be better off not having to 
spend so much on weapons, “it is not in the interests of either side to disarm while the 
other does not”.29 
The point for Singer is that if people are faced with repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma scenarios, they may come to realize that cooperation is the better strategy. 
This, indeed, reflects the finding of a famous game theory simulation, in which 
political scientist Robert Axelrod tested a number of different strategies to see which 
would produce the best pay-offs in repeated prisoner’s dilemma-type situations. 
According to Singer: 
 
The winner [of Axelrod’s experiment] was a simple strategy called ‘Tit for 
Tat’. It opened every encounter with a new prisoner by cooperating. After that, 
it simply did whatever the prisoner had done the previous time. So if the other 
prisoner cooperated, it cooperated, and it continued to cooperate unless the 
other prisoner defected. Then it defected, and continued to do so unless the 
other prisoner again cooperated.
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In Singer’s opinion, the left could use research findings such as this as the 
source of ideas for how to “create conditions that draw on our inherent grasp of the 
rules of mutually beneficial cooperation and thereby make it possible for mutually 
beneficial relationships to flourish where otherwise they would not”.31 Again, his 
emphasis is on a realistic appreciation of what would allow cooperation to flourish 
and what would not. 
One political lesson that can be drawn from game theory, for instance, is that 
mutually beneficial cooperative behaviour depends on repeated, long-term interaction 
– the very sort of interaction that is fast disappearing in large urbanized modern 
populations. In Singer’s view, taking this into account may allow us to better design 
social institutions to counteract the anonymity of the increasingly urbanized societies 
in which the majority of modern human beings now find themselves.
32
 
Furthermore, Singer highlights the fact that large disparities in power or 
wealth also remove the incentive for mutual cooperation, especially if nothing that 
those at the bottom of the social scale do makes a difference to those at the top. Again, 
this provides an additional argument about the need to tackle the increasing 
inequalities in modern societies, especially because leaving those at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy “so far outside the social commonwealth that they have nothing to 
contribute to it, is to alienate them from social practices and institutions in a manner 
that almost ensures that they will become adversaries who pose a danger to those 
institutions”.33 
Such arguments would be unlikely to offend most leftists. Nevertheless, a 
further necessary condition for the development of mutually beneficial cooperation is 
the ability and willingness to punish defection (as in the Tit For Tat experiment). In 
other words, because self-interested tendencies exist alongside cooperative ones, the 
temptation to defect (and gain maximum short-term rewards) will always remain. 
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Thus, unless there is a genuine threat of retaliation or punishment for non-cooperation, 
mutually beneficial relationships are unlikely to develop.  
In contrast to “the more idealistic left”, who might wish for continued 
cooperation whatever the circumstances, Singer instead argues: 
 
The easier it is for cheats to make a living, the more of them there are likely to 
be. A pre-Darwinian left would blame the existence of cheats on poverty, or 
lack of education, or the legacy of reactionary capitalist ways of thinking. A 
Darwinian left will realize that while all while these factors may make a 
difference to the level of cheating, the only permanent solution is to change 
the pay-offs so that cheats do not prosper. This means not turning the other 
cheek.
34
 
 
Singer here appears to be criticizing uncritical leftist beliefs about the efficacy 
of social welfare, or of the Marxist creed ‘from each according to ability, to each 
according to need’ – that is, the naïve assumption that if everyone has a more 
equitable level of income, say, then greed or self-interest will disappear, and humans 
will willingly contribute towards the greater collective prosperity of all.  
A Darwinian perspective on human nature, one that took self-interested 
tendencies as a given and resisted naïve ‘good of the group’ thinking, would instead 
predict that any system that lacked incentives or constraints may simply maintain or 
reinforce deleterious behaviours. For example, a social welfare system that 
unconditionally guaranteed income could end up providing individuals with little 
incentive to improve their circumstance; thus, unless informed by a realistic 
appreciation of human tendencies, social welfare policies aimed at reducing poverty, 
say, could actually create the conditions in which poverty becomes entrenched – the 
‘welfare trap’ or welfare dependency often identified by the political right. 
Of course, such a conclusion about welfare (or about welfare ‘cheats’) is 
unlikely to find favour with the traditional left. Yet, while Singer himself does not 
address this issue, ‘social cheating’ is also evident amongst the affluent, for example 
with tax avoidance – in which case, an evolutionary-informed analysis could also 
highlight the need for strong deterrents to ensure that these cheats, too, do not prosper. 
Importantly,  Singer is making the point that human cooperative tendencies can also 
be stymied (unintentionally) by ill-informed egalitarian policies – as, say, in the 
Soviet Union, where the State exploited the workers, or in cases of welfare 
dependency, where individuals may exploit the State (despite this being detrimental to 
their long-term well-being). A realistic left would realize that competition can carry 
benefits as well as costs, but also that cooperation itself is not cost-free. 
 
≈ 
 
Darwinian thinking suggests that we are not likely to be naturally altruistic. How can 
a self-sacrificing trait that benefits the group at the expense of the individual survive 
or become established? From an evolutionary perspective, it seems that self-
sacrificing tendencies would be eliminated from the gene pool no matter how much 
they might benefit the group in the long term. 
Again, this is a conclusion that might appear unpalatable to the left; indeed, it 
could lead to the further conclusion that, because self-sacrificing behaviour does exist 
and because humans are (or can be) altruistic, this behaviour is somehow 
‘inexplicable’ in Darwinian terms – hence, another source of the leftist notion that 
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Darwinian theory is largely irrelevant to modern human behaviour. Similarly, the 
more idealistically-minded left might object to evolutionary accounts of seeming 
altruistic behaviour on the grounds that, because such behaviour is ultimately 
designed to benefit the altruist’s genes, it is not genuinely or ‘truly’ altruistic.  
In respect of the first objection, an evolutionary-informed left would 
appreciate that modern Darwinian theory (such as the ‘selfish gene’ concept) is not an 
attempt to explain away altruism, but rather to understand how altruistic behaviour 
could have arisen in the first place. With this in mind, and with regard to the second 
objection, Singer argues that there is a difference between an individual’s motivation 
for altruistic acts, and the evolutionary benefits that may accrue to that individual. For 
instance, a volunteer who chooses to work with disabled children, say, with the sole 
intention of improving their lives, is acting altruistically “in the everyday sense” even 
if, as a consequence of this behaviour, the volunteer becomes more attractive to the 
opposite sex (and hence increases his or her reproductive fitness).
35
 
The evolutionary rationale for our behaviours is often hidden from our 
conscious mind. With a parent’s love for a child, for instance, the parental genes’ 
‘ulterior motive’ is actually to pass on copies of themselves. Yet while this might 
explain why this emotional response has evolved, it does not explain away parental 
love or deny that such an emotion is genuinely felt. In the same way, the conscious 
motivation for cooperative behaviour may be genuinely altruistic even though, from a 
genetic perspective, this behaviour may originally have been ‘selfishly’ designed to 
enhance our reproductive prospects.  
Importantly, by understanding the evolved basis of these behaviours we can 
also understand the social triggers that influence them – in the case of love for a child, 
what social factors may enhance this tendency or, in the case of child neglect or 
infanticide, the social factors that may negate it. This enhanced understanding of the 
influences on parenting behaviour can further inform the design of appropriate 
institutions or social systems to bring about more flourishing family life. Similarly, 
the political spin that Singer places on Darwinian reasoning about altruism focuses on 
how altruistic behaviour might further be encouraged, or how social practices might 
be geared towards providing wider social benefit from our evolved altruistic 
tendencies.  
Singer provides the example of how some Native American tribes apparently 
allowed young men who had vowed to fight to the death in an upcoming battle to 
have sex with as many willing women as they wished.
36
 In this case, the reproductive 
pay-offs are transparent: while the young men may die by sacrificing themselves for 
the ‘good of the group’, their genes would live on in any children that result from the 
socially sanctioned pre-martial sex. Here, Singer wishes to emphasise how a social 
practice, which relies on an altruistic behaviour ultimately premised on genetic self-
interest, can result in wider group benefit. 
However, a more complex and more revealing example is perhaps provided by 
modern suicide attacks.
37
 Initially, such behaviour seems inexplicable from an 
evolutionary perspective – especially as, unlike in the Native American example, this 
action does not provide compensatory reproductive opportunities. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that such self-sacrificing behaviour is sanctioned and approved within the 
suicide attackers’ own community, then the extra status and resources that might 
accrue to his or her family could provide benefits to that individual’s genes (i.e., those 
genes held in common amongst relatives). Suicide attacks, therefore, could be an 
extreme example of kin altruism – a behaviour that does not directly benefit the 
individual, but which ensures the success of copies of that individual’s genes residing 
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in others. Like the Native American warriors, therefore, the self-sacrifice of suicide 
attackers could also be genetically ‘selfish’.38 
Of course, this is not a full explanation of this sort of social phenomena. 
Nevertheless, it does indicate that the wider social ‘benefit’ of exploiting evolved 
predispositions depends on the perspective you adopt. Suicide attackers’ behaviour 
could be seen as altruistic by members of their own group; they are unlikely to be 
viewed in this way by the groups they attack. Darwinian reasoning, by providing 
various perspectives on this sort of behaviour, may help identify how we might best 
avoid inter-group conflict or competition, and how we might ‘expand the circle’ of 
those to whom we may behave altruistically.  
As these examples also show, social practices that influence particular 
behaviours can be either good or bad for a group, or can benefit one group at the 
expense of another. Singer, therefore, is surely correct to argue that understanding the 
possible evolved psychological influences on this type of behaviour may allow us to 
rationally direct it in desirable ways. 
For instance, the traditional left wishes to change social practices by directing 
people’s attitudes and behaviours in certain ways. Darwinian reasoning does not 
undermine this: we can still rationally determine what behaviour should be rewarded 
and what behaviour should be punished, even if there is an evolved basis to many of 
our inclinations. At the same time, a Darwinian perspective on the ultimate (genetic) 
rationale for certain behaviours can be used to challenge conservative beliefs about 
the sanctity of traditional practices and customs. Singer’s (and the traditional left’s) 
more rational approach is to ask whether customary practices are just, or whether they 
result in increased happiness or wellbeing. 
Singer himself offers little direct practical advice about how we can use an 
evolutionary-informed understanding of altruistic activity. Instead, he merely suggests 
that we need to understand more about what leads people to do altruistic deeds – e.g., 
donate blood to strangers, or, even more altruistically, bone marrow – “so that we can 
base social policies on a more secure foundation of knowledge about human 
behaviour”.39 Singer then returns to less desirable aspects of human behaviour: the 
status seeking and conspicuous consumption prevalent in modern developed countries 
that provides little benefit to others. Again, he only gives vague suggestions about 
how we could “shift ideas of status away from conspicuous consumption, in a more 
socially desirable direction” – for example, by introducing a tax on consumption (say, 
on luxury items) as a means to change the behaviour of social high-fliers.
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Like Singer, Geoffrey Miller also highlights the need to “switch from an 
income tax that promotes short-term runaway consumption to a consumption tax that 
promotes longer-term ethical investment, charity, social capital, and neighborly 
warmth”.41 Indeed, Miller’s more substantial evolutionary informed critique of 
modern consumer behaviour – and most especially, his belief that if we wish to design 
a better alternative to the developed world’s mindless and endless consumption, we 
must first understand why it is so appealing to humans – neatly illustrates the sort of 
ideas that Singer believes the left should start to explore. For instance, if we more 
clearly understand the way in which the marketing industry plays upon our evolved 
psychology to influence our behaviour, we would be better armed to challenge it, or 
to direct it in ways likely to provide people with more worthwhile lives. 
Importantly, Miller also emphasises that, despite being based on evolved 
human psychology, present social arrangements and behaviours are not fixed – or 
rather, that it is possible to mould them in more desirable ways. Indeed, according to 
Miller, while current Western society is organised so that “individuals become 
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alienated workaholics competing to acquire consumerist indicators of their spending 
ability”, it is our responsibility to redesign our social institutions to reap more 
worthwhile social benefits from our evolved instincts: 
 
In another possible society, individuals could compete to display their 
effectiveness in saving poor villages from economic stagnation and saving 
endangered habitats from destruction. … [C]onspicuous charity is at least as 
natural as conspicuous consumption, and we are free to decide which should 
be more respected in our society.
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Miller ends both The Mating Mind and Spent by emphasizing the possibility of 
harnessing our evolved psychology to realize a far better future. Singer, too, ends A 
Darwinian Left with a tantalizing vision of how a clearer understanding of our past 
may perhaps provide a path to a better future. In particular, Singer emphasises the role 
of reason in directing our behaviour in desirable ways. To conclude this chapter, 
therefore, I will assess the ‘role of reason’ within our evolved nature. 
 
≈ 
 
In the conclusion to Chapter 7, I argued that, ‘deflated’ appearances to the contrary, 
Singer’s vision of a Darwinian left ultimately belongs in the utopian tradition of 
political thought. Briefly, Singer holds out the hope that, by acknowledging and 
understanding our evolved nature, we could potentially use our capacity to reason to 
(literally) reason our way beyond the constraints that this nature may impose on our 
behaviour. 
Of course, to those holding a ‘tragic’ vision of human nature, our limited 
capacity to reason is what dooms the utopianism of leftist social reform. For example, 
in decrying the left’s utopian assumption “that complex social orders can be rationally 
constructed from the top down to serve some deliberately designed end”, conservative 
political scientist Larry Arnhart argues that this “unwisely presumes that human 
beings have enough knowledge of all the numerous and ever-changing factors 
influencing a social order so that they can plan out its future to attain a goal without 
unintended consequences”.43 
Arnhart instead champions the notion of ‘spontaneous’ social order that arises 
as the unintended outcome of numerous individual actions to realise short-term goals, 
rather than the intended outcome of the rational design of human minds. According to 
Arnhart, spontaneous order is fundamental to the conservative view of liberty, in 
which the most desirable social arrangements are best achieved through individuals 
and groups acting in their own interests, free from the dictates of a central authority.
 44
  
Furthermore, Arnhart links the political notion of spontaneous order with 
evolutionary theory: “Darwin employed this idea of spontaneously evolving order to 
explain the evolution of complex structures and processes in living things through the 
random heritable variation with selective retention by natural selection”.45 Human 
society, according to Arnhart’s conservative interpretation of Darwinism, should 
therefore reflect the spontaneous order of nature. 
Nevertheless, the analogy with Darwinian ‘spontaneous order’ can also be 
drawn in a way that indicates the problems that can result from ‘unplanned’ design. 
For example, natural selection simply opts for that which works, given prevailing 
circumstances and resources, with no going back to start again. Natural selection, 
therefore, can come up vastly unwieldy and inefficient designs – such as the giraffe’s 
 175 
laryngeal nerve that, due to the gradual evolution of the giraffe’s neck, now makes a 
detour of nine metres to cover a distance that was originally only a few centimetres.
46
 
(Indeed, one of the key Darwinian arguments against the notion of an Intelligent 
Designer or Creator is how unintelligently designed many organisms actually are.) 
And as the varied history of human culture clearly demonstrates, spontaneous social 
order can also come up with numerous workable designs, however irrational or 
unpleasant these may seem to the modern liberal mind (e.g., cruel or intolerant social 
hierarchies or religious practices). 
Arnhart, therefore, may be justified in drawing parallels between the evolution 
of cultural practices and traditions, and the ‘spontaneously evolving order’ of the 
natural world. Yet while he is also perhaps correct to caution against sudden or ill-
considered disruption of these established traditions or practices (as happened during 
the French and Russian Revolutions), his implicit political conclusion – namely, that a 
spontaneous order is the best or the only possible option – is difficult to defend. The 
liberal democratic society in which Arnhart himself lives, the United States, for 
example, is a product not only of spontaneous order but also of the rational planning 
of the nation’s founders, those who drafted the American Constitution. Contra 
Arnhart, therefore, human society can, at least to some extent, ‘be rationally 
constructed from the top down to serve some deliberately designed end’. 
This marks a revealing contrast between Singer’s Darwinian left argument and 
Arnhart’s Darwinian conservative one. Both use the example of the failures of Soviet-
style communism to point to the constraints imposed by human nature on our political 
aspirations. Yet while Arnhart (following the ‘tragic’ tradition extending back to 
Edmund Burke’s conservative critique of the French Revolution) uses the failed 
communist experiment to reject the possibility of wide-ranging social reform, Singer 
simply argues that these constraints themselves be taken into account in future plans 
for social reform.  
Here, Richard Dawkins’ wonderful metaphor of natural selection as a ‘blind 
watchmaker’ provides a useful analogy.47 (The ‘blind watchmaker’ is synonymous 
with the idea of spontaneous order – that is, an explanation for how complex design 
has occurred in the absence of a designer.) But because we are, as Singer suggests, the 
first species to understand that we have evolved, and how this might influence our 
behaviour, we need not be so blind. We can take what we know about predictable 
human behaviour, and we can use this knowledge to change our behaviour, and hence 
ultimately to change society.  
This is a possibility first indicated by Dawkins himself nearly 40 years ago in 
The Selfish Gene. Here, he suggests that, while we human beings have indeed been 
built by natural selection as self-replicating ‘gene machines’, we now possess the 
ability to turn against our genetic creators: “We, alone on earth, can rebel against the 
tyranny of the selfish replicators”.48 Singer’s later suggestion about how we may 
reason our way free from our evolved constraints thus largely reinforces Dawkins’ 
original insight.  
 
≈ 
 
In the case of human beings, the stochastic process of Darwinian evolution has 
created a creature that is unique in both its use of culture and in its capacity to reason. 
We can construct and reconstruct our environments through cultural changes, but we 
are also capable of rationally reflecting on these changes. Harnessing this insight to 
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the egalitarian aspirations of the left might lead us further towards a society in which 
human beings can increasingly live harmoniously and cooperatively with each other.   
If nothing else, an evolutionary-informed account of why we behave as we do 
– why we are so easily swayed by the ‘keep up with the Jones’ imperative of modern 
consumerism, say – could provide further critical insights into the capitalist system. In 
providing for human needs, capitalism’s ‘invisible hand’ has been more successful on 
a bigger scale than anything that has come before. Yet, beyond a certain point, this 
has not provided us with increasingly flourishing and fulfilling lives. Rather, as 
pointed out by that great philosopher of the modern age, Homer Simpson, consumer 
capitalism appears to lead increasingly to “boredom, obesity and loss of purpose – 
you know, the American dream”. 
Surely, a better dream is not beyond the evolved but newly conscious capacity 
of the most intelligent animal the world has thus far seen. 
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False facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often endure long; but false views, if 
supported by some evidence, do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their 
falseness and when this is done, one path towards error is closed and the road to truth is often at the 
same time opened. 
Charles Darwin The Descent of Man 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our political behaviour cannot be truly understood if we overlook its origins in either 
evolved human nature or historically contingent culture. The left has traditionally 
emphasised the latter, while ignoring the former. In A Darwinian Left, Peter Singer 
argues that without a clear understanding of what human nature is, both culturally and 
biologically, the left’s aspirations for a more egalitarian society may continue to be 
dashed. 
This thesis has defended and developed Singer’s argument. I have shown that 
many of the standard leftist criticisms of Darwinian theory – say, that it is determinist 
or reductionist, or that it is politically pernicious – are based on misinterpretations of 
modern evolutionary ideas, or misunderstandings of the social implications of an 
evolved human nature. My conclusions match those of Singer: that our political ideals 
are not determined by the scientific facts of an evolved human psychology. 
Moreover, I have demonstrated that a Darwinian approach to politically 
troubling subjects such as the causes of sexual or racial inequality is not necessarily as 
socially egregious as many leftists fear. Indeed, by adopting a Darwinian perspective 
on these topics, the left would be in a much better position to effect beneficial social 
change. At the very least, an evolutionary-informed left could more readily counter 
pseudo-scientific beliefs about the ‘naturalness’ or the inevitability of sexual or racial 
disparities.  
I have also emphasised how the left’s rejection of evolutionary theory is 
politically counter-productive. By continuing to defend an implausible view of an 
infinitely malleable human nature, the left concedes the intellectual high ground to the 
right. Competitiveness and status-seeking do feature in human nature, and the left is 
wrong to deny this. An evolutionary-informed left, however, could show that a 
society designed solely to satisfy these aspects of our nature may negate other, more 
meaningful evolved characteristics, such as our deep desires for fulfilling social 
interaction and cooperation. 
In the decade of so since the publication of A Darwinian Left, very little 
appears to have change about leftist attitudes to Darwinism. Yet armed with an 
accurate view of human nature made possible by modern evolutionary theory, the left 
could find new ways to bring about radical emancipatory social transformation. 
While Singer’s Darwinian left has profound implications, his argument is 
simple. His originality lies in employing Darwinian reasoning for egalitarian political 
purposes. I hope that this thesis is of a similar nature, and that it extends this 
originality in further and deeper directions. 
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